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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal Indian law is often described as both conceptually incoherent and
largely irrelevant to the core concerns of American constitutional law.' Neither

1. See, e.g., RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES
AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 201 (1980) (noting that the modem United States Supreme Court has "abandoned
precedent and order" in its Indian law jurisprudence); DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 2 (3d ed. 1993) ("Federal Indian law has been described as 'complex' or 'anomalous'.");
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 4 (1987) ("Leading scholars have been

sharply critical of the Court's performance during the modem era. They have attacked both the lack of coherent
doctrine and the substance of the doctrine."); Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 1, 10-11 (1987); Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Omen: Three Affiliated Tribes v. Moe and the
Futureof Tribal Self-Government, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 1 (1977) ("The Court lacks direction. Opinions are

internally contradictory, inconsistent with one another, and often in conflict with political, historic, and economic
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charge is justified: the United States Supreme Court's Indian law jurisprudence-consisting of that body of esoteric cases mapping the relationships
between Indian tribes and their American governmental counterparts-should be
neither marginalized as a constitutional outcast nor ridiculed for its seeming
incongruities.2 Contemporary confusion in Indian law results from a failure to
recognize Indian law's close familial ties to constitutional doctrines that lie at the
core of the Supreme Court's concerns during the last century. This Article focuses
on the development of federal Indian law from approximately the latter quarter
of the nineteenth century through and beyond the New Deal transformation of the
late 1930s, and argues that this body of law closely tracks the doctrinal
developments of the Court's centrally located, and far better-known, substantive
due process jurisprudence of the same period.
The Supreme Court's Indian law cases in the era between the Reconstruction and the New Deal represent merely a different face of the same laissez-faire
monster seen in Lochner v. New York. 3 The Court's Indian law cases of the subsequent period, in turn, represent the darker-complexioned incarnation of the New
Deal social welfarist ideal seen in cases such as West Coast Hotel Co. v.
4 Beginning
Parrish.
with the earlier era, this Article attempts to show that
Lochner not only has a number of direct progeny-for instance Buchanan v.
Warley5 and Adkins v. Children's Hospital6-but also several not-so-distant
Indian cousins, chief among them Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.7 Lochner and Lone
Wolf both upheld the centrality of the private individual and her right to contract
and own property. The Lochner Court achieved this end by invalidating
legislation that abrogated individual economic rights, while the Lone Wolf Court
accomplished the same result by upholding legislation that created a private
property regime ex nihilo. At the pinnacle of this period, the Court practically

facts."); Phillip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation
in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 381-82 (1993) (quoting various Supreme Court Justices who
describe the Court's Indian law docket as consisting of "peewee" and "chickenshit" cases); Robert Laurence,
The Indian Commerce Clause, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 226 (1981) ("The recent Indian jurisdictional decisions
... do little to further the evolution of a unified analytic framework."); Robert S. Pelcyger, Justice and Indians:
Back to Basics, 62 OR. L. REV. 29, 30 (1983) ("In this vital area... the Court has been anything but consistent
and predictable .... "); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts,
56 U. CHi. L. REV. 671, 676 (1989) (noting the general "lack of integration" of Indian law with other areas of
law).
2. Some recent inroads have been made to integrate Indian law issues into more traditional areas of the
law. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 1 (constitutional law); Frickey, supra note I (statutory interpretation and use of
"clear statement rules"); Resnik, supra note I (federal jurisdiction); Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and
Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1991) (property).
3. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a maximum hours regulation as violative of the liberty of bakers and
their employers to contract); see infra Part II.B. 1.
4. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage regulation of hotel employees); see infra Part III.B.
5. 245 U.S. 60, 79 (1917) (upholding black purchaser's right to acquire property without discrimination
on basis of race or color); see infra Part II.B.1.
6. 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating minimum wage regulation for female hospital employees); see infra
Part II.B.1.
7. 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (affirming that Congress possesses unilateral power to abrogate treaties with Indian
tribes and upholding congressional allotment of tribal property to individual members); see infra Part II.B.3.
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withdrew all sovereign privileges from the tribal unit,8 yet extended full
solicitude toward the private-property owning individual Indian.
The connection between the Court's Indian law jurisprudence and its
contemporary substantive due process concerns is further evidenced in the New
Deal transformation of the late 1930s. Lochner's demise is embodied not only in
West Coast Hotel, but also in Shoshone Tribe of Indians of Wind River
Reservation in Wyoming v. United States9 (Shoshone 1) and United States v.
0
Shoshone Tribe of Indians of Wind River Reservation in Wyoming' (Shoshone
2
I1), United States v. Alcea Tribe of Tillamooks," and Williams v. Lee.1 Both
West Coast Hotel and Shoshone I heralded the death of the laissez-faire
Constitution. West Coast Hotel accomplished this by upholding labor regulations
that interfered with the "natural" workings of the marketplace, while Shoshone I
reached the same ultimate end by requiring the United States to compensate
Indians for its obliteration of tribal life-an existence formerly considered to be
repugnant to the American ideal. The re-recognition of the tribal unit as one of
legal and constitutional significance by the 1930s Court is, in short, one aspect
of the New Deal's repudiation of the old, laissez-faire constitutional universe.
Just as the arrival of a long-forgotten relative can aid in illuminating
familial traits previously unnoticed, so the "rediscovery" of federal Indian law as
a member of the American constitutional law family helps to clarify our
understanding of the Court's core concerns during the past century. Not only do
these decisions verify the thesis that the Lochner Era Court was captured by the
ideology of laissez-faire, but they also serve as good counter-evidence against the
often stated, but overly simplistic, characterization of this Court as an3 activist
body hell-bent on invalidating legislation incompatible with its whims.'
In a more reformist mode, this Article will argue that because the
contemporary Court has overlooked symmetries between its Indian law and its
substantive due process cases, it has failed to incorporate some crucial
implications of the late 1930s transformation into its present-day understanding
of Indian law issues. 4 Although the Court has generally attempted to reconcile

8. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1885) ("The soil and the people within [U.S.
geographical] limits are under the political control of the Government of the United States, or of the States of
the Union. There exists within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two." (emphasis added)).

9. 299 U.S. 476 (1937) (Shoshone 1).
10. 304 U.S. 111 (1938) (Shoshone if). Shoshone I and Shoshone II ruled that federal appropriation of
treaty-recognized tribal lands required payment of just compensation to the Indian tribes under the Fifth
Amendment. Moreover, the two cases together repudiated much of the Lochner Era Court's anti-tribal
jurisprudence. See infra Part III.C.1-2; see also United States v. Klamath and Moadoc Indians, 304 U.S. 119,
123 (1938) (noting that the power of the United States to control and manage Indian affairs "is subject to
constitutional limitations, and does not enable the United States[,] without paying just compensation therefore[,]
to appropriate lands of an Indian tribe to its own use or to hand them over to others").
11. 329 U.S. 40 (1946) (holding that just compensation must be paid to Indians whose unrecognized tribal
lands were appropriated by federal government); see infra Part III.C.3.
12. 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (denying state court jurisdiction over a contract dispute between an Indian
and a non-Indian on the ground that such jurisdiction "would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
themselves"), see infra Part W.A.

13. For, as we shall see, much of the activity of the Lochner Era Indian Law Court consisted of upholding
congressional action intruding upon tribal prerogatives. See infra Part I1.B.2-3 (discussing anti-tribalism cases).
14. For general views concerning the 1930s transformation in the Supreme Court, see generally BRUCE
ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 113-30 (1991); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME
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the meaning of the Constitution and the Due Process Clause in light of the
rejection of Lochner and its laissez-faire assumptions in the New Deal, 5 it has
yet to consciously conceptualize its Indian law jurisprudence within this modern
framework.' 6 In particular, the Court has yet to reconcile the contemporary
axiom of tribal sovereignty, and the plenary power doctrine, with its modern,
social-welfarist interpretation of the Constitution.
Part II of this Article consists of both a brief historical account of federal
Indian policy from the end of the Civil War to the early 1930s and an analysis
of the gradual transformation of the Court's view of the tribal entity's legal status
during this era. Part III describes the demise of the Lochner Era Indian policy and
law, and their subsequent transformation in the "Indian New Deal" and beyond.
The structure of Part III mirrors that of Part II. It first lays the historical
groundwork, and then describes the legal transformations that took place within
the contemporary Court. Part IV shows that the sovereign tribal entity reborn in
the New Deal has become entrenched as an axiom of Indian law during the sixty
or so years after that transformative period. This Article concludes by briefly
discussing several contemporary implications of the reconceptualization of Indian
law offered here.
II. INDIAN POLICY AND LAW, 1870-1933
This Part begins with a historical discussion concluding that the federal
administrators and private reformers of this period were motivated by an
essentially Lochnerian vision of the ideal America, composed of private property
owners, yeoman farmers, and freely contracting laborers working for economic
gain independent of state interference. These administrators and reformers sought
to impose this vision upon the incongruous, group-based existence of the Indians.
Contrary to common understanding, 1 7 federal policy during this era was driven
by the desire to treat Indians like everyone else. This ideal of a glorious future
in which Indian tribes no longer existed and Indian individuals flourished as fully
assimilated private property owners and American citizens was best symbolized
by the Dawes Act of 1887, which provided for both the allotment of tribally held
lands and the granting of citizenship to individual Indian allottees.'

COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 40-68 (1993) (Ch. 2: "The Revolution of 1937").

15. For a view that the modern Court has failed to fully incorporate the lessons of the New Deal's
repudiation of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), see SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 68-92.
16. There have been very few "consequences" of the demise of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553
(1903), because the modem Court does not yet recognize that Lone Wolf is dead. As far as the 1997 Court is
concerned, Lone Wolf s holding that Congress possesses plenary power over Indian tribes is still good law. See,
e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 405, 416 (1994); see also id. at 433, 436 (Blackmun, J., and Souter, J.,
dissenting).

17. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Davis, Ethnic Cleansing Didn't Start in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995, at
D16, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, NYT file (describing post-Civil War federal Indian policy as
based upon bloodthirsty conquest of Indian tribes).
18. See Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341,
342, 348, 349, 381 (1994)) (also known as the General Allotment Act of 1887).
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This Part then argues that the Court's decisions in Lochner and Lochner's
progeny have many equals in the Court's Indian law decisions of the same era.
These cases can be divided into two categories, both of which demonstrate that
the Court's treatment of Indians during this period mirrored its treatment of white
bakers, female hospital workers, and black home purchasers. These two categories
are the often-excoriated "anti-tribalism" cases and the little-known "proindividual-Indian" cases. Like Lochner, the anti-tribalism cases contain quite
reasonable and legitimate interpretations of the post-Civil War, pre-New Deal
Constitution, although the resemblance is not initially apparent. The proindividual-Indian cases are even closer relatives of Lochner than the anti-tribalism
cases, and the resemblance is likewise easier to discern.
Destruction of the "Citadel of Savagery": A Brief History of Federal
Indian Policy, 1870-1933
The movement in the aftermath of the Civil War toward an America
property
conceived on the model of a minimalist state populated by individual
9 What is not so
owners and contracting agents has been well documented.'
widely known is that federal Indian policy during the same period was governed
by an identical ideal. History shows that despite the apparently harsh means
employed to achieve this end (most notably the forced allotment program), Indian
policy during the post-Civil War Era was guided by a desire for the equal
treatment of Indians.2 ° In the minds of governmental and private reformers
alike, the time had arrived for the United States to treat Indians in the same
the America of this
manner as it treated its other denizens. 21 Everyone during 22
age was conceived of under the regnant "Spencerian" model, including Indians.

A.

19. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (rev. ed. Beacon Press

1955) (1944); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF

LEGAL ORTHODOXY 19 (1992); BENJAMIN R. TWiSS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ-FAIRE
CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942); see also William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor
and the Law in the Guilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 767 (1985); Lea S. Vandervelde, The Labor Vision of the

Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437 (1989).
Some commentators object to the characterization of Lochner Era America as largely driven by laissez-faire
principles. See, e.g., Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, "13 COLUM. L.
REV. 294 (1913). Regardless of the merits of this debate, and whatever the "actual" state of affairs in Lochner
Era America, it suffices for present purposes to point out that the federal government and the Supreme Court
of that era consistenty voiced their allegiance to laissez-faire ideals.
20. See generally HENRY E. FRITZ, THE MOVEMENT FOR INDIAN ASSIMILATION: 1860-1890 (1963);
ROBERT WINSTON MARDOCK, THE REFORMERS AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 30-84 (1971); LORING BENSON

PRIEST, UNCLE SAM'S STEPCHILDREN: THE REFORM OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, 1865-1887 (1942); 2

FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS

609-897 (1984).
21.

See MARDOCK, supra note 20, at 47, 52-53.

22. Justice Holmes negatively cited to the work of Herbert Spencer in his dissent in Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The [Fourteenth] Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's SOCIAL STATICS."). Spencer's theory is connected to social Darwinism, and his "first work, SOCIAL
STATICS (1850), was an attempt to strengthen laissez faire with the imperatives of biology .... " HOFSTADTER,
supra note 19, at 40. In the present context, the "Spencerian" model refers to a model that promotes the belief
that the atomistic private property owner striving for gain in a minimalist state is the ideal juridical subject and
the sole plausible conception of an ideal life.
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1. The Gradual Movement from Separation to Assimilation
During the Lincoln-Douglas debates of the late 1850s, Stephen Douglas
challenged Abraham Lincoln's professed desire to provide citizenship for
"negroes, Indians, and other inferior races"23 by pointing out that the signers
of
the Declaration of Independence surely did not mean to include "the savage
Indians, [nior the Fejee Islanders" when they "declared all men to be created
equal. 24 Although Lincoln at first dodged this charge, he eventually answered
Douglas's challenge: "I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to
include all men ....They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society...
[applicable] to all people, of all colors, every where. 25
Despite this noble acknowledgment, federal Indian policy during Lincoln's
presidency continued on much the same course taken by earlier administrations-the sequestering of Indians on isolated reservations far-removed from white
society. 26 William Dole, President Lincoln's Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
was mainly concerned with extending the then-regnant reservation policy, 27
which was justified by the truism that "[t]he white and the red man cannot occupy
territory in common. 28 The concentration of Indians on reservations was also
justified by reform-minded administrators as an expedient route for "civilizing"
the Indians. As Dole wrote in 1864: "[T]he object which all profess to seek, viz:
ultimate reclamation and civilization of the Indian, is best to be attained by
steadily persevering in our present policy... [of] concentrating the Indians upon
portions of the public domain ....,,29
The first clear signal of the federal government's desire to seek equal
treatment for Indians appeared in 1871 in the form of the United States'
repudiation of treaty-making with Indian tribes (the 1871 Act).30 Since the
beginning of the Republic, the United States had followed the treaty route
whenever it desired to reach agreement with an Indian tribe. This procedure, of
course, lent credence to the Marshallian view 31 that Indian tribes were somewhat

23.
24.
25.
26.

THE LiNcoLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 45 (Robert W. Johannsen ed., 1965).
Id. at 299.
lI at 304.
See I FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE
AMERICAN INDIANS 463 (1984); see also WILKINSON, supra note 1,at 14 ("A central thrust of the old laws...
was to create a measured separatism. That is, the reservation system was intended to establish homelands for
tribes, islands of tribalism largely free from interference by non-Indians or future state governments.").
27. See PRUCHA, supra note 26, at 463.
28. Id. at 464 (quoting William P. Dole in the 1864 COMM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 149).
29. I at 476 (quoting William P. Dole in the 1864 COMM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 573-75).
Indians were placed upon reservations because "[t]here they could be kept from contact with frontier settlements
and could be taught the arts of agriculture and other pursuits of civilization ....I"d. at 481 (discussing
Secretary of Interior Columbus Delano's description of the Ulysses S.Grant administration's Indian policy); see
also id. at 107-08 & n.l
1 (quoting 1869 COMM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 3, 9) ("The policy of collecting
the Indian tribes upon small reservations ... seems to be the best that can be devised .... When upon the
reservation they should be taught as soon as possible the advantage of individual ownership of property ...and
the tribal relation should be discouraged.").
30. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871 (1871 Act), ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566 (1871) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 71 (1994)).
31. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832) (Marshall, C.J.) (holding that state laws
have no effect in tribal territory and stating that tribes are "distinct political communities, having territorial
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akin to foreign sovereigns, entities with whom treaties were the normal medium
of interaction. After the Civil War, however, the notion that Indian tribes were to
32
be respected by the United States as sovereign nations was long dead. In what
seemed to many a long overdue measure, Congress attached to the end of a long
appropriations bill (which became the 1871 Act) the following provision: "[N]o
Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom
the United States may contract by treaty .... Although directly motivated by
the House's jealous concern that valuable Indian lands were passing to private
3
(mostly railroad company) hands without its consideration or input, 1 it is
undeniable that this enactment symbolized a giant leap toward achieving the goal
of equal treatment of Indians. 35 The federal government, by this provision,
pledged that it would govern its Indian charges in the same manner that it
governed all other Americans-through properly enacted legislation and not
through such exotica as treaties.
Despite the "integrationist" theme of the 1871 Act, federal policy continued
36
on the reservation course for several more years. Indeed, by the mid-1870s, the
segregationist, reservation-oriented approach reached its most extreme form-the
attempted consolidation of all American Indians into what was then considered
"Indian Territory." 37 This concentration policy was largely driven by the belief

boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive"); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17
(1831) (Marshall, C.J.) (describing tribes as "domestic dependent nations"). See generally infra Part II.B.2.
32. As Senator George Vest, referring to Marshall's Worcester opinion, said in 1882, "I do not understand
it. I have never understood it, and in the providence of God I never expect to understand it." 13 CONG. REC.
2570, 2576 (1882).
33. 1871 Act, ch. 120, 16 Stat. at 566.
34. Members of the House were concerned because tribal cessions of land were accomplished through the
treaty-making route of the Constitution, thereby circumventing consideration in the House and allowing the
2 (President
Senate to have exclusive Congressional authority over such matters. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
"shall have Power by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties ....
");see also CONG.
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3261-64 (1868). As Representative Sidney Clark of Kansas stated: "It seems to
me that the House ought not to sit idly by and see eight million acres of the public domain of the United States
transferred by treaty into the hands of a corporation or of an individual, this House, representing the people,
exercising no control or supervision over the matter whatsoever." Id. at 3263; see FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 106-07 (1982 ed.).

35. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (noting that the 1871 Act signified a
transformation in federal-Indian relations); In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 498 (1897) (same), overruled by United
States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1885) (same).
36. For instance, the peace treaties signed with various Plains tribes that had been hostile to the United
States in the post-Reconstruction Era all provided for the establishment of reservation land. See, e.g., Treaty
Between the United States and the Sioux Indians (Treaty of Fort Laramie), Apr. 29, 1868, U.S.-Sioux Nation,
art. 2, 15 Stat. 635 (1868).
37. PRUCHA, supra note 26, at 563-66. As Secretary of Interior Columbus Delano exclaimed: "Could the
entire Indian population of the country, excluding Alaska and those scattered among the States... be located
in the Indian Territory ....there would be 180 acres of land, per capita, for the entire number .. "Id. at 563
(quoting Columbus Delano) (first omission in PRUCHA).
The so-called "Indian Territory" consisted of more than 60,000 square miles designated for the perpetual and
exclusive use of several southeastern and eastern tribes. See JEFFREY BURTON, INDIAN TERRITORY AND THE UNITED

STATES, 1866-1906, at 3 (1995). The territory roughly comprised what is now the state of Oklahoma. See RoY
GrrrNGER, THE FORMATION OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 1803-1906, at 13-29 (1939); see also FRANCIS PAUL
PRUCHA, ATLAS OF AMERICAN INDIAN AFFAIRS 69-72 (1990) (providing maps of Indian Territory through various
periods). The original denizens of Indian Territory were the Five Civilized Tribes: the Cherokee, the Creek (or
Muskogee), the Choctaw, the Chickasaw, and the Seminole. See PRUCHA, supra note 26, at 69-70.
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that Indians who moved to this large reservation "would profit from the
encouragement of their more advanced brethren and would learn by daily
observation [of] . . . 'thrift, enterprise, and energy."' 38 Federal administrators
and Christian reformers alike initially praised the concentration policy as the
penultimate step toward the transformation of Indians from savages to citizens.39
The wisdom of the consolidation policy and the reservation scheme in
general, however, soon came under attack because its achievement necessarily
required the removal of many Indians from their ancestral homes to the distant
Indian Territory. Reformers quickly saw that the requisite journeys were often
"attended by great suffering and loss of life,"4" a fact that provoked
much
criticism in the late 1870s. Various horrific and poignant stories appeared in the
eastern press describing the terrible plight of removed Indian tribes.4 ' Largely
as a result of protests by the powerful Christian reformers of this period,42 the
policy of consolidation was temporarily abandoned by 1880."'
For a brief period, federal policy reverted to the earlier scheme of keeping
Indians on reservations situated near their aboriginal homes. 4 It was soon
realized, however, that this was no solution. If the ultimate purpose of keeping
Indians on reservations was to transform each individual Indian into an American
citizen indistinguishable from other American citizens, and if experience had
proven that the reservation system failed in this respect, then a new solution was
needed. The method eventually settled upon for civilizing the Indians was to grant
each Indian an individual-sized parcel of formerly communal land in fee simple
and simultaneously to provide each recipient of such parcel with United States
citizenship. 4 Given the goal of transforming the Indian into a private-property
owning, freely contracting individual able to compete with other such persons for
economic gain, the most effective policy would be one that directly molded the

38. PRUCHA, supra note 26, at 566 (quoting 1876 COMM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 4-6). It should not
be overlooked, of course, that white demand for tribal reservation lands outside of Indian Territory also played
a role in the shaping of the concentration policy. See id at 563-65.
39. For a summary of the various arguments advanced in favor of the consolidation policy, see Secretary
of Interior Zachariah Chandler's 1876 report discussed in PRUCHA, supra note 26, at 565. Secretary Chandler
believed that the following beneficial results would flow from consolidation: (1) "expensive agencies would
be abolished"; (2) Indians could "be more easily watched-over and controlled"; (3) Indians could be better
guarded from falling prey to "evil-designing" whites; (4) Indians could be better taught; and (5) most of the
presently occupied reservation land would become vacant and revert to the federal government's control, thereby
allowing the land to be opened for entry and settlement by white homesteaders. See id.
40. Id at 577 (quoting 1881 REP. SECRETARY INTERIOR v-vi).
41. See MARDOCK, supra note 20, at 168-91. For an account of Indian resistance to removal-for example,
the "Ponca Affair" and the journey of the Nez Perce Indians led by Chief Joseph that generated much news
coverage in the nation's press during this period-see id at 168-91. See also PRUCHA, supra note 26, at 566-76.
42. See infra note 55.
43. See MARDOCK, supra note 20, at 182-89; see also PRUCHA, supra note 26, at 497-501, 577; FRANCIS
PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRISIS 132-68 (1976).
44. See PRUCHA, supra note 26, at 577. By 1880, Secretary of Interior Carl Schurz had come to the
conclusion that the most effective policy was "to respect the home attachments of the Indians." Id.
45. See id. at 577, 580-81. Mardock notes that "[t]he idea of apportioning Indian lands to individual tribal
members was not a novel one ....
MARDOCK. supra note 20, at 211. As early as the first quarter of the
nineteenth century, Christian missionaries had promoted the virtues of private land ownership to the Indians. See
id In 1822, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun recommended an allotment scheme as a measure of defusing the
agonistic habits of some Indian tribes. See id
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Indian individual into such an agent." Most reformers, simply put, arrived at the
conviction that "civilization could not take place until that 'citadel of savagery,'
the [individual] Indian[-]tribal relationship in its social, political, and economic
aspects, [was] destroyed."4' 7
The centerpiece of the project of obliterating Indian tribes and assimilating
individual members into the American mainstream was the Dawes Act of 1887,
48
also known as the General Allotment Act. Introduced by Senator Henry L.
Dawes of Massachusetts, who was considered to be among the "most active
supporters of the [policy of] individualization of the Indian through private
property [ownership]," 49 the Dawes Act sought to create private property regimes
out of communal tribal societies. To replace the repugnant communal tribes, the
Dawes Act called for new Indian "societies" populated by mutually competing,
self-reliant economic agents-newborn citizens freed from the governance of the
oppressive tribal unit. As an official chronicler of the Department of Interior has
described, the Dawes Act represented the culmination of "a change in philosophy
toward Indian administration which tended to encourage government officials to
46. See PRUCHA, supra note 26, at 577, 580. The sentiment that individual ownership of property was a
prerequisite to the end of civilizing the Indians was widespread. As one federal administrator stated: "The
board was convinced that no people could reach a high state of civilization 'under the communistic system, and
without the incentive to labor and enterprise that the right to individual ownership of property inspires."'
PRUCHA, supra note 43, at 244 (quoting 1880 COMM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 34-35); see id. at 227-30.
47. MARDOCK, supra note 20, at 212.
48. See ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341-342, 348-349,
381 (1994)). The Dawes Act's official title is descriptive of its purpose: "An Act to Provide for the Allotment
of Lands in Severalty to Indians on the Various Reservations, and to Extend the Protection of the Laws of the
United States and the Other Territories Over the Indians, and for Other Purposes." Id
While the Dawes Act represented the final, full-scale realization of the allotment policy, many treaties made
with western tribes from 1865 to 1868 provided for allotment in severalty of tribal lands. See MARDOCK, supra
note 20, at 212.
49. PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 666-67. Dawes was a Republican Congressman representing western
Massachusetts from 1857 to 1875. See Biographical Directory of the American Congress 1774-1996, at 918
(1997). He was elected as the Massachusetts Senator in 1875, and served in the Senate until 1893. See id.
Dawes was "a great admirer and a close associate of Lincoln" during Lincoln's presidency. See Steven J.
Arcanti, To Secure the Party: Henry L Dawes and the Politicsof Reconstruction, 5 HIST. J. W. MASS. 33, 33
(1977). Although considered generally to be a moderate Republican during the Reconstruction period, Dawes
voted with the majority that overrode President Andrew Johnson's veto of the Freedman's Bureau Bill of 1866.
See id at 40; see also id at 42 (Dawes voted to override Johnson's veto of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.).
Generally, however, Dawes was firmly in the centrist camp during this tumultuous era of the House of
Representatives and of the nation as a whole. See, e.g., ERiC FONER, RECONSTRUCTnON 344 (1980) (citing
Dawes's replacement of Thaddeus Stevens as Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee as an example
of the passing of the "Radical Generation"); see also id. at 556 (derisively describing Dawes as a "nondescript
politico whose chief talent had been to maintain reasonably good relations with all factions while committing
himself to none").
Dawes's view of federal Indian policy in the post-Reconstruction period was not much different than his view
of Reconstruction-that although something had to be done to rectify past and present injustices, radicalism
ought to be avoided. Indeed, the act that eventually bore his name-appearing as revolutionary to observers in
the late twentieth century-was nothing more than a centrist, widely supported measure during the 1880s.
Indeed, Dawes's initial support for Indian causes likely resulted from his fear of negative repercussions at
the hands of the many pro-Indian Christian reformers who resided in his home state of Massachusetts. As a
result, although the monumental 1887 Act bears his name, Dawes was "relatively late in climbing on the
allotment bandwagon." PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 666 (noting that Dawes himself considered the 1887 Act to
be mostly the work of Senator Richard Coke of Texas). Nonetheless, after he became publicly identified with
the popular (at least in the Northeast) cause of Indian assimilation, Dawes became an extremely active supporter
of Indian individualization through the instrnment of allotment and the right of private property. See id. at 66667.
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deal with individual Indians and Indianfamilies, and to ... ignore the tribal
groupings. 5"
Although anti-Indian prejudices undoubtedly contributed to the passage of
the Dawes Act, historians agree that it was mostly "pushed through Congress, not
by western interests greedy for Indian lands, but by eastern humanitarians who
deeply believed that communal landholding was an obstacle to the civilization
they wanted the Indians to acquire .

. . ."

For instance, the powerful Indian

Rights Association praised the Dawes Act as "one of the greatest achievements
of the friends of Indian rights. 5 2 These reformers believed that "[piride of

ownership.

. .

would generate individual initiative... and bring both material

and cultural advancement" for the Indian savages."
of the Harvard Law School enthused, the Dawes Act
and beneficent" achievement.' The Board of Indian
so far as to proclaim that "the 8th of February, 1887
Dawes Act] .

.

As James Bradley Thayer
was a "great, far-reaching,
Commissioners even went
[the date of passage of the

. may be called the Indian emancipation day."55

50. S. LYMAN TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 95 (1974) (emphasis added).
51.

PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 669; see D.S. OTIs, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN

LANDS 56 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., Univ. of Okla. Press 1973) (1934). In 1884, Dawes praised the work of
private Indian reformers in a Senate speech, stating that they "have waked up the Nation; they have forced the
government into their work[,J ... to them the nation will yet acknowledge its debt of gratitude for having led
it to abandon the cruel and merciless and profitless processes by which they had undertaken hitherto to deal with
the Indian and to take him as they have the colored man and treat him as a man." MARDOCK, supra note 20,
at 228 (quoting 15 CONG. REC. 4071 (1884)) (omission in MARDOCK).
52. INDIAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION, FOURTH ANN. REP. 9-10 (1886), quoted in MARDOCK, supra note 20,
at 223.
53. MARDOCK, supra note 20, at 222.
54. James Bradley Thayer, The Dawes Bill and the Indians, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1888, at 315.
55. TYLER, supra note 50, at 95 (quoting BD. INDIAN COMM'RS ANN. REP. (1888)) (emphasis added). The
Board of Indian Commissioners, a quasi-governmental body comprised mainly of prominent humanitarians and
philanthropists, believed that the ultimate purpose of the Dawes Act was to "place the Indian on an equal footing
with other citizens." Id at 98. Although such beliefs may appear foolish to the modern observer, one must be
cautious in making such retrospective judgments. As Tyler put it: "It is easy for us to look back on the
Allotment Act of 1887 and call it a failure, but to friends of the Indian groups, almost unanimously, it had
seemed the solution to the Indian problem .... " Id.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, many former abolitionists turned their effort and attention to the
"liberation" of the American Indian. The movement from the cause of abolition to the cause of Indian policy
reform seemingly flowed as a matter of logic: "The influence of Lincoln's humanism, the strong impetus given
to the idea of equality by freeing the slaves ... provided the stimulus for postwar reform. The experience of
the war years inspired a vigorous movement for a humanitarian Indian policy." MAR.DOCK, supra note 20, at 14.
As THE NATIONAL ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, an abolitionist journal, noted in 1869, "the movement to improve
the condition of the Indians was one of the 'good results of the abolition of chattel slavery, and of the increasing
recognition of the equal rights of the victims of that iniquitous [sic] system .... "lI at 14-15 (quoting THE
NATIONAL ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, Apr. 10, 1869, at 2).
Because many Indian reformers were also antislavery humanists, e.g., Harriet Beecher Stowe, much of the
same rhetoric pervaded the abolitionist and Indian assimilation movements. See id. at 199. In both concerns,
the humanitarians-and, in their wake, the federal government-were guided by unyielding notions of human
freedom and equality. See id. at 198-99. Equality in treatment was necessary because of the fundamental,
universalist faith in the "unity of manldnd"--that all men are born equal and are merely conditioned differently.
Freedom for all races was also a bedrock mandate. Indeed, what else was the Civil War about, in the minds
of the reformers, but the struggle for Liberty?
By the 1880s, the reformers' fundamental demand in Indian policy had crystallized: the transformation of
individual Indians into private-property owning, god-fearing, English-speaking, American citizens. See id. at 198.
Propelled by a belief in the existence of "self-evident truths," the reformers embraced "the abolition of the
reservation system through the ownership of property" as the only possible route to Indian salvation. See id. The
similarity between the reformers' ideal vision and the contemporary era's infatuation with laissez-faire ideals
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The Dawes Act authorized the President to survey certain reservation lands
and to allot suitable tribal property to individual members.5 6 The amount
allotted "reflected the strong tradition of a quarter-section homestead for the
yeoman farmer." Specifically, the Dawes Act provided each head of an Indian
family with 160 acres of land, and each single person over eighteen years of age
with eighty acres.5 8 After the property was selected and allotted to individual
Indians, the Secretary of the Interior would issue a patent to each Indian allottee
declaring that the United States would hold the allotted lands in trust for twentyfive years, after which period the allottee would receive fee simple title to the
land.59 Of crucial importance was the provision regarding citizenship: upon
receipt of the original trust-laden patent, the Indian allottee would be "declared
to be a citizen of the United States, and [thus] entitled to all the rights, privileges,
and immunities of such citizens .... ."60 A clearer expression of the link between
the Lochner Era's Indian policy and its hegemonic weltanschauungcould hardly
be had-the ownership of private property was the sine qua non of American
citizenship.
Additionally, the Dawes Act provided that once portions of tribally held
lands had been allotted to all members, the Secretary of the Interior could
purchase the remaining "surplus" lands. These lands-amounting to enormous

was no mere coincidence. In the words of one prominent Indian rights advocate, Christian ideals were often
identical to those of laissez-faire: "[Tlhe railroad, with all its corruptions, is a Christianizing power ....
PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 625 (citing Conference Proceedings, Lake Mohonk Conference 51-52 (1885) (quoting
Lyman Abbott)). The rugged individualism of laissez-faire, in short, meshed nicely with the theology of salvation
through industrious individual effort.
Because "individual development and the stimulation of honest labor," PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 622, were
essential components of the evangelical Protestant worldview, the "citadel of savagery," MARDOCK, supra note
20, at 212, symbolized by the Indian tribe, had to be eradicated. At the 1889 Lake Mohonk Conference-annual
meetings of unparalleled influence attended by Senator Dawes and every other prominent Indian reformer and
policymaker of the day-a resolution calling for allotment as a necessary component of the eventual assimilation
of Indians into the American mainstream was adopted. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 658; see also id. at 61723, 665, 670, 753. The culmination in federal policy of this reformist program-the 1887 Dawes Actrepresented "a major triumph for the reformers." MARDOCK, supra note 20, at 227; see PRUCHA, supra note 20,
at 670. Its passage was widely hailed by Indian reformers as the "Indian emancipation" and the actualization
of Christian ideals. See TYLER, supra note 50, at 95.
With idealistic lenses framing their view of the world, reformers and policymakers of the period almost
uniformly overlooked the harsh realities visited upon Indians by their well-intentioned programs. See PRUCHA,
supra note 20, at 671. Confident that "true justice" could be achieved by means of federal legislation tempered
with Christian principles, the reformers clung tightly to their ideal of tribeless Indians and dismissed casually
the widespread protests of Indians who did not wish to have the laissez-faire world of post-Reconstruction
America imposed upon them. See generally id. at 677, 680, 686; cf. MARDocK, supra note 20, at 223. "The
overwhelming majority of Indians opposed the breakup of the tribal system, [yet] the Indian voice was either
not heard, not heeded, or falsely reported." WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE ASSAULT ON INDIAN TRIBALISM 8
(1975). The reformers suffered an affliction common to good-hearted advocates: "[They go] to work on a hard
and knotty moral log, with might and main, but [they are] prone to drive in the wedge butt end foremost."
MARDOCK, supra note 20, at 228 (quoting Lydia Marie Child).
56. See ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 342, 348,
349, 381 (1994)).
57. PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 667.
58. See 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1994). Additionally, Indians who did not live on reservations could select 160
acres of land in the public domain as their allotment. See id. § 334.
59. See id.§ 349.
60. Id
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tracts because tribal territories were sparsely inhabited-would then be opened up
for homesteading and eventually sold, in 160 acre lots, to white settlers.6
2. Beyond 1887: Pulverizing the Tribal Mass
From 1887 to the early 1930s, the allotment policy was pursued with
tremendous vigor by the federal government. During this period, federal policy
evolved toward an ever more pure conception of the independent and individual
Indian citizen as economic agent.6 2 In an address to Congress in 1901, for
instance, President Theodore Roosevelt expressed his sense of the increasing
speed of the assimilation policy:
[T]he time has arrived when we should definitely make up our minds to
recognize the Indian as an individual and not as a member of a tribe. The
General Allotment Act is a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal

mass. It acts directly upon the family and the individual .... We should now
break up the tribal funds, doing for them what allotment does for the tribal
lands; that is, they should be divided into individual holdings. 3
In 1906, Congress passed the Burke Act, which authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to issue fee simple patents to all Indians deemed "competent and capable
of managing his or her own affairs," even if this was prior to the expiration of the
original twenty-five year trust period. 64 The text of a "Declaration of Policy"
promulgated by the Indian Office in 1917 similarly highlights the urgency felt by
the federal government for the goal of "Americanizing" the Indians:
Broadly speaking, a policy of greater liberalism will henceforth prevail
in Indian administration to the end that every Indian, as soon as he has been
determined to be as competent to transact his own business as the average
white man, shall be given full control of his property and have all his lands
and moneys turned over to him, after which he will no longer be a ward of
the Government.'
The cardinal principle of this declaration can be neatly summarized: an Indian
who is as competent as an ordinary white man to transact the ordinary affairs of
life should be given the same amount of control over his property.

61. See id. § 348.
62. Most notably during this period, the twenty-five year inalienability requirement imposed by the original
Dawes Act was gradually whittled away to almost nothing-despite the fact that many unprepared Indians lost their
allotted lands as a result. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 882. Occasionally, however, Congress halted the movement
to full alienability by Indian allottees when it realized that unscrupulous white traders were the ultimate recipients
of much allotted property that quickly passed to them from unsophisticated Indians. See id. at 672.
63. 15 MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 6672 (1901) (emphasis added); see PRUCHA, supra note
20, at 669 & n.26 (noting that the "mighty pulverizing engine for breaking up the tribal mass" language was
originally used by Merrill E. Gates at the 1900 Lake Mohonk Conference).
64. See ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1994)).
65.

at 882.

1917 COMM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 3 (quoting Cato Sells), quoted in PRUCHA, supra note 20,
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Gradually but surely expanding its reach, the Dawes Act allotted or "surplused
away" the great majority of tribal lands by 1934.66 The goal of the Dawes Act
was to create new Spencerian agents-individual property owners, contract
67
laborers, and yeoman farmers-from the formerly communally bound Indians.
The reality? The answer will have to wait until Part III; for the next chapter of
the story will be a Court-centered one.
B.

The Indian Law Cases of the Middle Republic: Lochner Redux

1. Lochner
In the infamous case of Lochner v. New York," the United States Supreme
Court struck down a state criminal statute limiting the number of hours that
bakery employees could work as an illegitimate interference with the freedom of
contract guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 69 Assuming without question
that the "liberty to contract," like the right to own private property,70 was
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 the majority declared that laws such
as the one challenged would be upheld only if the state could proffer a
compelling interest advanced by the law. 72 Finding mere dissatisfaction with
market outcomes a wholly insufficient justification for promulgating marketintrusive measures (whether in the form of maximum-hour or
74 minimum-wage
regulations 73), the Court easily invalidated the New York law.
This story is well-known to us all. The Lochner majority began and ended
with the assumption that the mature form of the American constitutional polity
was one that, in Holmes's famous dissenting words, "enact[ed] Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics."75 Justice Peckham and the majority placed their legal
analysis within a legal-philosophical framework grounded upon the fundamental
66. See WILLIAM CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 21 (2d ed. 1988) ("The primary effect of the [Dawes]
Act was a precipitous decline in the total amount of Indian-held land, from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48
million in 1934.").
The Dawes Act was not applied to many tribes of Indian Territory. In particular, the Osages, Peoria, Miami,
Sac and Fox, and the Five Civilized Tribes were initially exempted from its application. See GITINGER, supro
note 37, at 169. Note, however, that many other tribes were located in Indian Territory. These included the
Cheyenne, Arapahoe, Apache, Comanche, Kiowa, Caddo, Delaware, Wichita, Kaw, Otoe, Tonkawa, Pawnee,
Ponca, Shawnee, Ottawa, Quapaw, Seneca, Wyandotte, Iowa, Kickapoo, and Pottawatomi. See COHEN, supra
note 34, at 770 n.1. Not until the passage of the Curtis Act in 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495-519 (1898), did
forced allotment come to Indian Territory. Within eight years of the passage of the Curtis Act, Indian Territory
was transformed into the state of Oklahoma. See GITTINGER, supra note 37, at 257-58. For an account of this
transition that focuses on the role played by federal court reforms during this period, see generally BURTON,
supra note 37.
67. The ideal of Indian individuals as economic agents was further fostered by the federal Indian citizenship
policy. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 681-86.
68. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
69. See i at 64.
70. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1877) (recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment
constitutionalizes common-law protection of property rights).
71. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects liberty to contract).
72. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53-54.
73. See PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY 111 (1992).
74. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61, 64-65.
75. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see supra note 22.
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proposition that the proper role of the state is solely to secure the private
individual from interference by others-including by the state itself.76 Looking
at the New York labor regulation through such lenses, the Court could hardly
have come to a different conclusion.
Justice Peckham's majority opinion lived a robust life for more than thirty
years." During this period, the Court continued down the path forged by
Lochner and gradually extended the coverage of the laissez-faire Constitution.
Not only were white bakers embraced by the Constitution's free-market arms, but
also black property purchasers"8 and female hospital workers.79 Slowly
realizing that "the Reconstruction amendments [should] be interpreted to require
equal protection of the fundamental rights of all Americans to exercise their
freedom [through] property and contract,"° the so-called "Lochner Era" Court
eventually expanded the legal reach of the laissez-faire Constitution to cover
almost every American. Only "wards of the state" incapable of participating in the
unfettered market were excluded.8 '
Bruce Ackerman, among others, has argued that the Lochner decision
represents a justifiable and reasonable interpretation of the post-Civil War, but
pre-New Deal, Constitution. 2 His argument will not be reiterated here in detail.
Briefly, Ackerman observed that the pre-Civil War American Republic already
emphasized the importance of individual economic liberties by, for example,
according constitutional protection to the liberty of contract. 3 He then argued
that "[tihis constitutional understanding was reinforced by the Reconstruction
[A]mendments. The Emancipation Amendment[, for instance,] . . . was
understood, first and foremost, in legal terms that relied on the language of
property and contract. ' ' 4 Coupling this additional emphasis on economic liberties
with the nationalist and "egalitarian" prescriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, Ackerman concluded that the postCivil War Constitution could reasonably be construed to accord heightened
protection for the economic rights of all Americans.8 5 Under Ackerman's view,
therefore, Lochner's protection of the liberty to contract of white bakers and their
employers was justifiable. 6
Lochner itself represents but the tip of the laissez-faire iceberg, for cases such
8 continued
as Buchanan v. Warley8 7 and Adkins v. Children's Hospital"
to

76. See id at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also KAHN, supra note 73, at 113-14.
77. See KAHN, supra note 73. at 125.

78. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 79 (1917).
79. See Adldns v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
80. ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 101.

81. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56-57 (implying that wards of the state are a class of persons for whom
protective legislation is reasonable); see KAHN, supra note 73, at 112 (wards of state included "women, children,
mentally retarded people, and... those who work underground").
82. See ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 100-02.

83. See id at 100; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §. 10, cl. I ("No state shall.., pass any... Law impairing
the obligation of Contracts .... "); U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3 ("[Njor shall ... property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.").
84. ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 100.

85. See id at 101.
86. See id at 99-103.
87. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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deliver the constitutional promise of an all-inclusive minimalist state. In
Buchanan, the Court found that blacks, no less than whites, possessed the
constitutionally protected right to purchase, use, and sell property-a right that
could not be deprived solely on the basis of color.89 As the Court stated in
strong language: "The Fourteenth Amendment and these statutes enacted in
furtherance of its purpose operate to... entitle a colored man to acquire property
without state legislation discriminating against him solely because of color.' '9°
In Adkins, the Court ruled that female hospital workers possessed the same
freedom to contract that the Court provided for Lochner's male bakers. 9' Finding
that women of mature age are sui juris and thus could not be subjected to
restrictions on their liberty to contract that could not also be imposed on similarly
situated men, the Court concluded that there was no good ground "for distinction
between women and men, for certainly, if women require a minimum wage to
preserve their morals[,] men require it to preserve their honesty. ' '92 At the height
of the Lochner Era, Ackerman concludes, "blacks no less than whites, women no
less than men, had been granted equal rights of property and contract" by the
Court. 93

The remainder of this Part argues that the Court's Indian cases during this
period likewise evidence the ubiquitous reach of the laissez-faire Constitution. Not
only were whites and blacks, males and females, given the constitutional right to
contract and own private property without interference from the state, individual
Indians were also accorded this protection by the Lochner Era Court. The exalting
of the individual Indian, however, had as its consequence an obvious casualty not
found in the other contexts-the Indian tribe. As the Court heightened its
solicitude for the rights of the individual Indian property owner, it concomitantly
lowered its solicitude for the rights of the tribal unit to the point of complete
abandonment by the turn of the century.
2.

Movement from Non-Recognition of Tribes to Anti-Tribalism: The
"Second Generation" Cherokee Nation Cases of the Lochner Era94

88. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
89. See Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 81-82.
90. ld at 79. The statutes referred to in the quoted passage are the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat.
27 (1866), and the Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
91. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 553.
92. Id. at 556.
93. ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 101.
94. The discussion begins with this category of cases for the simple reason that they are considered to be
among the most important Indian law decisions in the Court's history. They are discussed first not because they
represent closer analogues to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), than the pro-individual-Indian cases of
Part ll.B.4, for they do not. Indeed, these decisions, which uphold the power of Congress to run roughshod over
Indian tribes in Congress's pursuit of its assimilationist goals, are a step removed from Lochner. While Lochner
(and the cases in the subsequent section) directly exalts the rights of individual economic actors by invalidating
intrusive governmental action, these anti-tribal cases advanced the cause of the laissez-faire Constitution by
upholding governmental action creating or helping to implement a private property regime for Indians.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), and Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902),
perhaps the most vilified among all the Court's Indian decisions, are generally cited for the proposition that the
congressional guardian possesses plenary power over the lives of its Indian wards. The decisions upheld, for
instance, congressional power to unilaterally abrogate treaties with Indian tribes; congressional power to
prosecute offenders for crimes committed in Indian Territory even when both the offender and the victim were

Spring 1997]

REDISCOVERING CONSTITUTIONAL LINEAGE

In his famous Cherokee Nation v. Georgia9" and Worcester v. Georgia9"
opinions, Chief Justice Marshall single-handedly established the contours of the
pre-Civil War relationship between the federal, state, and Indian sovereigns. 97
In Cherokee Nation, Marshall recognized that although Indian tribes were not
"foreign nations" in the context of determining whether Article III of the
Constitution permitted original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court for suits brought
by Indian tribes against states, 98 tribes were nonetheless sovereigns of a sort.99
As the Chief Justice stated in an often quoted phrase, "[Indian tribes] may, more
correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations."" Marshall
further elaborated that the relation of Indians to the federal government
"resembles that of a ward to his guardian,"'' ° thereby setting the stage for the
development of the plenary power doctrine in the Lochner Era. Nonetheless, it
must not be forgotten that Marshall did explicitly deem the Cherokee tribe to be
a "nation" of at least a limited variety. Indian tribal communities, though not fully
independent nations, were more than mere assemblages of private individuals."
In the second of the 1830s cases involving the Cherokee Nation, Worcester v.
Georgia, Marshall further expanded the legal distinctiveness and power of the
tribal unit. 0 3 After a broad survey of legal and historical materials, he
concluded that "[t]he Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent political communities.'' t°4 Based upon this characterization of tribal
sovereignty, Marshall famously ruled that "the Cherokee [N]ation ... is a distinct
community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in

Indians; and congressional power to lease tribally owned lands to non-Indians for mining purposes without tribal
consent. The Court employed the following justification for upholding congressional action in all of these cases:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the
United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights....
From their very weakness and helplessness.... there arises the duty of protection, and with
it the power.
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now
weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection .... It must exist in that
government, because it never has existed anywhere else .
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84.
While several relevant cases are discussed below, this section does not directly question the validity of the
plenary power doctrine because others have already written extensively about the unjustifiability of this largely
atextual doctrine. See, e.g., Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984). The present section tries instead to find a plausible justification for
these decisions. Although they appear to be products of a morally and legally bankrupt Court from the
"enlightened" perspective of 1997, this section argues that they represent doctrinally reasonable readings of the
Lochner Era Constitution. Given the Reconstruction Amendments and the radical assimilationist policy of the
Lochner Era, the Court was justified in turning a blind-eye toward claims of sovereign status advanced by tribal
organizations.
95. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
96. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
97. See generally Frickey, supra note 1.
98. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
99. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17, 19.
100. Id. at 17.
101. Id
102. See id
103. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
104. Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
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which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia
have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves ....
Political realities aside,' °6 the legal doctrine of the pre-Civil War period held
that the Indian tribe was a recognized form of political community that, although
not equivalent in sovereign power to a foreign state, was nonetheless far more
"sovereign" than a private association of individual citizens. 7
With the passing of the Civil War-the most profound clash over the meaning
of American citizenship in the Nation's history-and the gradual acceptance of
the laissez-faire version of the American Republic, both federal policy and legal
doctrine concerning Indian tribes were dramatically transformed. The destruction
of the tribes and the rejection of the early Republic's pro-tribal-sovereignty
jurisprudence was inevitable in the aftermath of a long war fought to free
individual human beings from the oppressive grip of archaic, communal societies
in which individual actors were not free to contract as they wished or to own
private property. The post-war social and political milieu, dominated by an ideal
of evolutionary progress through unfettered competition by private individuals for
economic gain, could not tolerate the existence of strong, sovereign tribes on the
American landscape.
The sections that follow track the progressive transformation of the Court's
view of the juridical status of the Indian tribe during the Lochner Era. In order
to demonstrate that the Court went quickly from its original pro-sovereignty
Worcester posture, to an intermediate position of mere non-recognition of tribes,
and, ultimately, to a position of blatant anti-tribalism during the Lochner period,
the following sections focus on three cases again involving the Cherokee Nation,
which was by this time located in Indian Territory after the its forced removal
from Georgia and the southeast in the 1830s.' 0 8 Although the Worcester
doctrine, holding that tribes were more than private organizations and were
"limited sovereigns," could no longer be maintained in the post-Reconstruction
world, the Court initially reconciled Indian tribal existence with the laissez-faire
axiom by granting tribes equivalent legal status as that possessed by any other
private association of individuals. However, by the beginning of the twentieth
century, the Court moved even further away from the Marshall Court's pro-tribal
stance, and ended securely at a position that provided Indian tribes even less
protection and legal recognition than that afforded associations of private
citizens."°9

105. Id.at 561.
106. In response to Chief Justice Marshall's Worcester opinion, President Andrew Jackson was purported
to have said: "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it." GETCHES, supra note 1, at 149
(quoting Andrew Jackson).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) ("Cases such as Worcester... surely
establish the proposition that Indian tribes within 'Indian country' are a good deal more than 'private, voluntary
organizations'...." (citations omitted)).
108. A good chronicle of this tragic episode is CHEROKEE REMOVAL: BEFORE AND AFTER (William L.
Anderson ed., 1991). See generally WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, AFTER THE TRAIL OF TEARS: THE CHEROKEES'

STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY, 1839-1880 (1993).
109. The fascinating question of why the Lochner Era Court recognized the juridical status of corporations,
but not that of labor unions or tribes, is beyond the reach of this Article. For an interesting treatment, see
WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991).
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a. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Company: The Intermediate
Position of Indian Tribes as Private Associations
In 1884, Congress passed a law (the 1884 Act) granting the Southern Kansas
Railway Company a right of way for railroad and cable lines through the territory
of the Cherokee Nation."' The 1884 Act required Southern Kansas to pay the
Cherokees "full compensation... for all property to be taken or damage done"
by its appropriation of the rights of way."' It further provided an elaborate
procedure to ensure that the railroad paid fair and just compensation." 2
In 1885, Southern Kansas, ready to enter Indian Territory, began negotiations
with the Cherokee Nation concerning the amount of compensation for the
Cherokee land to be taken by the railroad." 3 The talks soon broke down,
however, and a federal referee-as required by the 1884 Act-eventually
determined the proper amount of compensation.' 14 Dissatisfied with the referee's
finding, the Cherokee Nation filed suit in federal court seeking an injunction to
prevent Southern Kansas's entry onto its land." 5 Although the tribe alternatively
pled that, if its request for an injunction were denied, the court should award full
and just compensation in accordance with the 1884 Act, it was clear that the
Cherokees' main bone of contention was not the amount of compensation, but the
intrusion upon its sovereignty represented by the 1884 Act itself." 6 The federal
circuit court refused to invalidate Congress's delegation of its power of eminent
domain to Southern Kansas and denied the tribe's request for an injunction.' 7
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the tribe argued that because it was a
sovereign nation-as recognized by the early Marshall Court opinions and by
various treaties beginning with the Treaty of Hopewell of 1785a"-"the right
of eminent domain ... remainfed] exclusively vested in it[, and not in the United
States Congress]."" 9 Because the federal government itself possessed no right
of eminent domain over Cherokee lands, a fortiori it had no authority to grant a
right of way to another party. 120 Alternatively, the Cherokee Nation requested
the Court to declare both that full compensation be paid by Southern Kansas, and
that, "even on payment of the compensation so awarded[,] the corporation could
acquire no right to build its road through the [Cherokee] territory ... without [the
Cherokee Nation's] consent ....

110. See Act of July 4, 1884 (1884 Act), ch. 179, 23 Stat. 73 (1884).
111.

ld. § 3.

112. See id §§ 3. 5, 6.
113. See Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry. Co., 33 F. 900, 901-02 (W.D. Ark. 1888).
114. See id at 903.

115. See id
116. See id. The right of the Five Civilized Tribes to self-government and the perpetual and exclusive
occupation of Indian Territory had been preserved in the agreements governing their removal from the southeast.
See, e.g., ANGE DEBO, AND STL THE WATERS RUN 5 (1940).
117. See Southern Kan. Ry., 33 F. at 914, 915.
118. Treaty of Hopewell, Nov. 28, 1785, U.S.-Cherokee, 7 Stat. 18 (1785).
119. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1890).
120. See id at 649.
121. 1d at 650.
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Justice Harlan, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected the tribe's request for
an injunction. 22 Finding "[t]he proposition that the Cherokee Nation is
sovereign in the sense that the United States is sovereign, or in the sense that the
23
several States are sovereign" to be without support,' Harlan justified his
decision by reciting the familiar litany from United States v. Kagama that tribes
are dependent wards of the federal guardian subject to the absolute control of
Congress.2 4 Because the Cherokee Nation was not "a separate, independent,
sovereign people with no superior within its limits," Justice Harlan concluded that
the United States possessed the power of eminent domain over tribally owned
lands, just as it possessed such power over property owned by any other
American or group of Americans, '2 and had the right to delegate this power to
a third party.2
Unlike the Worcester v. Georgia'27 Court, the Southern Kansas Railway
28
Seeing
Court refused to recognize the tribe even as a "limited sovereign.'
Cherokee
the
of
status
juridical
the
regarding
only an all-or-nothing question
Nation, Harlan crucially ruled that "[t]he lands in the Cherokee territory, like the
lands held by private owners everywhere within the geographical limits of the
United States, are held subject to the authority of the general government to take
them ....,,t29 With this simple pronouncement, the substance of Marshall's
Worcester decision was largely laid to rest. Tribes were no longer "distinct
political communities""' with unique sovereign attributes; they had become, in
less than sixty years, no more than mere private, voluntary associations.
There was, however, a silver lining in the Southern Kansas Railway opinion.
Justice Harlan found that the railroad company had a constitutionalobligation to
pay full and just compensation to the tribe before it could appropriate the tribe's
lands.1 3' Barely mentioning the explicit statutory provision in the 1884 Act
requiring that tribes be fully remedied for their lOSS, 132 Harlan concluded that
the Cherokee lands could be taken by the United States, or by Southern Kansas,
"provided only, that they are not taken without just compensation being made to
the owner.' 33 Because "the [C]onstitution declares that private property shall
not be taken 'for public use without just compensation,""4 the 1884 Act must
in its granting of the eminent domain power to the
conform to this mandate
35
railway company.1

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See i& at 653.
Id
See id. at 655 (citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886)).
See id. at 654-56.
See generally Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 641.
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. at 655.
Id. at 657 (emphasis added).
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557, 561.
See Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. at 657.
See Act of July 4. 1884 (1884 Act), ch. 179, §§ 3, 5, 23 Stat. 73 (1884).
Southern Kat. Ry., 135 U.S. at 657.
Id. at 659 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
See id
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Harlan's rejection of the notion-soon to become realityI 3 -- that tribes need
to be compensated for their loss only when Congress gratuitously and expressly
grants such a privilege, 37 effectively equated the Indian tribe, in terms of its
juridical significance, with any other nongovernmental organization. Although a
step back from the pro-tribal stance of Worcester, such a conception was probably
the best that tribes could hope for in the Lochner Era. Within a legal, cultural,
and political milieu that worshipped the primacy of the individual economic
agent, the tribal organization could not help but appear as a blight upon an
otherwise pristinely libertarian landscape. As we will see next, the building
momentum toward a laissez-faire America composed solely of individual property
owners soon pushed the tribal community into legal oblivion.
b. Stephens v. Cherokee Nation and Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock:
Obliteration of the Tribe as a Recognized Juridical Subject
In 1896, Congress authorized an independent panel, the Dawes Commission, to
draw up the citizenship rolls of the Five Civilized Tribes in Indian Territory. 3 '
The determination of tribal citizenship was crucial because only tribal members
would be awarded an allotment of tribally owned territories. 13 9Congress delegated
this power to the Dawes Commission because it could no longer tolerate the existence of these archaic, communistic' 40 societies within the borders of the United
States. 41 Although an allotment act for the tribes of Indian Territory had not yet
been drafted, most observers recognized that such action was imminent.' 42
Although the Five Civilized Tribes were initially exempted from the provisions
of the 1887 Dawes Act on account of their unique relationship to the federal
government, their strong opposition to the allotment policy, and their relatively
advanced and civilized state, 43 once congressional investigations revealed the
"true" state of affairs in Indian Territory, public sentiment soon urged the
application of the same allotment principles used on other tribes to those within
Indian Territory.'" Congressional investigations uniformly described the "general
prevalence of misrule" and universally concluded that "a deplorable state of affairs"
136. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
137. See generally Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. at 657.
138. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 751; see also Act of June 10, 1896 (1896 Act), ch. 398, 29 Stat. 321,

339-40 (1896).

139. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 753-54 & n.36, 748, 902-03, 907; see also DEBO, supra note 116, 33-54.
140. See PRUCHA, supra note 43, at 244.
141. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 748, 753.
142. See id. at 751. The mandated allotment of lands within Indian Territory eventually came in the form
of the Curtis Act, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495-519 (1898), which was challenged and upheld in Cherokee Nation v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902). "[Tlhe Curtis Act authorized the Dawes Commission to proceed with allotment
of lands as soon as the tribal rolls were completed." PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 753-54.
143. See GrrrINGER, supra note 37, at 58, 169, 223, 229; see also PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 897; OTIS,
supra note 50, at 94. "[The Dawes] Act was drawn so that it did not apply to ... the Indians of the Five
Civilized Tribes. These latter were the most advanced and most nearly ready of all for such a policy but they
were known to be bitterly opposed to any change in their organization." GITINGER, supra note 37, at 169.
144. It cannot be denied that white desires for the vast lands of Indian Territory also played a major role in this
movement. See, e.g., GITTINGER, supra note 37, at vii-viii (describing the "desires of land-hungry white settlers"
and the eagerness of railroad officials to a secure share of Indian Territory lands); EDWIN C. MCREYNOLDS,
OKLAHOMA: A HISTORY OF THE SOONER STATE 278-81 (1954) (citing grazing contracts, discovery of coal, and
admission of railroads as increasing pressure for opening Indian Territory to settlement by non-Indians).
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existed in the Indian-controlled lands.145 A particularly damning report was filed
by the Dawes Commission in 1894.146 After generally noting that the tribal
governments of Indian Territory had failed to protect and provide for "the life,
liberty, and property of individual Indians," the Commission concluded:
It was apparent to [the Senate Committee] that the existing [Indian
governmental] system could not continue. "It is not only non-American,.... but
it is radically wrong, and a change is imperatively demanded in the interest of
the Indian and whites alike .... There can be no modification of the system.
47 It
cannot be reformed. It must be abandoned and a better one substituted."'1
The "better" solution, of course, was assimilation through allotment. Stephens v.
Cherokee Nation14 8 arose in this context. In Stephens, several individuals of
mixed blood who were not placed on the citizenship rolls prepared by the Dawes
Commission for the Cherokee Nation challenged the authority49of the Commission
to determine the citizenship status of individual Cherokees.1 They claimed that
only the Cherokee Nation itself-not the United States or its surrogate
Commission-possessed the power of determining who was or was not a citizen of
the Cherokee Nation.' 50 Alternatively, they argued that the 1896 Act that
empowered the Dawes Commission was unconstitutional because it had the effect
of allowing the Commission, upon finding that plaintiffs were not Cherokee citizens,
to destroy their "vested rights" in the tribal property that would eventually be
allotted.' 5'
52
Chief Justice Fuller upheld the 1896 Act against both challenges.' To the first
challenge, Fuller's opinion merely quoted the Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas
Railway Co. opinion at great length as standing dispositively, somehow, for the
proposition that the Cherokee Nation possessed no exclusive right to determine its
own membership. 53 This conclusion, however, diverged from the Southern
KansasRailway ruling by placing the Indian tribe at ajuridical position even lower,
for instance, than that held by the Royal Order of the Elks or a college
fraternity-for at least each of the latter possesses the exclusive power to determine
its own membership.
The Stephens Court further expanded the anti-tribal thrust of the contemporary
period by rejecting the plaintiffs' second claim.'54 Recall that the right of the
Dawes Commission to determine that the plaintiffs were not Cherokees contained
within it the power to deprive them of both their right to enjoy tribal property prior
to allotment, and their right to an allotted parcel once Congress mandated allotment

145.

See PRUCHA, supra note 20, 748-49, 750, 755.

146. See S. REP.No. 53-377 (1894), discussed in PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 750.
147. PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 750 (quoting Senator Henry M. Teller in S. REP. No. 53-377, at 12 (1894);
1894 COMM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 20); see also BURTON, supra note 37, at 202.
148. 174 U.S. 445 (1899).
149. See id.

150. See id at 483.
151. See id at 488.

152. See id at 492.
153. See id. at 484 (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 653 (1890)).
154. See id. at 488.
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for the Cherokee Nation.15 5 In finding that the Commission's decision to exclude
the plaintiffs from the Cherokee Nation citizenship roll did not constitute a
deprivation of property in violation of the Due Process Clause, the Stephens Court
reasoned that because "[tihe lands and moneys of [this] tribe[] are public lands and
public moneys, and are not held in individual ownership," the individual plaintiffs
had no vested right to tribal property even if they were members of the Cherokee
Nation and were erroneously kept off the tribe's membership rolls. 56 This last
claim was made in the face of an explicit acknowledgment that an earlier treaty
between the United States and the tribe had given fee simple title to the land in
question to the Cherokee Nation.' 57
The importance of this holding cannot be overemphasized. Moving from Justice
Harlan's conception, in Southern Kansas Railway, of tribes as having equivalent
legal status as any other non-governmental association of private individuals, the
Stephens Court now considered the tribe to be less worthy of judicial recognition
than private organizations. After Stephens, all tribal property was, in reality, "public
property."'5 8 Moreover, while individual members of the Elks at least have vested
property rights in jointly held property, such as the group's lodge-house, this was
no longer true for members of organizations called "Indian tribes." Under the
Stephens view, prior to allotment, i.e., before the federal government imposed a
system of individualized ownership of property, individual Indians had no
cognizable rights whatsoever in tribal property.
By the time of the 1902 decision in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock,' 59 the
Court's non-recognition of tribal sovereignty rights was well-entrenched. Hitchcock
arose when the Cherokee Nation challenged the validity of an 1898 congressional
act forcing United States citizenship upon tribal members, allotting tribally owned
lands, and leasing tribally owned lands for mineral exploration. 160 Unlike the
plaintiffs in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 16' the Cherokees did not challenge the
allotment provision of the Act of June 28, 1898,162 (the Curtis Act), which
extended the reach of the Dawes Act to the Five Civilized Tribes of Indian
Territory. 63 Instead, the tribe assailed the authority of the Secretary of State (as
empowered under the Curtis Act) to make leases with non-Indian companies to mine
for oil, gas, and coal in Cherokee territory, with royalties going into the United
States Treasury but set aside for credit to the tribe.'64 The Cherokee Nation's
claim was that the United States, by the 1846 Treaty, had vested "the Cherokee
Nation... with a fee-simple title to its tribal lands in... Indian Territory ... ."'65

155. See, e.g., id. at 486-87.
156. I at 488 (emphasis added).
157. See Treaty with the Cherokee (1846 Treaty), Aug. 6, 1846, U.S.-Cherokee, 9 Stat. 871 (1846), discussed
in Stephens, 174 U.S. at 485.
158. See Stephens, 174 U.S. at 488.
159. 187 U.S. 294 (1902).
160. See id at 295-99.
161. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
162. Curtis Act, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495-515 (1898).
163. See Hitchcock, 187 U.S. at 298.
164. See id at 298.
165. 1d at 295; see supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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The United States did not deny this fact." Because a fee interest in land included
the right to control its disposition, the tribe argued that the Secretary's leasing of
Cherokee lands over the objections of the tribe amounted to "a deprivation of [the]
,,167
property rights of... [the] citizens of the Cherokee Nation ....
The Court, unsurprisingly, upheld the Curtis Act.'" In its analysis, the Court
crucially noted that although the United States had previously recognized "the
Indians as a separate and distinct people, and as being invested with rights which
69
constitute them a state, or separate community,"' the 1871 Act, stipulating that
the United States would no longer make treaties with Indian tribes, signified an
71
abandonment of this approach.7 0 Reaffirming Stephens v. Cherokee Nation,'
the Hitchcock Court found that the Curtis Act could not be assailed as an
"impairment or destruction of vested rights"'2 because "[tihe lands and moneys
of these tribes are public lands and public moneys, and are not held in individual
Moreover the Court held that "[t here is no question
ownership . . . ,,."
Congress has merely
involved in this case as to the taking of property'"because
74 Such a claim, implying
property.
tribal
of
development
the
taken "control" of
that a deprivation of property rights occurs only when government takes
possession of nongovernmental property, is absurd-the Court had elsewhere
deprived a
found substantive due process violations where the government
75
property owner's right to exercise control over his property. Implicit in the
Hitchcock holding is the assumption, contrary to Justice Harlan's Southern Kansas
Railway opinion,176 that tribes are inferior to even private voluntary associations
in their right to just compensation under the Takings Clause.
The very last sentence of the Hitchcock opinion expresses another element of
anti-tribalism. Refusing to address the tribe's allegation that the leasing scheme
of the Curtis Act was not "calculated to operate beneficially to the interests of the
Cherokees,"' 177 the Court tersely stated: "The power existing in Congress to
administer upon and guard the tribal property .. .is a question within the

166. See Hitchcock, 187 U.S. at 299-300. The federal government raised only three arguments in support of
its motion for demurrer: (1) separation of powers; (2) failure to include an indispensable party; and (3)
conformity of the Secretary's actions with the Curtis Act, which was a valid exercise of congressional power
over Indian property. See id. The government did not argue that the Cherokee Nation did not have fee-simple
title to its tribal lands. See id.

167. Id at 299.
168. See id. at 308. Given the Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899), precedent, the Hitchcock

Court could hardly have concluded otherwise. "The holding that Congress had power to provide a method for
determining membership in the [F]ive [C]ivilized [Tiribes ... necessarily involved the further holding that
Congress was vested with authority to adopt measures to make the tribal property productive ...for the benefit
of the [Tribe[s]." Hitchcock, 187 U.S. at 307.

169. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. at 305.
170. See, e.g., id. at 305-08 (discussing Act of Mar. 3, 1871 (1871 Act), ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1994)).
171. 174 U.S. 445 (1899).
172. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. at 307.
173. Id. (quoting Stephens, 174 U.S. at 488).
174. Id. at 307 (emphasis added) ("Congress was vested with authority to adopt measures to make the tribal

").
property productive ....
175. See id.at 307-08.
176.

See Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890).

177. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. at 308.
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province of the legislative branch to determine, and is not one for the courts."' 17 1
By transforming congressional actions over Indian affairs into nonjusticiable
political questions, the Court abandoned entirely its Marshall Era solicitude for
tribal sovereign prerogatives. The long jurisprudential distance between Hitchcock
and Marshall's Worcester opinion is apparent: while the earlier opinion both
extolled the Cherokee Nation as a "distinct political community" and guarded it
from legislative interference, 179 the later opinion did neither-tribal property
was merely "public property" and congressional decisions over tribal lands were
not to be second-guessed by the judiciary. ° Indeed, even the gap between
Hitchcock and Justice Harlan's intermediate 1890 Southern Kansas Railway
opinion is substantial-instead of carefully reviewing congressional action to
ascertain that tribes are provided full and just compensation in accordance with
the mandate of the Fifth Amendment (as Justice Harlan did in Southern Kansas
Railway), the Hitchcock Court articulated a jurisprudence of complete deference
to the will of Congress. 8'
The next step in the Lochner Era's anti-tribal progression can be predicted.
Having already gone from requiring just compensation when tribal lands are taken
to permitting the United States to control the use of tribal lands without the
consent of the affected tribe,18 2 the next logical stage in Indian law was the
judicial endorsement of absolute, unconstrained congressional power over Indian
83
affairs.'

178. Id
179. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832).
180. See generally Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294.
181. See iL at 308.
182. See, e.g., id at 307-08.
183. Before considering Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, however, it would be helpful to consider the laissez-faire
outlook embodied in the three Cherokee Nation cases of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
Hitchcock, Stephens, and Southern Kansas Railway. Recall, for instance, the federal acts upheld in Stephens and
Hitchcock. These laws were undeniably hostile toward the property rights of the Indian collective. In the eyes
of the Stephens and Hitchcock Courts, the tribe's fee simple interest presented no bar whatsoever to a federal
takeover of tribal property, and whether full compensation would be paid to the tribe was of little concern. See
id But see discussion of Southern Kansas Railway, supra Part II.B.2.a.
These decisions, however, are perfectly in line with the regnant Lochnerian jurisprudence-they upheld laws
that provided for allotment of land to individual Indians, for American citizenship to the allottees, and for the leasing
by non-Indian parties of unexplored land for economic exploitation. All three components of the validated statutes
embody laissez-faire values. First, by upholding congressional efforts to allot tribally held lands to individual
Indians, the Court sanctioned the birth of a private property regime and the death of a "primitive," communal
one--thereby delivering thousands of new property-owning and labor-contracting Lochnerian economic agents onto
the American promised land. Second, by granting citizenship to individual Indians, the Court released individual
Indians from the grasp of the "primitive" and "overly intrusive" tribal organization and thrusted them into the
laissez-faire America ofLochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), and
Adkins v. Children'sHospital,261 U.S. 525 (1923). Last, by allowing the leasing of lands for mining purposes, the
Court promoted the goal of efficient utilization ofeconomic resources-for the mineral resources lay dormant while
the Cherokees were in exclusive charge of their communal lands.
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Transition Between Anti-Tribe and Pro-Individual-Indian: Lone Wolf
and the Creation of a Private Property Regime
In the infamous case of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,' the United States Supreme
Court unanimously 8 5 upheld a congressional act unilaterally abrogating an
earlier treaty between the United States and the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache
Indians. The three Indian tribes argued that the Act of June 6, 1900 (1900 Act),
which provided for the forced allotment of communally held tribal lands to
1" and the payment of $2 million to the tribes for
individual Indians in severalty M
the purchase of more than two million acres of "surplus" tribal land remaining
after the initial allotments were made, violated Article XII of the 1867 Treaty of
Medicine Lodge (1867 Treaty). 87 Article XII unequivocally stated that "[n]o
treaty for the cession of any portion or part of the reservation herein described,
which may be held in common, shall be of any validity or force as against the
said Indians, unless executed and signed by at least three fourths of all the adult
3.

male Indians occupying the same .

.*"'

The plaintiffs argued that because

fewer than three-fourths of the "adult male Indians" of their respective tribes
and
consented to the agreement enacted into law by the 1900 Act, the agreement
89
its enacting legislation violated the express terms of the 1867 Treaty.'
In addition to the charge of treaty breach, the three tribes asserted that the 1900
Act violated "the property rights of the . . . Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache
Indians" by allotting tribally owned lands to individual tribe members and by
"opening to settlement by white men ... two million acres of [tribal] lands," thus
depriving the tribes "of their lands without due process of law ... contrary to the
Constitution of the United States . . . ."190 The plaintiffs, in other words, also
attacked the 1900 Act under a constitutional doctrine then in vogue-substantive

due process.
In upholding the 1900 Act, Justice White rejected both claims of the tribes.
First, after briefly canvassing Court precedent establishing the relationship of
9
Congress to Indian tribes as one of "guardian to ward,"' ' White concluded that
"[pilenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by

184. 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903). The plaintiff, Lone Wolf, was the Principal Chief of the Kiowa Tribe and
the defendant, Ethan Hitchcock, was the United States Secretary of Interior.
185. Justice Harlan is described as having concurred in the result, but there is no separate written opinion.
See id.
186. An estate in severalty is one that is "held by a person in his own right only, without any other person
being joined or connected with him .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1374 (6th ed. 1990).
187. See Lone Wolf. 187 U.S. at 564 (citing Act of June 6, 1900 (1900 Act), ch. 813, 31 Stat. 677 (1900)
and Medicine Lodge Treaty (1867 Treaty), Oct. 21, 1867, U.S.-Kiowa. Comanche, and Apache, art. 12, 15 Stat.
581 (1867)).
188. 1867 Treaty, supra note 187.
189. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 561 (citing 1867 Treaty, supra note 187). The three tribes also alleged in their
complaint that "the [required) signatures ... had been obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations and
concealment" in violation of the 1867 Treaty. Id.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) ("These Indian tribes are the wards
From their very weakness and
of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United States ....
helplessness.... there arises [in the federal government] the duty of protection, and with it the power.").
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Congress from the beginning .. ,,.9"'Because Congress must always possess
paramount power over the tribes in order to fulfill its obligations as guardian, "the
legislative power might pass laws in conflict with [earlier] treaties made with the
Indians."9 The Court thus had no power to invalidate the 1900 Act despite
Congress's purported bad faith toward its treaty partners.'9
Much of Justice White's opinion was devoted to establishing the unilateral right
of Congress to abrogate treaties between the United States and Indian tribes. Only
the second-to-last paragraph of the decision discussed the Indians' Due Process
claim that Congress deprived the tribes of valuable property- both the lands
allotted and the lands "surplused" for future white settlement-without due
process of law.195 In rejecting this alternative claim, the Court relied on
Hitchcock's ruling that "full administrative power was possessed by Congress
over Indian tribal property."'96 Characterizing the unconsented to allottment of
commonly held property as "a mere change in the form of investment of Indian
tribal property,"' 97 Justice White concluded, with minimal discussion, that the
1900 Act did not violate the Due Process Clause. 198
The Court's approval of a congressional treaty-breach and its refusal to
recognize a violation of due process in 1903 is not surprising.'" Lone Wolf is
nonetheless interesting for the purposes of this Article because it embodies the
intersection of the Lochner Era's dual anti-tribal and pro-individual-Indian
orientations. Not only did the Court sanction Congress's running roughshod over
the rights of the Indian collective (evincing its anti-tribalism), but, by doing so,
it also endorsed the creation of a new private property regime populated by
individual Indian economic agents. 200 Lone Wolf thus serves as the perfect
"Janus-faced" segue between the anti-tribalism cases of this section and the proindividualism cases of the next-"anti-tribal" is not equivalent to "anti-Indian";
it is instead merely the flip-side of Lochnerian pro-individualism.2 "'

192. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565.
193. Id at 566 (citations omitted); cf. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (upholding
the right of Congress to abrogate, unilaterally, treaties with foreign nations).
194. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 567-68.
195. See id
196. Id (citing Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902)).
197. Id at 568.
198. See id

199. One aberrant case during the Lochner Era appeared to have recognized the Worcester notion that tribes
are sovereign entities. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383 (1896), held that the Cherokee Nation's "'powers of
local self-government ...

existed prior to the Constitution" and thus that the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury

Clause did not apply to tribal court prosecutions. See also Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), in which
the Court found that tribes retained jurisdiction over an Indian-on-Indian murder that took place in Indian
country.
200. The similarity between Lochner and Lone Wolf is striking. Both cases uphold the centrality of the

private individual and her right to contract and to own property. The Lochner Court accomplished this end by
invalidating legislation abrogatingindividual economic rights, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905),
while the Lone WolfCourt achieved the same result by upholding legislation creating individual economic rights
(by establishing, out of the communist tribal mass, a brand-new private property regime), see Lone Wolf, 187

U.S. 553.
201. That is, a deep coherence exists in the Indian law cases of this period. The Court was neither anti-Indian
nor pro-white American, but actually pro-individual-Indian and anti-tribal.
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Lochner's Close Kin: The Pro-Individual-Indian Cases of the Lochner
Era
The cases in the immediately preceding sections are often mistakenly offered
behaved
as irrebuttable evidence that the United States, including its judiciary,
2'n Although
Era.
Lochner
the
during
inhabitants
immorally toward its aboriginal
the anti-tribalistorientation of these decisions cannot be denied, this Article
disputes the assertion that the United States and its Supreme Court behaved badly
toward Indians merely because they were Indians. Rather, federal hostility toward
Indians during this period was merely the manifestation of cultural and political
distaste for the tribal unit. This section argues that when an individual Indian,
instead of an Indian collective, claimed a violation of protected economic
liberties, the Court almost uniformly sided with him. By supplementing the more
familiar anti-tribal cases with the little-known pro-individual Indian cases, this
section attempts to present a fuller picture of the Court's philosophy and dispel
the crude conception of the Lochner Era Court as the racist master of the nation's
Indian wards.2' 3
4.

a. Jones v. Meehan: Protection of
Individual Indian Property Rights
In 1863, the United States entered into a treaty with the Chippewa Indians
under which, in accordance with prevailing practice, the Indians ceded to the
United States all interests and rights to their ancestral lands in exchange for a sum
of money and a much smaller plot of reservation land in which the tribe would
thereafter reside.2" Within this treaty was a peculiar provision stating that,

202. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized
FederalIndian Law, 46 ARK. L. REv. 77, 97-101 (1993).
203. Although the focus of this Article is strictly upon the federal cases of the Lochner Era, several state court
decisions of this period also established strong judicial protection for the property and contract rights of individual
Indians. In Whirlwind v. Von der Ahe, 67 Mo. App. 628 (Mo. 1896), for instance, the Missouri Supreme Court
upheld the capacity of reservation Indians to make contracts and sue in court for their enforcement. The white
defendant sought to escape judicial penalties for his breach of a contract made with individual Sioux Indians on the
ground that the latter had no power either to contract or sue. See id. at 630. Citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886), as precedent, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected this contention in strong language typical of the era's
treatment of Indian individuals:
It is part of the American Creed-expressed in the charter of our liberties-that all men are
created equal before the law. In the administration of justice, neither race, rank, nor riches
confers any advantage on its possessor over any other persons. These accidents are not permitted
to mar the purity of laws made for the equal protection of every human being.
Whirlwind, 67 Mo. App. at 630-31.
In another state court decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a congressional act, declaring "executory
contracts entered into by an Indian [to] be void[,]" would be unconstitutional if extended to Indian-made contracts
outside of an Indian reservation (in this case, the City of New Orleans). See Taylor v. Drew, 21 Ark. 485,486 (1860)
(quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1847 (1847 Act), ch. 66, § 3, 9 Stat. 203, 203-04 (1847)). Because the power of Congress
does not include "the power to declare [an Indian's] contracts within a State and in reference to its laws null and
void," the Arkansas court construed the 1847 Act as not applying to the transaction in dispute. Id.
For an even earlier example of the pro-individual, anti-tribal "bias" in the state courts, see Jackson v. Sharp, 14
Johns. 472, 476 (N.Y. 1816) (noting that the federal prohibition against purchase of lands from Indians related
solely to purchases of land from Indians, as a tribe or community, and did not extend to cases of individual
ownership).
204. See Treaty with the Chippewa Indians (1863 Treaty), Oct. 2, 1863, U.S.-Chippewa Indians, 13 Stat. 667
(1863).
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because of the urgent request of the Indians, "there shall be set apart from the
tract hereby ceded a reservation of six hundred and forty acres near the mouth of
the Thief River for the [C]hief Moose Dung .. ,.o.
Itappeared that the
Chippewa chief did not wish to cede his favorite portion of the original tribal
territory to the federal government. The United States agreed to this provision and
Chief Moose Dung was thus permitted to remain upon his personal 640 acres.
After the completion of the treaty and the migration of the rest of the tribe, he,
along with his son, Moose Dung the Younger, "lived upon, exercised dominion
2
over, and claimed to own, the land so selected, and cultivated part of it .... " 06
In 1891 Moose Dung the Younger, who had inherited the land from his father
in accordance with tribal custom, made a ten-year lease to James and Patrick
Meehan of his land for the sum of twenty-five dollars per year. 20 7 This lease
was recorded in 1891, after which time the Meehans dutifully paid the annual rent
and erected a saw mill on the bank of the Thief River.20 8 In early 1894,
however, Moose Dung the Younger received another offer, from one Ray
Jones, 209 to lease the same plot of land for an annual rent of two hundred
dollars. 20 Knowing a good deal when he saw one, Moose Dung the Younger
accepted the offer.2 ' Subsequently, in August of 1894, Congress passed a
resolution authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to approve this lease to Jones
if the Secretary deemed the lease "proper and advisable. 2 12 The Secretaryafter raising the required rent to four hundred dollars per year-authorized the
lease. 213 Jones and Moose
Dung the Younger then entered into a twenty-year
214
lease for the 640 acres.
None too happy with this, the Meehans brought suit against Jones to quiet title
to the land in question. The fundamental question raised by the case, as the Court
put it, concerned the first Moose Dung's property right: "What was the nature
of the title which the elder [C]hief Moose Dung took under the [T]reaty of
October 2, 1863 . . . ?,,25 If his interest in the land was only in the form of
"Indian title," then he and his heirs would have "no power to convey the land
except to the United States, or by their consent. '216 The doctrine that Indian title
(the Indians' right as original occupants of the land) merely provides its holder
with a right of occupancy and not ownership in fee simple-and the correlative
rule that land held under such title is inalienable except to the United States or

205. Id art. IX. "Moose Dung" is the English translation of Chief Monsimoh's Chippewa name. See Jones
v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 4 (1899); see also Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REv. 28 (1947).
206. Meehan, 175 U.S. at 6.
207. See id
208. See id at 7.
209. See id Jones admitted at trial that he knew of the existence of the prior lease between Moose Dung the
Younger and the Meehans. See id
210. See id. It appears that the Great Northern Railway Company built a railroad in 1892 to the area in
question, as a result of which a large settlement sprung up and land values increased dramatically. See id.
211. See id
212. See H.R. Res. 207, 53d Cong. (1894) (enacted as J. Res. 41, 28 Stat. 1018 (1894)).

213. See Meehan, 175 U.S. at 7. The Secretary of the Interior also placed additional conditions on the lease.
See id at 7-8.
214. See id at 7.
215. Id at 8 (discussing 1863 Treaty, supra note 204).
216. Id
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with its permission-derives from an old chestnut of Indian law, Johnson v.
McIntosh. t7 Chief Justice Marshall held in McIntosh that Indian tribes were
incapable of conveying their land without the express consent of the United
States, because discovery conferred upon the sovereign-i.e., the United States
via Great Britain-a title good against all others.1 8 In a much quoted line,
Marshall ruled that the United States, and only the United States, had the
2 9 power
to extinguish the Indians' "title," "either by purchase or by conquest. '
Therefore, if Moose Dung's interest in the land was merely in the nature of
Indian title, the Meehans' quiet title claim was a clear loser220-not only did the
Meehans not have authorization from the United States for their lease with Moose
Dung the Younger, but the defendant Jones did have express approval from the
United States for his lease. 2 Equally important, no precedent existed for the
proposition that when treaties conveyed land to Indian tribes in exchange for the
land of their original occupancy, the United States somehow also conveyed away
to the tribe the discoverer's exclusive right of purchase or conquest 222 of the
reserved land. Indeed, as the "anti-tribalism" cases demonstrate,223 even after
the United States granted land in fee simple to a tribe by express treaty
provisions, it retained plenary power to control the property.22 4 If, as in
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock225 and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,2 ' for instance,
the United States could allot and lease tribal lands expressly stipulated by treaty
to be held in fee simple by the tribes without their consent, it ought to follow that
the United States retained absolute control over the disposition of Moose Dung's
land even after the signing of the 1863 Treaty.
The Court in Meehan, however, found that the 1863 Treaty's provision
reserving the 640 acres to Moose Dung "took effect, as a present grant ...of an
alienable title in fee,"' 227 and thus held that Jones's 1894 lease was invalid as
against the Meehans' earlier, congressionally-unauthorized lease.228 In reaching
this initially counter-intuitive conclusion, Justice Gray discussed precedents such
as McIntosh and acknowledged that
[u]ndoubtedly, the right of the Indian nations or tribes to their lands within the
United States was a right of possession or occupancy only; the ultimate title
in fee in those lands was in the United States; and the Indian title could not

217. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); see infra Part III.C.1.b.
218. See id at 573 ("[D]iscovery gave title to the government by whose subjects . .. [the discovery] was
made, against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by possession. The exclusion
of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil

from the natives ....").
219.

Id at 587; see also Cohen, supra note 205, at 47-48.

220. See Meehan, 175 U.S. at 12-13.
221. See id at 7.
222.

223.
224.
(1902);
225.
226.
227.
228.

See McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587.

See supra Parts II.B.2-3.
See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899). Stephens was decided the same year as Meehan.
187 U.S. 294.
187 U.S. 553.
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 23 (1899).
See id at 31-32.
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be conveyed by the Indians to anyone but the United States, without the
consent of the United States.229
Justice Gray further conceded that the Court had found on at least one previous

occasion, in a situation much like the one in Meehan, that the reservation of a
section of land to an individual Indian within a treaty between the tribe and the
United States merely conveyed "original Indian title"-i.e., only the right of

occupancy-to that individual.2 30 Nonetheless, after canvassing other opinions
lending support to his position,"2

Justice Gray ruled in favor of the Meehans

and held that "the [1863 T]reaty itself converts the reserved sections into
individual property ... equivalent to a present grant of a complete title in fee
simple... alienable by the grantee at his pleasure ....
232

The strangeness of this conclusion when compared to the anti-tribalism
holdings of the same era should be apparent. The Meehan Court essentially
upheld the property right of an individual Indian against the asserted rights of the

United States over the same property-Moose Dung the Younger's earlier,
unauthorized conveyance to the Meehans overrode the subsequent, congressionally authorized and executive branch approved lease with Jones. Perhaps

a cynical way to read this opinion is that the Court merely protected the economic
liberty of the white Meehans to lease property without subsequent interference by
the government. Yet, the underlying conclusion is undeniable-when the United
States reserves land to an individual Indian instead of an Indian tribe,23 that
Indian holds property rights of the same strength and intensity as that held by any
other American owner of private property.
Meehan is good evidence that the Lochner Era Court did not violate the rights
of Indians merely because they were Indians. Rather, the Court was as vigilant
over the property rights of the individual Indian as it was over the liberty to
contract of Lochner's white bakers. Meehan serves to refine the significance of
the anti-tribalism cases of the Lochner Era-they are anti-collective and anti-

229. I at 8. The Meehan Court also noted that the view that the Indians' "'relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian' has become more and more appropriate as [the tribes] have grown less
powerful and more dependent." Id. at 10 (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)).
230. See id at 13. In the course of interpreting a similar provision found in the 1830 Treaty of Dancing
Rabbit Creek, 7 Stat. 340 (1830) (granting provision), Justice Nelson concluded in Gaines v. Nicholson that such
land "'was so much carved out of the territory ceded, and remained to the Indian occupant, as he had never
parted with it. He holds, strictly speaking, not under the treaty of cession, but under his original title confirmed
by the Government in the act of agreeing to the reservation."' Meehan, 175 U.S. at 13 (quoting Gaines v.
Nicholson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 356, 365 (1850)).
Justice Gray's conclusion also appeared to contradict Attorney General Roger Taney's Opinion of 1833. In
interpreting a treaty much like the 1863 Treaty at issue in Meehan, Taney stated that "'these reservations [of
land to individual Indians] are excepted out of the grant made by the treaty, and did not therefore pass by it;
consequently, the title remains as it was before the treaty; that is to say, the lands reserved are still held under
the original Indian title .... [Therefore, the Indian occupants cannot convey them to individuals .
I.d. at
12 (quoting 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 587 (1833)).
231. See Meehan, 175 U.S. at 14-21.
232. id at 21.
233. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294

(1902).
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communal societies, but they are not anti-Indian. They are simply the Indian
avatars of the laissez-faire Constitution. 2"
b. The Movement to an Indian Lochner?
i. In re Heff
arrested and convicted in a Kansas federal
was
man,
a
white
Heff,
Albert
district court for selling "intoxicating liquors" to an Indian in violation of a
federal law prohibiting such activity.235 The Act of January 30, 1897 (1897 Act)
clearly stated that
"any person who shall sell ... vinous liquor ... to any Indian to whom
allotment of land has been made ... or to any Indian a ward of the
government ... or any Indian, including mixed bloods, over whom the
government ... exercises guardianship ... shall be punished by imprison-

234. Meehan can perhaps be read in a limited way-that judicial solicitude for the property rights of
individual Indians occurs only when there has been "explicit" federal recognition of that right in the form of a
treaty reservation. However, Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1922), dispels that truncated interpretation.
There, the Court vigorously protected the property rights of individual Indians despite the lack of a prior
governmental recognition of the Indians' "title" to the land at issue. See id. at 229, 230.
Cramer arose when the United States (suing as guardian of the Indians in a quiet title action) brought suit
on behalf of three Indians against the Central Pacific Railway Company to prevent the latter from taking
possession of lands occupied by the Indians. See id. at 224-25. The railroad company claimed that it owned the
land in question as a consequence of the Act of July 25, 1866 (1866 Act), by which Congress granted to the
company's predecessor an area of land including the parcels in dispute, subject only to the provision that "such
lands as 'shall be found to have been granted, sold, reserved, occupied by homestead settlers"' were not
conveyed. Id. at 225 (quoting Act of July 25, 1866 (1866 Act), ch. 242, 14 Stat. 239 (1866)). The Indians
contended that their interests in the land fell within that exception because they and their families had occupied
the area since before 1860. See id at 225, 226. The defendant railroad responded that this fact did not transform
the Indians into the "homestead settlers" referenced in the 1866 Act's exemption, for it was not until 1875 that
homesteading privileges-the right of an individual to acquire title to public land by entry, occupation, and
use-were extended to Indians. See id. at 226-27 (citing Act of March 3, 1875 (1875 Act), ch. 131, 18 Stat. 402,
420 (1875)). Thus, according to the defendent, the Indian occupants of the land at issue were not-and legally
could not be-"homesteaders" under the 1866 Act and held no recognized title to the land. See id. at 226-27.
In an opinion by Justice Sutherland, the Cramer Court overcame this seemingly insurmountable difficulty
and ruled in favor of the Indians after explicitly invoking that era's assimilationist policy approach. See id. at
227-30. Taking notice of the fact that the Indians "had under fence between 150 and 175 acres[,] ... portions
of which they had irrigated and cultivated[,]... [and] that they had constructed and maintained dwelling houses
and divers[e] outbuildings," the Court found that to deny these individuals their rights to the land in question
would be inconsistent with the contemporary era's Indian policy. Id. at 226-27. Because "such occupancy of a
fixed character lends support to ... [the] policy ... of inducing the Indian to forsake his wandering habits and
adopt those of civilized life[,J" id. at 227, the Court concluded that to allow the railroad to take possession of
the Indians' land would be contrary to public policy, see id. at 230. In language resounding with the era's
assimilationist flavor, the Court stated:
The action of these individual Indians in abandoning their nomadic habits and attaching
themselves to a definite locality, reclaiming, cultivating and improving the soil and
establishing fixed homes thereon was in harmony with the well understood desire of the
Government which we have mentioned. To hold that by so doing they acquired no possessory
rights to which the Government would accord protection, would be contrary to the whole
spirit of the traditional American policy toward these dependent wards of the nation.
l. at 228-29. Therefore, despite the fact that it was legally impossible for the Indian plaintiffs to have qualified
as homesteaders at the time of Congress's conveyance of the land at issue to the railroad, the Cramer Court
upheld the unrecognized property rights of the individual Indian occupants against the railroad's claims. See id.
at 230.
235. See In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1897), overruled by United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
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ment for not less than sixty days, and by a fine of not less than one hundred

dollars . ..."',36

Because Heff' s conduct fell squarely within the statute's coverage, he was easily
convicted.237
Heff subsequently filed a federal habeas petition alleging that the 1897 Act was
"unconstitutional as applied to the sales of liquor to an Indian who has received
an allotment and patent of land under the provisions of the [A]ct of February 8,
1887[, the Dawes Act]." 2 The Indian to whom Heff had sold two quarts of
beer, a member of the Kickapoo Tribe named John Butler, had received an
allotment of land under the Dawes Act, and thereby held a patent from the
Secretary of Interior for his individually owned parcel.239 Under section 6 of
the Dawes Act, Indians such as Butler were "declared to be ...citizen[s] of the
United States, and... entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of such
citizens ...."m Heff argued that Indian allottees like Butler were no longer
wards of the government because of their citizenship status and thus could not be
subject to the 1897 Act, despite its explicit application to such persons.24
In an opinion by Justice Brewer, the Court granted Heff's habeas petition and
vacated his conviction.242 The core of the opinion rejected the government's
contention that the Dawes Act granted Indian allottees only a qualified form of
American citizenship.24 3 The United States argued that the provision of a
twenty-five year trust to be held by the United States over the fee patents of all
allottees 2 4 indicated that Congress did not intend by section 6 of the Dawes Act
to convey to Indian "citizens" the identical kind of citizenship held by other
Americans. 5 Specifically, the Indian "citizen" created by the Dawes Act was still
a ward of the federal government, and thus subject to federal laws such as the
1897 Act.246
In response to this argument, the Court explicitly noted that while the United
States had previously governed Indians under a guardian-ward paradigm, recent
events had signaled a transformation in the federal government's Indian
policy.247 Stating that "[o]f late years a new policy has found expression, ...
which looks to the breaking up of tribal relations, the establishing of the separate
Indians in individual homes, free from national guardianship, and charged with

236. Act of January 30, 1897 (1897 Act), ch. 109, 29 Stat. 506 (1897), quoted in Heff, 197 U.S. at 490.
237. See Heff, 197 U.S. at 489.
238. Id at 492 (citing Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 381 (1994)).
239. See id
240. Id (quoting Dawes Act, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. at 390).
241. See id at 493.
242. See id at 497.
243. See id at 495; see also Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
244. See Dawes Act, ch. 119, § 5,24 Stat. at 389.
245. See Heff, 197 U.S. at 497.
246. See id
247. See id. at 498 ("The practice of dealing with the Indian tribes as separate nations was changed by a
proviso inserted in the Indian [AIppropriation [Aict of March 3, 1871."). The Court was referring to the
Congressional decision in 1871 to end the practice of federal treaty-making with Indian tribes. See supra Part

H.A.1.
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24 the Court
all the rights and obligations of citizens of the United States,""
rejected the argument that Congress merely intended to grant the individual Indian
allottee a qualified, ward-like form of American citizenship.24 9 Finding that
Congress clearly wished to award full United States citizenship at the time the
Indian allottee received his patent, the Court stated that

[a]s a matter of constitutional law, an Indian appears to be entitled to the
benefit of, and to be subject to, the laws of the state in which he resides the
moment he becomes a citizen of the United States. By virtue of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment, a citizen of the United States becomes, by residence
therein, a citizen of the state, and entitled to all the rights ... of all other
citizens of the state, and to the equal protection of the laws.2The Court concluded with strong language resounding in the contemporary era's
dominant sentiments:
Can it be that because one has Indian, and only Indian, blood in his veins, he
is to be forever one of a special class over whom the general government
may, in its discretion, assume the rights of guardianship which it has once
abandoned, and this whether.., the individual himself consents? We think
the reach to which this argument goes demonstrates that it is unsound.25 '
Despite express language in the 1897 Act prohibiting sales of liquor252to Indian
allottees-citizens such as Butler, the Court vacated Heff's conviction.
Again there is the possibility of a cynical interpretation-that the Court was
merely protecting the economic liberty of the white man Heff to sell liquor to
Indians without government interference. Nonetheless, the Heff Court's
reasoning-and the explicit language used to support its conclusion--clearly
demonstrates the Court's penchant for treating the individual Indian citizenallottee in the same manner that it treated all other American citizens.
ii. Dark Clouds: Tiger v. Western Investment Company
The reign of Heff was surprisingly short-lived. In response to the Court's
decision, Congress in 1906 passed the Burke Act, which amended section 6 of the
Dawes Act to provide citizenship to Indian allottees only after the expiration of
the twenty-five year trust provision in the Indians' patents.253 Although the
Burke Act did not itself provide for the alteration of any rights already vested in
individual allottees-and thus did not overrule the Heff decision 25 4 -it
successfully confined the effect of Heff s ruling so that once Indians were granted

248. Heff, 197 U.S. at 499; see id. at 501-02 ('T]hepolicy of the government has changed, and... an effort
is being made to relieve some of the Indians from their tutelage and endow them with the full rights of
citizenship, thus terminating between them and the government the relation of guardian and ward .
249. See id. at 495.
250. I at 504.
251. Id. at 508.
252. See id at 509.
253. See ch. 2348, § 6, 34 Stat. 182-83 (1906) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1994)); see also PRUCHA, supra
note 20, at 875-76. Thus, an Indian allottee could not become a citizen until twenty-five years after receiving
his initial allotment.
254. That is,
the Burke Act itself only affected future allottees.
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citizenship, they could not be held to additional restrictions applicable only to
them. 5
A close cousin of the Burke Act was the Act of April 26, 1906 (1906 Act),
which extended the length of the period of prohibition against alienation of
allotted lands by Indian allottees in Indian Territory from five to twenty-five
years."' 6 The purpose of this statute was to stem the flow of allotted lands from
Indian to white hands. This previously unforeseen consequence of immediately
granting full property rights to Indians resulted from giving unprepared Indians
the power to sell their lands to white buyers. Because Indians were generally
unfamiliar with the American property system, many lost their allotted parcels to
whites who were less scrupulous, but more transactionally sophisticated."5
Specifically, the 1906 Act provided that "[n]o full-blooded Indian of [the Five
Civilized Tribes] shall have power to alienate, sell . . .or encumber ... any of
the lands allotted to him for a period of twenty-five years .... [unless] approved

by the Secretary of Interior." 258 Although such restrictions on the property rights
of Indian citizens were antithetical to the laissez-faire spirit of the Indian policy
and jurisprudence of the period, government policymakers settled for this
anomalous step as a necessary compromise between the ideal of Indian
"liberation" and the reality of landless Indians swindled out of their allotted
parcels. 259
Although the 1906 Act satisfied policy concerns, questions arose as to its
constitutionality. After all, the Heff Court had strongly suggested that once
citizenship was granted to individual Indians, no restriction could be placed on
their economic liberties that could not also be placed on those of other
citizens. 260 The ward-like status created by such "Indian-only" limitations
appeared incompatible with the Indian allottee's newly acquired American
citizenship. 26 t Apart from Heff-related concerns, it was also possible that
extending the restriction period on a person's ability to alienate property
constituted a deprivation of property rights in violation of substantive due process.
The Court eventually confronted the constitutional issue in Tiger v. Western
Investment Co. 262 This case arose when the plaintiff, Marchie Tiger, a full-blood
255. Compare Burke Act, ch. 2348, § 6, 34 Stat. 182, with Heff, 197 U.S. at 507.
256. See Act of Apr. 26, 1906 (1906 Act), ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137 (1906) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 355
(1994)). The five year period of prohibition was established in a 1902 statute, in which Congress amended a
previous law that allotted the lands of the Creek Nation by shortening the number of years in the alienation
restriction period. See Act of June 30, 1902 (1902 Act), ch. 1323, 32 Stat. 500 (1902). Section 16 of the 1902
Act provided that lands allotted to citizens could be alienated after merely five years-in contrast to the Dawes
Act's twenty-five year restriction on alienation. See id. § 16.
Gradually recognizing that many Indian allottees-especially full-blooded Indians-were not competent to
conduct land transactions only five years after their "emancipation" from the tribal "'plantation," however,
Congress passed the 1906 Act. See 1906 Act, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137.
257. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 59-1558 (Report of Commissioner Leupp to Secretary of Interior) (Feb. 8,
1906)), quoted in PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 875 ("Experience has demonstrated that citizenship has been a
disadvantage to many Indians. They are not fitted for its duties or able to take advantage of its benefits ....
Degraded by unprincipled whites.... no protection is given them ... .
258. Ch. 1876, § 19. 34 Stat. at 144.
259. See, e.g., PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 875.
260. See In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 499 (1897), overruled by United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
261. See id at 497.
262. 221 U.S. 286 (1911).
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Creek Indian, sold parts of his allotment property to the defendants, Western
Investment Company and Coweta Realty Company, in separate transactions in
July and August of 1907.263 After these contracts were completed, however,
Tiger had a change of heart and wished to rescind both agreements. The
defendants refused to allow Tiger to rescind, and Tiger subsequently brought suit
in the state court of Oklahoma seeking rescission of his contracts with the
purchasers. 264
Tiger's sole argument was that because he was a full-blood Creek Indian, his
capacity to convey his allotted parcel was restricted for a period of twenty-five
years by the extension provided in the 1906 Act, which stipulated that fullblooded Indians who received their allotments in 1902 could not convey their
allotments until 1931 without explicit federal approval.26 Tiger's parcel was
"allotted under certain acts of Congress" in 1902 and he received the lot by
inheritance in 1903.266 Because the contracts in dispute with the defendants
were made in 1907, Tiger argued that they were null and void.267 As a fullblood Creek Indian, Tiger simply could not alienate his parcels before 1931
without violating federal law. 268 The 1907 contracts, therefore, were2 "illegal,"
9
and thus either voidable by Tiger or, simply, void and unenforceable.
The defendants argued that the original Act of June 30, 1902 (1902 Act)
provided for only a five year period of restriction on alienation. 270 Thus, their
contracts with Tiger-signed shortly after the expiration of that five year
period-were entirely valid. Responding to Tiger's argument, the purchasers
argued that the 1906 law was an unconstitutional deprivation of Tiger's property
rights. 27 ' They pointed out that by July and August of 1907, Tiger "had full
legal title to the premises, which could not be impaired by legislation of Congress
subsequent to the [1902 Act]. 272 Because Tiger was made a citizen of the
United States upon the receipt of his allotted parcel in 1902, the purchasers
argued, "to add to the restrictions of the [1902 Act, by extending the period of
non-alienation five-fold in subsequent legislationI is violative of his constitutional
rights, and deprives him of his property without due process of law."273
The defendants prevailed in the Oklahoma state courts, and Tiger then appealed
to the United States Supreme Court.274 In an opinion by Justice Day, the Court
reversed the Oklahoma Supreme Court, upheld the 1906 Act in its entirety, and

263. See id. at 298-99.

264. See id. at 299.
265. See id. at 302 (citing Act of Apr. 26, 1906 (1906 Act), ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137 (1906) (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 355 (1994)).

266. See id at 287.
267. See id. at 299. As noted, the 1906 Act permitted conveyance of allotted land before 1931 if the
Secretary of the Interior approved of the transaction. See id. at 302. No such approval, however, was either
sought or given to the transaction between Tiger and the investment companies. See id. at 299; cf PRUCHA,
supra note 20, at 668.
268. See generally Tiger, 221 U.S. at 299; cf. 1906 Act, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137.
269. See Tiger, 221 U.S. at 304.
270. See id at 309.
271. See id at 310.
272. Id.
273. Id
274. See Western Inv. Co. v. Tiger, 21 Okla. 630 (1908), rev'd, 221 U.S. 286 (1911).
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voided the 1907 contracts between Tiger and the investment companies.275
Importantly, the Court found that despite strong language to the contrary in Heff,
there was nothing incompatible between Indian citizenship and the continued
control by Congress over the lands of Indian allottees.7 6 Canvassing the antitribal opinions of the era-and crucially failing to distinguish between tribal and
individual Indian rightsZ'-Justice Day stressed the importance of the largely
irrelevant proposition that "Congress has full power to legislate concerning the
tribal property of the Indians. '27 8 Additionally, the Court noted that cases
subsequent to Heff had expressed sentiments contrary to that case's statement that
Indian citizens could not be treated as wards of the federal government, but must
instead be treated like any other citizen. 279 Thus, Justice Day concluded that
Congress possessed the absolute privilege to determine when its guardianship
responsibilities over its Indian wards-United States citizens or not-would
cease. 2 8 Most crucially, the Court noted that "incompetent persons, though
citizens, may not have the full right to control their persons and property.' 281
Although Tiger obtained certain civil and political rights upon the conferral of
American citizenship, Congress still possessed full power to determine whether
he was a ward of the nation. 8 2 Because Congress had judged that full-blooded
Creek Indians owning allotted parcels were still "wards of the state," the 1906
Act's extension of the 1902 Act's period of inalienability was valid.28 3
The Tiger decision amounted to a judicial recognition that Indians such as
Tiger were akin to "women, children, [the] mentally retarded, and ... those who
work underground" 2 -and thus legally distinct from the white bakers of
Lochner.' The decision conflicted with the sentiment expressed in Meehan and
Heff that individual Indian property owners could not be excluded from the shield
provided by the laissez-faire Constitution.

275. See Tiger, 221 U.S. at 310. The Court first noted the peculiar posture of the case before it. While the
defendants argued that Congress had deprived the plaintiff of his right to property without due process of law,
the plaintiff himself did not make this claim. See id Indeed, the plaintiff sought protection under the very act
whose constitutionality was challenged by defendants as violative of the plaintifsrights. See also id. (noting
further that the 1906 Act had not been challenged by the Creek Nation, whose Council in fact approved of it).
Although the Court nonetheless proceeded to discuss the merits of defendants' argument, the peculiar structure
of the litigation ought not be overlooked. While the Court's rejection of the defendants' legal argument-that
the 1906 Act violated the plaintiff's property rights-is abstractly anti-Indian in orientation, the Court's ruling
actually had a positive result for the particular Indian plaintiff in this case. After all, by upholding the 1906 Act,
the Court allowed Tiger to renege on deals that he subsequently determined to be unwise.
276. See id at 314.
277. This distinction will become crucial to the Court in the next case discussed, Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S.
665 (1912). See infra Part II.B.4.b.iii.
278. Tiger, 221 U.S. at 311-12 (emphasis added) (citing as support Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
294 (1902)).
279. See idL at 314 (discussing United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909) (holding that although an
Indian had been given United States citizenship, the United States still possessed jurisdiction over him for
offenses committed within reservation limits)).
280. See id at 315.
281. Id
282. See idt at 316.
283. See id
284. KAHN, supra note 73, at 112 & n.74.
285. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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iii. Choate v. Trapp: The Indian Lochner?
One year after the Tiger decision, however, the Court returned to its original
track and placed individual property-owning Indians back under the aegis of the
86
laissez-faire Constitution. In the case of Choate v. Trapp, plaintiffs-eight
thousand individual members of the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes-sought an
injunction from the Court to prevent the State of Oklahoma from collecting taxes
on their allotted properties.8 7 In an opinion by Justice Lamar, the Court held
that once individual Indian citizens had been given limited-term tax exemptions
on their allotted parcels, Congress could not subsequently pass legislation
288
rescinding the exemption before it was originally to have expired. In what is
perhaps the only Supreme Court decision explicitly invalidating, on constitutional
grounds, a congressional statute concerning Indians, Justice Lamar concluded that
a subsequent law rescinding the previous exemption was an unconstitutional
deprivation of the individual Indian's property right to that exemption in violation
of the Due Process Clause.289
In the Curtis Act of 1898, Congress divided the communally held lands of the
Five Civilized Tribes of Indian Territory into individually sized parcels and
29
allotted these plots to individual tribal members in typical Dawes Act fashion. 0
In a separate arrangement between the United States and the Choctaw and
Chickasaw tribes, Congress further provided that "all the lands allotted [to
members of these two tribes] shall be nontaxable while the title remains in the
original allottee, but not to exceed twenty-one years from date of patent
.... ,291 By 1904, most of the members of these two tribes had received their
allotments under the Curtis Act.2 2
In 1908, Congress passed a general act removing previously imposed
restrictions upon the sale and encumbrance of allotted lands held by Indians under
the Curtis Act.2 93 Upon its passage, Indian allottees were free to do with their
property as they wished. The 1908 Act also expressly stipulated that lands from
which the alienability restrictions had been removed would thereby become
subject to taxation by state authorities.2 94 On the basis of the 1908 Act, the

286. 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
287.
288.

See id at 667.
See id at 674.

289. A brief comparison of Choate with Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), nicely illustrates the
Lochner Era Court's anti-tribal, but pro-individual Indian, posture. While a subsequent congressional act could
abrogate an earlier treaty governing tribal property rights, no such action was constitutionally permissible when
individual property was at stake. See supra Part ll.B.3.
290. See Choate, 224 U.S. at 668 n.1 (citing Atoka Agreement, Curtis Act, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495, 507
(1898)). For example, the Curtis Act also provided that each individual Indian allottee would become a citizen
of the United States; see § 30, para. 37, 30 Stat. at 518, and that the allotted parcels would be inalienable for

five years, see § 29, 30 Stat. at 507.
291.

Choate, 224 U.S. at 668 n.1 (citing Atoka Agreement, Curtis Act, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495, 507 (1898)).

292. See iL at 670.
293. See id at 567 (citing Act of May 27, 1908 (1908 Act), ch. 199, 35 Stat. 312 (1908)).
294. The likely motivation behind this additional provision was that because the removal of alienability
restrictions from Indian-held parcels signified Congress's release of the allottees from wardship status, there was
no longer any reason to continue to accord them protection not available to other American citizens. If individual
Indians were fully competent to convey their property without the permission of the federal government, they
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newly-born State of Oklahoma 2" sought to collect taxes on the parcels held by
members of the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes. 296
Attempting to avoid state taxation, the Indian allottees challenged the 1908
rescission of their tax exemption as an unconstitutional deprivation of property
rights without due process of law. 297 They sued initially in the Oklahoma state
courts. The case eventually proceeded to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which
rejected the Indians' challenge because it concluded that Congress possessed
absolute power to determine the nature and extent of the property rights of its
Indian wards. 298 Relying on anti-tribalism cases such as Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock299 and Stephens v. Cherokee Nation' in a context where individual
property rights were at stake-the same mistake committed by the Tiger
Court3°'-the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that because the United States had
the greater power to substitute title in severalty for ownership in common without
the Indians' consent, 3 the federal government surely had the lesser power of
taking back a tax exemption-"a mere gratuity which could be revoked at
[Congress's] will"3 3-that it had originally granted.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, however, the Oklahoma
decision was unanimously reversed. 3' The Court first challenged the state
court's reliance on cases such as Lone Wolf in the context of the present
dispute. 30 5 Although Justice Lamar agreed that Lone Wolf stood for the
proposition that "the plenary power of Congress over the Indian Tribes and tribal
property cannot be limited... so as to prevent repeal.., by a later statute," 306
he also found this precedent to be entirely irrelevant to the present litigation,
which involved the property rights of Indian individuals over their individuallyheld allotments. 307 As the Court stated in a passage fully affirming the Lochner
Era's "anti-tribal but pro-individual Indian" doctrinal stance,

should also be fully competent to function in the same economic environment in which all other citizens
dwelled-i.e., an environment in which state taxation of property, like death, was an unavoidable fact of life.
295. For an interesting account of the transformation of Indian Territory into the State of Oklahoma, see
generally GrlrNGER, supra note 37.
296. See Choate, 224 U.S. 665.

297. See id. at 670.
298. See id
299. 187 U.S. 553 (1903)
300. 174 U.S. 445 (1899).
301. See supra notes 277-278 and accompanying text.
302. See Choate v. Trapp, 114 P. 709, 709 (Okla. 1911) (adopting the opinion of Gleason v. Wood, 114 P.
703, 708 (Okla. 1911)); see also Choate, 224 U.S. at 670. The Oklahoma high court's reading seemed correct.
After all, Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1803), explicitly held that the power of Congress over
its Indian wards could not be limited so as to prevent the repeal or abrogation of earlier statutes or treaties by
subsequent congressional action. Additionally, the Court had upheld another coigressional post-hoc "deprivation"
of previously granted property rights in Tiger, decided just one year earlier. See Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221
U.S. 286 (1911). If Congress could extend the alienability restriction on Indian-held parcels for another twentyfive years-and thus take away the individual allottee's right to dispose of his property after five years as
granted by earlier legislation--surely it could also take away the individual Indian's right to be exempt from

state taxation by a subsequent, properly enacted statute.
303. Choate, 114 P. at 709 (adopting the opinion in Gleason v. Wood, 114 P. 703, 708 (Okla. 1911)).

304.
305.
306.
307.

See Choate, 224 U.S. at 679.
See id at 671.
Id
See id.
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[tihere is a broad distinction between tribal property and private property,
and between the power to abrogate a statute and the authority to destroy rights
acquired under such law. The question in this case, therefore, is... whether
[the Indian plaintiffs] ... had not acquired rights under the Curtis [A]ct which

are now protected by the Constitution of the United States.M
A clearer affirmation of the tribal-individual distinction could hardly be stated.
Having framed the question at issue, the Court found that rights to tax-exempt
status were given as consideration to the Indians by the United States in exchange
for the individual Indians' promise to relinquish their equitable claims in the
tribally held properties. 309 By reading the Curtis Act as a contractual agreement
between the United States and individual Indian citizens, the Court easily found
that the 1902 Act vested the plaintiffs with legally cognizable property rights in
the tax exemption. 1 In the Court's words, "the plaintiffs were offered the
allotments on the conditions proposed; as they accepted the terms .. in the
relinquishment of their claims, [they] furnished a consideration which was
sufficient to entitle them to enforce whatever rights were conferred ....,,3

Having thus critically distinguished tribal property rights from individual
31 2
property rights, the Court had but one further hurdle to leap. Because the tax
exemption in the Curtis Act constituted a vested property right, the subsequent
cancellation of that right violated the Due Process Clause-unless the Court were
a difference., 31 3
to conclude that the fact that "the owner is an Indian ... made
The possibility that individual Indians as Indians somehow possessed weaker
property rights than those ordinarily possessed by other citizens would justify the

passage with the Tiger Court's reliance
308. Id at 671 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Contrast this
upon anti-tribal cases such as Lone Wolf and Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902), to uphold a
congressional repeal of previously granted rights of individual Indian allottees. See Tiger v. Western Inv. Co.,
221 U.S. 286, 311-12 (1911); see also supra Part ll.B.4.b.ii.
309. See Choate, 224 U.S. at 671.
310. See id at 672.
311. Id
312. The State of Oklahoma also argued that even if certain "rights" were vested by the 1902 "agreement,"
the right to be free from state taxation was not one of them. See id. at 672. Oklahoma pointed out that if
Congress can restrict the "right" of Indians to sell their property for an additional twenty-five years via
subsequent legislation, it could surely restrict the Indians' right to be exempt from state taxation. See id. In other
words, Oklahoma claimed that tax exemption and alienability restriction provisions were indistinguishable-and,
therefore, that Tiger was dispositive.
The Court rejected the state's argument and found that a grant of tax exemption was distinguishable from
a prohibition on alienation: "One conferred a right and the other imposed a limitation." Id. at 673. While it is
difficult to understand the exact basis of this distinction, the Choate Court ruled that because the restriction on
alienation at issue in Tiger was properly characterized as a limitation, a subsequent act merely extending the
length of this limitation was fully within congressional prerogative. See id. As Justice Lamar put it, "[t]he right
to remove the restriction was in pursuance of the power under which Congress could legislate as to the status
of the ward and lengthen or shorten the period of disability." Ild. On the other hand, a grant of tax exempt status
given by Congress as consideration for the individual Indians' promise to relinquish their equitable "title" over
the tribal property conferred a legally enforceable right on the Indian allottees. See id. As the Court found, "the
provision that the land should be nontaxable was a property right ....That right fully vested in the Indians
litIt concluded that the 1902 Act gave "the Indian[s] as good a title to the [tax] exemption as it did to
.... I"
the land itself. Under the provisions of the [Fifth] Amendment there was no more power to deprive [them] of
the exemption than of any other right in the property .... " Id. at 674.
313. li at 677.
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1908 Act.3 14 Oklahoma thus argued that even if the tax exemption was a
property interest, and even if the Curtis Act vested these interests in the allottees,
the usual judicial protection accorded such rights-heightened as it was in the
laissez-faire Lochner Era-did not apply because the subject holding those rights
was Indian.3 15 After all, the state pointed out, the Court had long held-since
as early as Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and as recently as Tiger-that Indians
possessed a special and unique status within the American legal system.3 6
Oklahoma thus urged the Court not to extend the same constitutional protection
accorded other citizens to the nation's Indian wards.
The Choate Court rejected this final argument and placed the Indian allottee
squarely under the aegis of the same laissez-faire Constitution that shielded
Lochner's bakers from governmental interference. As Justice Lamar stated in
language strongly evocative of Buchanan v. Warley' 7 and Adkins v. Children's
Hospital,31s "[the Indian] is not excepted from the protection guaranteed by the
Constitution. His private rights are secured and enforced to the same extent and
in the same way as other residents or citizens of the United States."3 9 Directly
rejecting Tiger's suggestion that the Indian's "wardship" status conferred authority
on Congress to abrogate property rights vested in individual Indians by prior laws
or agreements, the Court ruled that rights such as the ones at issue in Choate "are
protected from repeal by the provisions of the [Fifth] Amendment., 320
The similarity between Choate and cases such as Buchanan and Adkins should
not be overlooked. In each instance, the Lochner Era Court expanded the
boundaries of the laissez-faire Constitution established in its Lochner opinion.
Progressively embracing within its reach white bakers, 32' black home purchasers, a2 female hospital workers,323 and, in 1912, Indian land owners, the
Court of this era consistently evinced its laissez-faire colors. Although racism
undeniably played a role in the shaping of the Court's jurisprudence during this
period,3 25 it must also be acknowledged that color-blind laissez-faire ideals
determined many of the contours of the era's legal doctrine. The period's social,
political, and legal exaltation of an ideal world comprised solely of individual
agents competing for economic gain without state interference permeated-as it
did nearly every other area of law-the Court's Indian law jurisprudence. The
Court's hostility toward the rights of Indian tribes is but a corollary of the Court's
application of heightened solicitude for the rights of individual Indians. Indians

314. See id
315. See generally id at 677-78.

316. See generally id (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) and Tiger v. Western
Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286 (1911)).
317. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
318. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
319. Choate, 224 U.S. at 677 (emphasis added).
320. Id at 678.
321. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
322. See Buchanan. 245 U.S. 60.
323. See Adkins, 261 U.S. 525.
324. See Choate, 224 U.S. 665.
325. Look no further, for instance, than Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v.

Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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qua Indians were not abhorred by the Court; only Indians as members of
326
communistic tribes were antithetical to the era's hegemonic ideology.
III. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AND POLICY:
THE NEW DEAL AND BEYOND
History convincingly demonstrates that federal Indian policy underwent a
revolutionary transformation during the presidential administration of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt. 327 The revolution in Indian policy shared the same origins
as the rest of the New Deal reforms: the realization of the devastating effects of

326. An examination of Lochner Era Indian law provides evidence against both the traditional claim that this
was a period marked by judicial activism and Cass Sunstein's argument that the Court of this period was
preoccupied with the preservation of the neutral "status quo." See SUNSTIN, supra note 14, at 64-66. Although
a case like Choate might be characterized as an instance of judicial activism akin to Lochner (that is, both cases
upheld individual economic liberties against legislative interference), the anti-tribalism cases of the previous
section, see supra Part II.B.2-3, provide strong evidence of judicial acquiescence in the face of massively
intrusive congressional action. Objectively, Lone Wolf, for example, presented a ripe opportunity for an allegedly
activist Court. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). After all, Congress had explicitly breached
an earlier agreement with thousands of Indians in order to encroach upon the property rights of several Indian
tribes. See id. at 556. Instead of actively scrutinizing the congressional breach, however, the Court barely noted
the breach's potential pitfalls on the way to affirming the exclusive, plenary power of Congress to exert its will
over the tribes. As it deferentially stated, "Congress possessed full power in the matter, [and] the judiciary cannot
question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment of this legislation." Id. at 568. The Lone Wolf
line of anti-tribal cases exemplify judicial passivism, not activism, in the service of laissez-faire ideals.
Likewise, Sunstein's claim that the Court of this era was gripped by a belief that the status quo was
equivalent to the "neutral" position-and thus that any alteration of the status quo signified a non-neutral,
partisan departure deserving of judicial scrutiny, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 3 ("A departure from the status
quo signals partisanship; respect for the status quo signals neutrality.")-does not fit the evidence presented by
the Lochner Era Court's Indian law decisions. Sunstein's characterization of the Lochner line of decisions as
driven by a belief that departures from the status quo of the free market-in the form of labor regulations, for
instance-signify unwarranted partisanship, see id. at 48 ("ITihe Lochner Court relied on a conception of
neutrality, taking existing distributions as the starting point for analysis."), does not comport with the proindividual-Indian cases. See supra Part II.B.4. For example, Choate, a case closely related to Lochner by virtue
of its exaltation of the property rights of individual American citizens, surely cannot be said to be the result of
the Court's solicitude for neutral "existing distributions" against "partisan" alterations. The simple truth is that
the property right safeguarded in Choate was itself but a recent legislative creation. Unlike the liberty interest
in Lochner, the right to a tax exemption could in no way be characterized as a natural right possessed by all
participants in the neutral free market since time immemorial. Instead, it was a congressionally created
gratuity-paradigmatic of an alteration from the status quo-given to its possessors but a decade previous. This
particular economic right, in short, was not part of any "existing distribution"; it was nonetheless celebrated and
protected by the Choate Court against legislative interference.
Sunstein's account fits even less well with the anti-tribalism cases discussed in Part II.B.2. Recall that in
cases such as Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), and Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445
(1899), the Court was presented with congressional acts that attempted to eradicate and transform the existing
status quo-i.e., the tribal existence of Indians-into a laissez-faire world populated by individual property
owners. Under Sunstein's theory, such departures from the existing distribution of rights and privileges-from
communal rights to individual liberties-signified "partisanship" deserving of close judicial scrutiny. As
discussed previously, however, no such scrutiny was present; indeed, these decisions exemplify judicial deference
at its most extreme. In addition, the holding in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902), that "the
power existing in Congress to ... guard the tribal property . .. is a question within the province of the

legislative branch to determine, and is not one for the courts," id. at 308, for instance, directly contradicts
Sunstein's claim that alterations in the status quo triggered judicial solicitude in the Lochner era.
Thus, neither judicial activism nor the preservation of the status quo unify the anti-tribal and pro-individualIndian cases discussed in this Part. The link between them-and to the Lochner line of decisions-is, instead,
the ideology of laissez-faire.
327. More specifically, President Roosevelt's Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 1934 to 1945, John
Collier, led the revolution in federal Indian policy during the so-called Indian New Deal. See PRUCHA, supra
note 20, at 917-1013.
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a blinding adherence to laissez-faire principles, and the repudiation of the belief
that the atomistic private property owner represented the sole plausible conception
of an ideal human life. In the context of Indian policy, the New Deal ended
federal attempts to create small Lochnerian worlds on tribal lands and embraced
the communal way of life as a laudable route to human flourishing. Part III.A
discusses this transformation in policy and shows that subsequent events have
served to cement and confirm the "pro-tribal autonomy" paradigm of the New
Deal.
Part III.B briefly describes the demise of Lochner in the late 1930s Court and
the end of the laissez-faire Constitution in the substantive due process context.
This section serves to introduce those aspects of the New Deal transformation that
continue to resound throughout the modem Court.
Part III.C focuses on the consequence of the death of Lochner for Indian law.
It argues that in the post-New Deal world, the Court does not-and ought
not-entirely acquiesce to governmental actions that attempt to create Lochnerian
worlds out of tribal communes. As a result of the New Deal's embrace of the
"social welfarist" Constitution, the United States-its political branches and
its
courts-must accord some respect for Indian tribes' sovereign rights and
privileges. To justify this claim, this section will discuss a somewhat puzzling line
of decisions beginning with Shoshone 1328 in 1937. These decisions resurrected
an older respect for the tribal entity obliterated by the Lochner Era Court.
A.

A Brief Lesson in FederalIndian Policy: The New Deal and Beyond
The New Deal of Roosevelt brought with it a set of circumstances that made
Indian policy changes possible, for the Great Depression had nearly destroyed
long-held convictions about the illimitable progress of industrial America
....[T]he concern for corporate action ("socialism" in the minds of critics)
overcame the rampant individualism of American society and made Indian
communal life and desires seem less out of place; the problems of
urbanization made a back-to-the-land movement a reality, and Indian devotion
to the land appeared to be wise and reasonable .... Congress, caught up in
the excitement of the New Deal, accepted too a "new deal" for Indians.3 29

The so-called "Indian New Deal" of the 1930s ushered in a transformation as
dramatic, monumental, and lasting as other transformations wrought by the New
Deal. Its policy of acceptance and encouragement of Indian culture, tribal
sovereignty, and self-determination continues to form the core of the post-New
Deal policy landscape. To quote Francis Paul Prucha's praise of the achievements
of President Roosevelt's Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 1934 to 1945:330
"[John] Collier's Indian New Deal ...set in motion forces that could never be
stamped out. Appreciation of Indian culture, respect for Indian rights, renewal of
328. 299 U.S. 476 (1937).
329.

PRUCHA,supra note 20, at 917-18.

330. In the 100 years prior to Collier's term, there were thirty-two Commissioners of Indian Affairs. See
TYLER, supra note 50,at 319-20. Each commissioner thus averaged approximately three years in office. Furthermore, no individual had served in this capacity for more than eight years before Collier's unprecedented-and
still unrivaled--twelve-year term. See id.
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Indian tribal communities-in a word, Indian self-determination.., became the
road to the future."3 3'
1. The 1920s: Culmination of Assimilation and Beginning of Criticism
The assimilationist paradigm of Lochner Era Indian policy reached its zenith
in the early half of the 1920s.332 Both the drive for comprehensive Indian
citizenship and the quest for rapid allotment of tribal lands found their
culmination during this period. On June 2, 1924, Congress passed the Indian
3 33
Citizenship Act, thereby granting United States citizenship to all Indians.
The allotment policies of the Lochner Era were finally fulfilled as the earlier
policy of granting restricted patents to Indian allottees was gradually chipped
away.334 By 1920, the switch from an emphasis on protection of the Indian
allottee to an emphasis on allowing him to do whatever he wished with his
property was complete. 335 Although administrators and reformers alike realized
that the policy of "freeing" the Indians had many negative consequences-for
instance, much of the land immediately passed out of the inexperienced allottee's
hands-they refused to alter their course because of their belief that "[elven
Indians who lost their land gained valuable experience and learned a lesson in
responsibility. "' 3' The federal Indian Office, for instance, was not deterred by
the fact that a "very high percentage of the patentees quickly sold or mortgaged
their land and wasted the proceeds. 337 After all, "the ultimate absorption of the
Indian race into the body politic of the Nation" required that the Indian be treated
just like everyone else, however harsh the consequences.338
To a new breed of Indian sympathizers, however, the 1920s represented the
nadir of Indian policy. John Collier and the American Indian Defense Association
(AIDA) mocked the Dawes Act's failure to transform tribal Indians into
independent farmers and stockmen. 339 A simple and unchallengeable fact
consistently trumpeted by these critics was that the amount of Indian farming
actually decreased under the policy of forced allotment.' The explanation for
this was equally simple-allotment resulted in the loss of approximately ninety

331. PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 919; see id. at 1112; KENNETH C. PHILP, JOHN COLLIER'S CRUSADE FOR
INDIAN REFORM (1974); Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70

MICH. L. REV. 955, 966 (1972).
332. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 790.
333. See Indian Citizenship Act, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924). This law was necessary, despite the command
of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the Court had held in Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102
(1884). that Indians born in the United States are not, by that fact alone, citizens of the United States, because
they are not "subject to the jurisdiction thereor' as required by the explicit language of the Fourteenth

Amendment.
334. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 875.

335. See, e.g., A Declaration of Policy in the Administration of Indian Affairs, 1917 COMM'R INDIAN
AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 3, cited in PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 882 n.48; id. at 882-83.
336. PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 882.
337. 1Mat 883.
338. Id
339. See id at 895.
340. See id,
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million acres of Indian-held lands to white hands.34 The reality of hundreds of
thousands of landless Indians was becoming more and more difficult for Indian
administrators and the public alike to ignore. Even if Collier's claim that "two
thirds of the Indians in two thirds of the Indian country for many years have been
drifting toward complete impoverishment" was not entirely accurate,342 it was
close enough to the truth for many to realize that a new course in Indian policy
was necessary.
As one commentator has described, "[a]llotment and the other assimilationist
programs that complemented it devastated the Indian land base, weakened Indian
culture, sapped the vitality of tribal legislative and judicial processes, and opened
most Indian reservations for settlement by non-Indians."' 3 By the time that the
Brookings Institute's Meriam Report-a detailed document commissioned by the
United States Department of Interior describing and analyzing the entire spectrum
of governmental goals and failures in Indian administration-was issued in 1928,
it was clear that federal Indian policy required dramatic rethinking.3 This 800
page report considered almost every area of Indian life and federal policy.3' Its
conclusions were uniformly negative. The very first sentence is indicative of the
overall critical tone: "The conditions among the Indians[:] An overwhelming
majority of the Indians are poor, even extremely poor, and they are not adjusted
to the economic and social system of the dominant white civilization."34
It is not possible in this context to elaborate fully the findings of the Meriam
Report. 7 Suffice it to say that most reformers and policymakers of the time

341. See id. at 896 (noting that Indian lands were cut from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million acres in
1934: approximately 38 million acres were lost through surplus sales post-allotment, 22 million acres were lost
through reservation homesteading, and 23 million acres were lost through alienation by Indian allottees to nonIndians); see also WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 20. See generally LEONARD A. CARLSON, INDIANS,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAND:

THE DAWES ACT AND THE DECLINE OF INDIAN FARMING (1981); COHEN, supra

note 34, at 138.
342. PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 896; see Comment, supra note 331, at 959-60.
343. WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 19. Regarding the less tangible elements of the Dawes Act's negative
effects, another scholar has noted:
The blow was less economic than psychological and even spiritual. A way of life had been
smashed; a value system destroyed. Indian poverty, ignorance, and ill health were the results.
The admired order and the sense of community often observed in early Indian communities
were replaced by the easily caricatured features of rootless, shiftless, drunken outcasts, so
familiar to the reader of early twentieth-century newspapers.
WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND/WHITE MAN'S LAW 75-76 (1971).
344. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 810; see also Comment, supra note 331. at 960-61.
345. See Louis MERIAM ET AL., THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928) [hereinafter Meriam

Report].
346. lit at 3.
347. The MeriamReport'sharshest criticisms were directed toward the Indian Bureau's handling of education
and health. See id.at 3, 11,25,29-34. Regarding Indian health, the MeriamReport pointed out that Indians suffered
from an inadequate diet and that infant mortality, tuberculosis, and trachoma were commonplace on Indian
reservations. See i, at 3. TheMeriam Reportcalledthe federal government's education policy "grossly inadequate."
See id. at 11.
The Meriam Report also criticized federal land allotment policy. See id. at 40-4 1. Concluding that the allotment
programs that had dominated the previous fifty years of federal Indian policy "resulted in much loss of land...
without a compensating advance in the economic ability of the Indians." the Merian Reportrecommended that the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) should, at the very least, put on a conservative hat in its issuance of fee patents. See
id at 41. Additionally, it recommended the curtailing of the leasing of Indian lands to whites and the regulation of
inherited lands to prevent further fragmentation of the allotted parcels. See id. at 40.
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considered it to be a monumental work worthy of extended debate and perhaps
even capable of motivating reconsideration of the direction of federal policy. 48
As John Collier and the AIDA put it, the Meriam Report had "blasted apart" the
hegemonic assimilationist approach and "had set the stage for a radical change in
the government's Indian policy."' 9
In the end, however, the Meriam Report must be recognized for what it was:
a study commissioned by the Herbert Hoover administration for the express
purpose of pointing out areas of failed applicationsof the dominant Indian policy.
While the Meriam Report identified administrative deficiencies and program
shortcomings, it was not intended to be a transformative document. 3 0 Its
merely suggested better ways to achieve
affirmative recommendations
351
assimilationist goals.
Nonetheless, the Meriam Report did hint at the possibility of a new dawn in
Indian policy:
The object of work with or for the Indians is to fit them either to merge into
the social and economic life of the prevailing civilization as developed by
whites or to live in the presence of that civilization
352 at least in accordance
with a minimum standardof health and decency.
Explicitly recognizing the possibility of an Indian policy in which the separate
existence of Indian communities would not be immediately rejected, the Meriam
Report set the ball rolling for the Indian New Deal.353
3
2. John Collier and the Indian New Deal: Tribalism Reborn 5
To view the Indian policy of the Roosevelt Administration against the backdrop
of the Lochner Era's Indian policy is to see night and day: respect for tribal
sovereignty and cultural self-determination supplanted the previous era's demand
for the indistinguishable Indian economic agent-citizen. 355 Roosevelt's policy
was forged by John Collier, Secretary of the agitationist AIDA from 1922 to 1933
and then Commissioner of Indian Affairs for nearly all of Roosevelt's presidency.356

348. In a statement voicing its approval of the Meriam Report, the Indian Rights Association declared that
the Report "constitutes the basis upon which to proceed .... " PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 811.
349. See John Collier, Now It Can Be Told, in AMERICAN INDIAN LIFE, June 1928, at 1-14.
350. See Donald T. Critchlow, Louis Meriam, Expertise, and Indian Reform, 43 HISTORIAN 327 (1981).
"Meriam and his associates were less interested in changing current governmental Indian policies than with
ensuring that existing policies were implemented efficiently ... by well-trained specialists." Id.
351. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 809. Importantly, this was how the Hoover administration interpreted
the Meriam Report-not as a clarion call for a new day in Indian policy, but as a clear-sighted reminder that
more effort must be put into the proper implementation and execution of the current assimilationist policy. See
id.
352. Meriam Report, supra note 345, at 86 (emphasis added).
353. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 939.
354. See generally PHILP, supra note 331; GRAHAM D. TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND AMERICAN INDIAN
TRIBALISM: THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION

ACT 1934-45 (1980); Lawrence C. Kelly,

John Collier and the Indian New Deal, 44 PAC. HIST. REv. 291-312 (1975).
355. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 939.
356. See PRUCHA, supra note 26, at 540; PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 1013. Collier, a one-time social worker
in New York City, was introduced to Indian life on a visit to the Pueblos near Taos, New Mexico, in 1920. To
him, the "Pueblo communal and ceremonial life [seemed] an answer to the problems of human society," and,
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Without question, the centerpiece of the Indian New Deal was the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934357 (IRA), a law that signified the death of the
Lochner Era's assimilationism. 3" Although Collier initially sought to halt the
allotment policy through unilateral Indian Office action, he eventually realized
that the achievement of his pro-tribalist goals would require congressional
support.35 9 After much debate and many amendments, the IRA, also called the
Wheeler-Howard Act, was enacted into law on June 18, 1934.3 °

from that point on, Collier worked tirelessly to advance the cause of the tribal commune. As early as 1923,
Coller had written the following critical tract:
The policy of denying to the Indian a group existence[,] ... [a] policy which is sanctioned
by the belief that the Indian as a race must perish from the earth in order that ... some
creatures with Amerindian blood in their veins may rush to the arms of Civilization[,] this
policy, historically so natural, but now so inhuman and un-American, is still the policy of that
guardian before whose command all Indians must bow down.
John Collier, America's Treatment of Her Indians, 18 CURRENT HIST. 772, 779 (1923); see PRUCHA, supra note
20, at 798-99.
357. Ch. 576, § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 461-483 (1994)). See generally PRUCHA,
supra note 20, at 957;
358. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 944. Although the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) was the
heart of the Indian New Deal, Collier's pro-sovereignty principles were carried into many other areas of federal
Indian policy. The expansion of the IRA's reach is just one example. In its original version, the IRA excluded
from its coverage the tribes of Oklahoma and Alaska. See id. By May of 1936, however, the Alaska
Reorganization Act, ch. 254, 49 Stat. 1250 (1936), was enacted, and by June of the same year, the Oklahoma
Indian Welfare Act, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 (1936), became law. The content of the two 1936 acts was nearly
identical to that of the earlier IRA. A second example is Collier's success in pushing the Indian Arts and Crafts
Act (IACA) through Congress in 1935. See ch. 748, 49 Stat. 891 (1935). The IACA set up an Indian Arts and
Crafts Board charged with the duty of marketing and promoting traditional American Indian crafts and wares.
See id
The federal administration of Indian education also was dramatically altered during Collier's reign. During
the previous era, the emphasis in this field was on the obliteration of Indian culture and the preparation of Indian
students for the Christian, English-speaking, individualist American world. See, e.g., PRUCHA, supra note 20,
at 814. Estelle Reel, Superintendent of Indian Schools from 1898 to 1910, provided the following short summary
of the Lochner Era's policy toward Indian education: "We are aiming at the... formation of self-supporting,
God-fearing Indian men and women .... A civilization without the elements of labor in it rests on a foundation
of sand. Labor is the basis of all lasting civilization and the most potent influence for good in the world.
Whenever any race, of its own volition, begins to labor its future is assured." Id. at 814, 821, 822 (quoting
Estelle Reel).
The philosophy behind the New Deal's education policy was radically different:
Behind the present program of... Indian education, there is an assumption that is new with
us and I believe'is still relatively infrequent in the administration of native affairs
generally-namely, that native life itselfhas values that urgently need to be maintained The
customary assumption of white superiority is abandoned in the new program ....
It is
assumed that in all efforts carried on by the government ... [that] the purpose is to be
helpful while interferingas little as possible with existing modes of life. Indian ways of doing
things are considered to be right except as they are found, by the experience of members of
the tribe or others unselfishly interested in their welfare, to be positively detrimental to the
Indians ....

Id at 977 (quoting 3 INDIANS AT WORK 36 (1935)) (emphasis added).
The new federal emphasis on tribal existence was evident even in the area of Indian health care. For example,
"an increased appreciation [developed] ... on the part of [Indian Office] physicians for the role of the Indian
medicine men." Id. at 985. As Collier reported in 1941, "[nlot only are [western physicians] discovering values
in the Indians' medicinal herbs, massages, sweat baths, cathartics, and cauterizations, but they are sensing a
strong psychotherapeutic value in the songs, prayers, and ceremonies of the Indians." 1941 COMM'R INDIAN
AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 433-44 (quoting John Collier), quoted in PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 985.

359. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 951. For discussion of Collier's battles with Congress, see id. at 958-76,
1002-005.
360. See IRA, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-483 (1994)).
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In the original version of the IRA bill, Collier intended not only to end the
process of allotment, but also to reverse its effects by mandating the return of
individually owned parcels of land to tribal ownership and by providing that an
allottee's interest in allotted parcels would revert to the allottee's tribe at his
death.3"' Although the final version of the IRA did not include either of these
radical provisions-the forced return of individually owned parcels seemed too
harsh to many, including Indians who had improved their allotted parcels 362 --it
nonetheless retained a great deal of the bill's original content and effectively
"repealed" the Dawes Act.' As Collier stated on the final passage of the IRA:
"One becomes a little breathless, when one realizes that the Allotment Law-the
agony and ruin of the Indians-has been repealed." 3"
Specifically, the first section of the IRA prohibited future allotments, 65
indefinitely extended existing federal restrictions on alienation, 3 6 permitted
367
individual allotments to be voluntarily transferred back to tribal ownership,
and authorized the Secretary of the Interior to purchase additional land for tribal
ownership. 3 " This section of the IRA alone should suffice to demonstrate its
revolutionary reversal of the previous era's "assimilation via allotment"
policy--even if the enacted IRA was not as radical as Collier had originally
hoped. 3 "
Of the remaining parts of the IRA, the most important were sections 16 and 17,
which established the framework of the new tribal organizations contemplated by
Collier.7 0 Under section 16, Indian tribes were granted "the right to organize
for [their] common welfare, and [to] adopt[] appropriate constitution[s] and by3 72
laws"3'7 if they expressed their desire for a constitution by a majority vote.
These newly organized tribes would have the power "to employ legal counsel...
to prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands ... without
the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with the Federal, State, and local
governments. 3 73 Section 17 provided for the issuance of a charter by the

361. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 961.
362. See id at 956.
363. See PHILP, supra note 331, at 159.
Although it bore little resemblance to Collier's original proposal, the IRA established a
turning point in Indian history by abandoning future land allotment. It extended the trust
period on restricted land, allowed for the voluntary exchange of allotments to consolidate
checkerboard reservations, continued existing practices of inheritance, and restored to tribal
ownership remaining surplus lands created by the Dawes General Allotment Act.
Id
364. PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 962.
365. See 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1994).
366. See id § 462.
367. See id § 463.
368. See id. § 465.
369. See 1934 COMM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 79-80, quoted in PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 962 ("IT]he
policy of common ownership of land enunciated in section I ... is reaffirmed and implemented throughout the
body of the [IRA].").
370. See generally Comment, supra note 331.
371. Ch. 576, § 16,48 Stat. 987 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 476(a) (1994)). See generally Comment, supra note

331.
372. See § 16, 48 Stat. at 987; see also 25 U.S.C. § 476(a) (1994).
373. 25 U.S.C. § 476(e) (1994).
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Secretary of the Interior to the Indian tribes that would allow a tribe to manage
its own property:
Such charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the power to purchase.
or otherwise, own, hold, manage, operate, and dispose of property of every
description, real and personal, including the power to purchase restricted
Indian lands and to issue in exchange therefor interests in corporate property,
and such further powers as may be incidental to the conduct of corporate
business .

..."

Other sections of the IRA provided that $10 million would be set aside for loans
to the new tribal corporations, and that qualified Indians would be given
preferential treatment for positions in the Indian Office without regard to civil
service laws.375 As a result of this policy, the number of Indians permanently
employed in the Indian Service increased from a few hundred in 1933 to over
4,500 in 1940.376
Even this cursory description reveals that the primary objective of the IRA was
not merely the termination of the allotment policy, but the restoration of the
Indian tribe. 377 The IRA rested on principles of appreciation for Indian culture,
concern for Indian self-government, and dedication to the tribal-based
economy. 378 The philosophy underlying the IRA implied that, instead of a

374. Id § 477 (1994).
375. This preferential policy was upheld against an Equal Protection Clause challenge in Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974).
376. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 992.
377. See generally id at 942.
378. A general theme of the New Deal was the existence of a close relationship between academia and
political power. See generally Lawrence C. Kelly, Anthropology and Anthropologists in the Indian New Deal,
16 J. HIsT. BEHAv. Sci. 6 (1980). The Indian Office was not spared from this influx of academicians into the
corridors of power in Washington. Instead of economists, however, John Collier's Indian New Deal looked to
anthropologists for advice concerning the direction and implementation of the post-allotment Indian policy. See
Kelly, supra, at 7-11; see also PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 942-44.
As Prucha succinctly put it, "Jilf
the cutting edge of Indian reform had earlier been the Christian
missionaries of the Dawes Act [E~ra, now it was to be the social scientists." Id. at 942. While the causes of this
phenomenon cannot be ascertained, it is likely that the infusion of social science into the Indian administration
was born of the same forces that engendered the New Deal itself. "[T]he economic chaos of the Great
Depression... created an environment for social engineering experiments which would not have been tolerated
a decade earlier." Kelly, supra, at 6.
Immediately upon assuming his position as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Collier began to make a
determined effort to bring social scientists into the policy- and decision-making processes of the Indian Office.
See id. Even before the drafting of the IRA, Collier had contacted some of the country's most prominent
anthropologists to gamer support for his still-unveiled reform programs. See id. at 7. Encounters between the
federal Indian administration and the social science academic world were typified by the Indian Office's seeking
of expert advice regarding Indian life from university-based anthropologists. Initially, Collier sent out
questionnaires to anthropologists and requested them to provide "information relating to the structure of existing
Indian ...political organizations, land tenure practices, and Indian attitudes toward property rights." Id. at 7.
In addition, Collier took the unprecedented step of addressing the annual meeting of the Americin Anthropology
Association on his policies in 1933. See id. at 8. (Collier would himself, later in life, become a professor of
anthropology at the City University of New York.). See PHiLP, supra note 331, at 221. During the congressional
hearings leading to the passage of the IRA, Collier again recruited anthropologists to come to the Indian Office's
aid by inviting them to provide supporting testimony. See Kelly, supra, at 8. Subsequent to the IRA's passage
in 1934, Collier formed the Applied Anthropological Unit, composed of six anthropologists newly hired and
placed on the federal payroll, "'to study the contemporary social organization of each group of Indians that wants
to organize under the IRA so that the constitution drawn up will be based on the actual social life of the group."'
Id at 10-11 (quoting John Collier).
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melting pot, America ought to depict a great pageant of people. 37 9 Fundamentally, the IRA was a declaration by Congress and the President that Indians
should have the opportunity to enrich American culture through their uniqueness
rather than through a forced and artificial similarity. 380
3. Closing of the Indian New Deal
Collier and his tribalist programs came under sharp attack after 1937, at about
the same time that President Roosevelt's economic reforms began to lose
congressional support. 38 ' As a result, from approximately 1938 until his
departure in 1945, Collier was on the defensive. 3 2 No longer did he have the
political muscle to push new, pro-tribalist legislation through Congress; instead,
he spent all his energy preventing an increasingly hostile Congress from undoing
his earlier achievements. 3 Despite some setbacks, Collier's achievements were
there to stay: "[R]elations between the government and the Indians could never
again return to the situation in the pre-Collier days. ' 3 4
Soon after his initial victories in Congress, including the 1934 IRA, critics
began to attack Collier's Indian policy as atheistic, primitivistic, and communistic.
For instance, the pro-assimilation American Indian Federation complained in a
letter to Roosevelt that "the Indian Office was dominated and controlled by the
'Christ-mocking, Communist-aiding, subversive and seditious American Civil
Liberties Union.' 38 5 Harsh rhetoric aside, these charges were not altogether
untrue. Collier did in fact chase Christian missionaries from reservations, protect
Indian religious liberties, and promote Indian self-determination through the
common ownership of property.3 86 Motivated by such attacks, several
influential senators sought to repeal the IRA in 1937.387 Collier challenged the
move, refused to compromise, and eventually won a hard-fought victory. 388 As
he stated in an official release opposing this proposal, "[t]he right of the Indians
to group self-determination, to the pursuit of their own vision of the good ... is
so fundamental that it cannot be surrendered .... 389

379. See generally PHILP, supra note 331, at 160; TYLER, supra note 50, at 218.
380. See generally PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 957-73.
381. See id. at 993.
382. See id.
383. See id. at 998.
384. I at 993.
385. Id. at 996-97 (quoting June 19, 1936 letter sent by the American Indian Federation to President
Roosevelt).
386. See id. at 951-53.
387. See id at 998.
388. See idi at 1004.
389. See id at 998 (quoting a statement by John Collier to the Associated Press in March 1937).
"Collier's fight with Congress did not occur in a vacuum, for Roosevelt's New Deal itself underwent a
similar estrangement from Congress .. . .I" d. at 1002. Indeed, Collier's unyielding loyalty to unpopular
Rooseveltian measures-including his endorsement of the court-packing plan of 1937-was the source of much
of Congress's anger toward his Indian policies. See id. On the flip-side, Collier's popularity outside the halls
of Congress-like Roosevelt's-hardly waned throughout his administration, and positive publicity came often
in the press, especially in national magazines such as The Nation, The Atlantic Monthly, and The New Republic.
See id at 1003. Because of widespread popular support for his programs, Collier was able to drive back most
of the attacks on his policy of promoting tribal sovereignty. See id. at 1004.
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Toward the end of his term, Collier could accurately boast that there had been
no fundamental revisions of the New Deal Indian policy. Just as the nation "could
never turn back from the reforms of Roosevelt's New Deal, so Indian affairs, in
subtle if not in overt ways, exist in a situation that is the legacy of Collier and the
Indian New Deal. ''390 Although many whites and Indians continue to criticize
Collier's reforms,3 9' most agree that Collier's efforts to ensure the Indian's
cultural independence were a success.
To summarize the achievements of this transformative period, Collier's own
words seem especially appropriate:
In 1933, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt took office, Indian
policy was changed in fashions radical and exhaustive. The change, in
principle, was from maximal to minimal authority; from denial of Indian
cultural values to their emphasis; from expectation of Indian doom to
expectation of Indian triumph; from one-pattern policy to a policy of multiple
options; but first and last, from denial393to intense encouragement of group selfdetermination and self-government.
4. Indian Policy in the Post-New Deal World
Those who know the next chapter of the American Indian saga realize well that
a darker era of federal-Indian relations lay ahead: the period of termination.
Although this word portends a far more negative state of affairs than what
actually occurred, the federal government did seek to revive the assimilationist
policies of the Lochner Era by withdrawing (or "terminating") federal protection
of Indians and subjecting them to state control during the mid-1950s. 395
After the resignation of Collier in 1945, the executive branch slowly joined
Congress in a "massive drive to assimilate the Indians once and for all and thus
to end the responsibility of the federal government for Indian affairs., 396
Although bandied about as a possible new direction for federal policy since the
1940s, 397 the return to the Lochner Era approach finally took form during the

390. ld at 1012.
391. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 354 (arguing that the IRA's ideals were never realized), Philleo Nash et al.,
The IRA Record and John Collier,in INDIAN SELF-RULE 101, 104-09 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986) (testimonials
of individual Indians criticizing Collier's administration).
392. See, e.g., John Painter et al., Implementing the IRA, in INDIAN SELF-RULE 79 (Kenneth R. Philp ed.,
1986).
393. John Collier, Indians Come Alive, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1942, at 75, 78; see PHILP, supra note
331, at 211 (discussing a January 22, 1945 letter from President Roosevelt to Collier regarding Collier's
resignation, in which "Roosevelt suggested that if the Indians possessed greater self-respect and a stronger
feeling of solidarity with the rest of the country, it was because Collier really believed in the Sermon on the
Mount, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution.").
394. See generally Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 139 (1978); Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in
Bureaucracy, 62 YALE LJ. 348 (1953); Michael C. Walch, Note, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy,
35 STAN. L. REv. 1181 (1983).
395. See Walch, supra note 394, at 1184-86.
396. PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 1013.
397. See, e.g., Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 394, at 145-47. However, even as late as 1946, the Director
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs stated that the main objective of his office was "'the organization of Indian tribes
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of Dillon Myer, who was appointed Commissioner of Indian
commissionership
393
1950.
in
Affairs
Harsh language aside, however, the termination policy was a small-scale
movement in nearly every respect-in terms of its duration, its real-world effect,
and its level of support. First, the Termination Era was short-lived. The period
between the first official termination acts (approximately 1954) and the federal
decision to end the policy 39 (approximately 1958) was only a few years.400
Second, while grandiose plans were laid out in Congress to carry out a thorough
and complete assimilation,4 °' little was actually accomplished. By 1958,
terminated Indians numbered only "13,263, out of an estimated tribal Indian
population of 400,000, or not much more than 3% ..

,

Similarly, only

so that they may manage their own affairs, and the adaptation of native Indian institutions and culture to modem
conditions."' TYLER, supra note 50, at 163 (quoting Commissioner's Order No. 536 (Sept. 17, 1946)).
398. See Cohen, supra note 394, at 351-52.
Although a variety of federal initiatives were enacted as means to the assimilationist end, two particular
categories are of note. The first was termination, the program of immediate withdrawal of federal recognition
for certain Indian tribes deemed ready to be "set free." Among the so-called "terminated tribes" were the
Klamath, the Ottawa, and the Ponca. See Klamath Termination Act. 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-564x (1994); Ottawa
Termination Act, Act of Aug. 3, 1956, ch. 909, 70 Stat. 963 (1956) (repealed by Pub. L. 95-281. § I(b)(3), 92
Stat. 246 (1978)); Ponca Termination Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 971-980 (1994). By specific legislative acts, Congress
ended federal guardianship over the Indian tribes, divided up tribal property rights among enrolled members,
transferred trust property to individual Indians, and remitted the duty of governing Indians to the states in which
they resided. See, e.g., Klamath Termination Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-564x (1994); Menominee Tribe Termination
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 891-902 (repealed 1973); see also Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 394, at 151-53. In short,
Congress functionally re-enacted the Dawes Act of 1887 for a few select Indian tribes. Wilkinson and Biggs note
that fourteen such acts became law during the 1950s. See id. at 151.
A second, more encompassing "Termination Era" act was Public Law 280 (PL 280), ch. 505, 67 Star. 588
(1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. § 1324, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)). PL 280
provided that, for all Indian country within the states of California, Minnesota. Nebraska, Oregon, and (most of)
Wisconsin, jurisdiction over criminal offenses and civil causes of action would henceforth rest with the states.
See Walch, supra note 394, at 1185-87. Additionally, PL 280 provided that any state could assume jurisdiction
over Indian country by unilateral legislative action-i.e., without Indian consent. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25
U.S.C. § 1324, 28 U.S.C. § 1360. With a single congressional act, Chief Justice Marshall's holding in Worcester
v. Georgia that the laws of a state "can have no force" within Indian territory, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832),
was swept aside. Nonetheless, few states actually decided to take on jurisdiction over Indian territory because
of the additional expenses that such extension of state control entailed. See COHEN, supra note 34, at 177.
399. See, e.g., PRUCHA, supra note 20. at 1058.
[N]o Indian tribe or group should end its relationship with the Federal Government unless
such tribe or group has clearly demonstrated-first, that it understands the plan under which
such a program would go forward, and second, that the tribe or group affected concurs in and
supports the plan proposed.
Id (quoting Speech of Fred A. Seaton (1958)). Seaton further "declared that it would be 'incredible, even
criminal' to send any tribe out into the mainstream of American life until it was properly educated to shoulder
the new responsibilities." Id. (quoting Fred A. Seaton).
400. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 50, at 172 (describing the Termination Era as existing between 1953-58).
401. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 83-108, 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
[I]t is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the territorial
limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and
responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States... and to grant them
all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship ....
Id
This Resolution is often considered to be the keystone of the termination policy-despite the fact that it had

no obligatory legal effect and was merely a precatory expression of intent. See Wilkinson & Biggs. supra note
394, at 150.
402. PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 1058.
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approximately 3% of tribal lands held in trust were terminated during this
period. 3 Finally, the assimilation policy of the 1950s, unlike that of the 1880s,
enjoyed little public support. 4°4 Although ostensibly the work of Congress, the termination acts were "the work of a few men, for Indian affairs were not a major
interest of... legislators" during the prosperous, post-war America of the
1950s.1 5 Indian affairs during this time were controlled by congressional subcommittees dominated by western land interests and "what they proposed was
accepted by the full committees and by the houses without much question or
debate." 406
The election of John F. Kennedy as President in 1960 marked the end of the
Termination Era. During his campaign, Kennedy promised the Indians "'a sharp
break with the policies of the Republican Party,"' and declared that "[t]here would
be no change in treaty or contractual relationships without the consent of the tribes
concerned" and that "[n]o steps would be taken by the Federal Government to
impair the cultural heritage of any group."' 7 As a testament to the shifting tide
against the termination policy, even Kennedy's opponent in the 1960 presidential
campaign echoed this pro-Indian self-determination sentiment. As presidential
candidate Richard M. Nixon stated, he likewise desired to see federal policy shaped
"'in full harmony with the deepest aspiration of the Indian citizenry. 408
In the decade immediately following the period of termination, all three
presidential administrations followed the path forged by Collier. The Kennedy
administration, first of all, largely fulfilled its campaign promise of respecting
Indian autonomy and culture. 4°9 As the Department of the Interior's Task Force
on Indian Affairs stated in a 1961 report, "[tihe proper role of the Federal
Government is to help Indians find their way along a new trail-one which leads
to . . . maximum self-sufficiency ....
President Lyndon B. Johnson's
administration was no different. 4t ' In a special message entitled "The Forgotten
American" delivered to Congress in 1968, President Johnson stated: "I propose,
in short, a policy of maximum choice for the American Indian[-]a policy
expressed in programs of self-help, self-development, self-determination. 4 2
Rounding out the decade with President Richard M. Nixon, the 1960s completed

403. See id at 1058-59. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that for the members of the terminated tribes
the actual results were no less tragic than those of the Lochner Era's assimilationist policy. "The Klamath lands
were sold and the proceeds quickly dissipated. The Menominees were plunged into even deeper economic
troubles than they had previously endured ...
CANBY, supra note 66, at 25-26. See generally Cohen,
supra note 394.
404. See TYLER, supra note 50, at 174, 176.
405. PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 1042.
406. Id. at 1043.
407. Id. at 1087 (quoting John F. Kennedy).
408. TYLER, supra note 50, at 218 (quoting Richard M. Nixon).
409. See generally PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 1087-110.

410. Report to the Secretary of the Interior by the Task Force on Indian Affairs, July 10, 1961, at 77, quoted
in TYLER, supra note 50, at 189, 195.
411. See id at 200.
412.

Special Message to the Congress on the Problems of the American Indians: The Forgotten American,

113 PUB. PAPERS 335, 336 (Mar. 6, 1968).
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the repudiation of the termination policy and the return to Collier's pro-tribal
policy paradigm.41 3 As Nixon said in a special message to Congress in 1970:
Both as a matter of justice and as a matter of enlightened social policy, we
must begin to act on the basis of what the Indians themselves have long been
telling us. The time has come to break decisively with the past and to create
conditions for a new era in
414which the Indian future is determined by Indian
acts and Indian decisions.
1
Speaking of the "immense moral and legal force"" of treaties and agreements
further
made between the Indian tribes and the federal government, Nixon
4 t6 that these
acknowledged, in a direct rejection of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
41 7
relationships should not be terminated unilaterally by the United States. The
culmination of the Nixon administration's Indian policy was the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act of 1975.418
Federal policy has not wavered from the course of sovereignty and selfdetermination since that time.41 9 The contemporary trend in federal policy of
presuming that a "government-to-government" relationship exists between the
United States and the Indian tribes is good evidence of the continued life of
Roosevelt and Collier's New Deal transformation in Indian policy. President
Ronald Reagan's administration, for instance, took the stance that tribes would be
treated as "independent political entities" capable of managing those welfarist
programs that had, for about a century, been the responsibility of the federal
government. 420 President George Bush's administration reaffirmed this general
direction in policy: "Today we move forward toward a permanent relationship
of understanding and trust, a relationship in which the tribes of the nation sit in
positions of sovereignty along with the other governments that compose the family
that is America. 42 ' Most recently, the administration of President Bill Clinton

413. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 1111-15.
414. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 213 PUB. PAPERS 564, 565 (July 8, 1970)
[hereinafter Nixon Message); see TYLER, supra note 50, at 218 ("What Indians need is more authority to make
their own decisions.") (quoting Louis R. Bruce, Commissioner of Indian Affairs under Richard M. Nixon);
PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 1112.
415. Nixon Message, supra note 414, at 566; see PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 1112-13.
416. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
417. See Nixon Message, supra note 414, at 564-67; see also PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 1113.
418. Pub. L. No. 93-638. 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1994)); see
also Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1994) ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress
...to help develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and human, to a point where the Indians will fully
exercise responsibility for the utilization and management of their own resources .... "); PRUCHA, supra note
20, at 1157.
419. "Since the 1960s.... assimilation has not been seriously considered in high government circles. Nor
Erik M. Jensen, American Indian Tribes and Secession, 29 TULSA L.J.
is it a view evident in academia ...
385, 393 (1993).
420. See PRUCHA, supra note 20, at 1208; see also 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 98-102 (Jan. 24, 1983)
(Indian policy statement of President Ronald Reagan).
421. Prepared Statement of President Bush (June 1991), quoted in Maria Williams, Some Native American
Tribes Begin Push for Self-Determination, SEATrLE TIMES, June 30, 1991, at Al, available in WESTLAW,

ALLNEWS database, 1991 WL 4466153, at *5 (emphasis added); see Statement of Interior Secretary Manuel
Lujan, quoted in Bill Workman, Lujan Backs Tribal Governments, SAN. FRAN. CHRON., Dec. 3, 1991, at A3,
available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS database, 1991 WL 8813343, at *2 ("Our mutual goal is to strengthen the
government-to-government bond between the federal government and the tribal governments.").
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has also pledged its commitment to treating the "547 federally recognized tribes
as 'full partners' in a 'unique government-to-government relationship. ' ' 41
The bare-bones survey of contemporary federal Indian policy offered here does
not intend to suggest that all is well in the lives of American Indians. Far from
it: figures from the 1990 Census indicate that Indians are almost three times
more likely to be unemployed than other American citizens and that
approximately one-third of all Indians live below the poverty line.423 Indeed,
few would deny that Indians as a group are among the most impoverished of all
Americans. For the purposes of the present Article, however, the above sketch
suffices nonetheless. With the brief exception of the 1950s termination policy,
federal Indian policy since the New Deal has not strayed from the pro-tribal path
blazed by Collier.
B.

The New Deal Court: The Phoenix(es)from Lochner's Ashes
The death of Lochner in the aftermath of the New Deal is not questioned, at
least among the constitutionally sane.424 What is not nearly so clear is the
meaning of its demise. That is, given that Lochner is no longer with us, questions
arise regarding, first, the specific aspects of Lochner consigned to the graveyard
of discarded constitutional doctrines, and, second, the new doctrines that have
arisen to take their place. This section will re-tell a commonly told tale of the Old
Court's burial and the New Court's birth. 42 Within the constraints of an Article
that is, after all, about Indians, the story of the origin of the social welfarist
incarnation of the Constitution now follows.

426

Two prominent cases of this

A major stated goal of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994),
was the support of tribal sovereignty. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1994) (The purpose of IGRA is "to provide
a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal ...self-sufficiency,
and strong tribal governments ....");134 CONG. REC. H8153 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Udall) ("This Nation has had a longstanding policy of protecting the rights of Indian tribes to self-government.
Most acts of Congress in the last 50 years, including in this Congress, have been designed to strengthen those
governments. The tribal-state compact provisions of [IGRA] should be viewed in those terms.").
422. Tom Kenworthy, Clinton Administration Continues Dialogue with Tribal Leaders, WASH. POST, May
6, 1994, at A3,available in, WESTLAW, ALLNEWS database, 1994 WL 2285625, at *2 (discussing conference
between Indian tribal leaders and senior Clinton administration officials); see Kit Miniclier, ErasingInjustices:
IndiansAir Grievances with Feds, DENVER POST, May 6, 1994, at B1. available in, WESTLAW, ALLNEWS
database, 1994 WL 8632900, at *2 ("[Attorney General Janet] Reno and Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt said
they will expedite efforts to resolve Indian problems while reminding their staffs to respect the sovereignty of
all ...federally recognized tribes.").
423. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS, SOC. AND ECON.

CHARACTERISTICS. The overall unemployment rate of all Americans is 6.3%, versus 14.4% for Indians. See id.
at tbl. 44. The overall poverty rate is 10.0%, versus 27.0% for Indians. See id. at tbl. 49. Median family income
for all Americans is $35,225 in 1990, versus $21,750 for Indian families. See id. at tbl.
129.
424. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 445 (12th ed. 1991) ("Rejection of the Lochner
heritage is a common starting point for modem Justices .
); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-6, at 578-81 (2d ed. 1988).
425. Reliance here is on ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 100-02; HORWITZ, supra note 19; SUNSTEIN, supra
note 14; and Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
426. Another aspect of the New Deal transformation--the rejection of the Old Court's formalist jurisprudence
and the New Court's embrace of pragmatism-will not be the focus of the present Article. It might nonetheless
be helpful to briefly mention this "second face" of the death of Lochner.
The adjudicative posture of the courts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was characterized
by a formalist adherence to acontextual legal concepts and rules. See HORWITZ, supra note 19, at 15; see also
SUNSTEN, supra note 14, at 40-41. Decisions in concrete cases were often made with little consideration of
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factual complexities or real-world results. This formalism had the "effect of freeing legal rules from the reality
testing that regular encounters with the concrete particularities of social life might entail." HORwiTZ, supra note
19, at 15.
The emphasis on context-free concepts and the refusal to take into account the real-world consequences of legal
rules can be seen throughout the Lochner line of decisions. Here, the abstract concepts were "liberty to contract,"
"rightto private property," or"equality of bargaining position," instead of"negligence" or "consideration." Lochner
itself is loaded with acontextual, formalist moves. Justice Peckham's insistence that state intrusion into the bargain
struck between two parties cannot be justified unless one party was within the category of "ward of the state,"
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905), is typical. The Lochner majority's reasoning ran this way: parties
were considered to be in "Equality of Bargaining Position," and thus entirely free to exercise their "Liberty of
Contract" without state interference, unless one of them was a "Ward of the State." Each of these concepts was
conceived of in a formalist manner: (1) "Equality of Bargaining Position" obtains whenever both parties are adult
males of average intelligence and capacity; (2) "Liberty of Contract" is strictly protected in every situation unless
conflicting and compelling interests demand otherwise; and (3) "Wards of the State" include women, children, the
mentally or physically deficient, and (for now-mysterious reasons) "those who work underground." See KAHN,
supra note 73, at 112; Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56-58; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (upholding minimum hour
legislation for miners).
By ignoring entirely the well-supported data offered by the State of New York showing the often-unfortunate
state of existence of bakers and applying in algorithmic fashion the substantive due process doctrines forged in
earlier, equally formalist opinions, the Lochner Court invalidated the maximum hour law with nary a consideration
of attendant real-world complexities. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 69-72 (Harlan, J., dissenting). (Note that Justice
Harlan's fact-focused dissent represents a departure from the conceptualist grip of this era.) Justice Peckham's
jurisprudential approach provoked Justice Holmes's famous pragmatic, anti-formalist dissent: "General
propositions do not decide concrete cases." Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The majority in Adkins similarly
ignored the empirical evidence offered by the plaintiff. See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 559-60
(1923) (dismissing empirical evidence produced by plaintiffs showing desirability of minimum wage law for women
in employment environment of 1920s and finding that these facts "reflect no legitimate light upon the question of
[the act's] validity... [because the] elucidation of [the act's constitutionality] cannot be aided by counting heads").
The Court's formalistic stance again prompted a dissent from Holmes. See id. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(accusing the majority of transforming the "innocuous generality" that the Fourteenth Amendment protected "the
liberty to follow ordinary callings" into a formalist dogma called "Liberty of Contract").
Holmes's dissents in Lochner and Adkins became law in the New Deal Court. Indeed, his statement that
"[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases[;] the decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more
subtle than any articulate major premise[,]" Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting), serves as an able motto
for the jurisprudence of the New Deal. After 1937, judicial evaluations of claims to "legal truth" came "in the form
of a practical assessment of how different claims served our needs ... " SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 53. The courts
embraced the regnant pragmatism of the period, which "eschew[ed] dogma ... [and] focus[ed] its inquiry on what
approaches seemed to work." Id.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), discussed
in the text to illustrate the rejection of the laissez-faire Constitution, also help to demonstrate the Court's
jurisprudential transformation in the New Deal. The Nebbia opinion tediously recited the economic data produced
by the state to demonstrate the need for the challenged milk-price regulation. See 291 U.S. at 516 (noting that 13
public hearings were held, at which 254 witnesses testified, and 2,350 typewritten pages of testimonies were taken
during enactment of the challenged act); see also KAHN, supra note 73, at 127 ("The most obvious contrast between
Nebbia and Lochner is the Court's treatment of facts."). Finding that the factual particulars of the milk trade
reasonably justified state action to avoid price instabilities, the Nebbia Court stated that "so far as the requirement
of due process is concerned,.. .a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to
promote public welfare .... " Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537. The Nebbia Court thereby ignored the rigid categories
employed by the Lochner Court. After all, if "Equality of Bargaining Positions" and "Liberty of Contract," (both
invoked by plaintiff Nebbia), were plugged into the Lochnerian algorithm without a consideration of the particular
context, the act at bar surely would have been invalidated.
This newfound judicial regard for life's attendant complexities continued in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937). Taking "judicial notice of the unparalleled demands for relief which arose during the
recent period of depression," the Court found that minimum wage laws were necessary to prevent the exploitation
of female hospital workers, despite a lack of empirical evidence. Id. at 399. The four dissenters recognized the legal
revolution embodied in the majority opinion: "The judicial function is that of interpretation .... What a court is
to do, therefore, is to declare the law as written, leaving it to the people themselves to make such changes as new
circumstances may require." Id. at 404 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). The pragmatist approach can also be seen in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Two aspects of Justice Brandeis's opinion particularly evidence its
contextualist colors: (1) the rejection of the existence of a transcendental body of law awaiting discovery by judges,
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42,-will
period-Nebbia v. New York427 and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish
serve to illustrate this transformation.
The first significant blow to the Lochner Era's fixation with individual
economic liberties came in Nebbia, which concerned a law that sought to "'fix
minimum and maximum ... retail prices to be charged by ... stores to
consumers for consumption' [of milk]." 42 9 Nebbia, a grocery store proprietor,
was convicted for selling milk above the state-imposed price and subsequently
challenged the constitutionality of the legislation. 43° The justification proffered
by the State of New York was that fixed prices were needed to control the price
instabilities, peculiar to milk, that would have detrimental effects of a public
concern if not properly regulated. 43' This kind of generalized "public interest"
rationalization was, of course, the very type found wanting by the Lochner
Court.4 3 2

In framing the issue in this case, Justice Roberts writing for the Nebbia Court
critically stated that "[e]qually fundamental with the private right [to contract] is
that of the public to regulate it in the common interest."" The significance of
this equation is realized only when it is compared to the Court's earlier view in
Lochner that the presumption of legitimacy will always be on the side of
individual economic liberties, and thus that any governmental action intruding
upon those rights must leap a high hurdle to be sustained.4 34 In ruling,
moreover, that "[slo far as the requirement of due process is concerned, . . . a
state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to
promote public welfare . . . , Justice Roberts sounded the first death knell
of the minimalist state. By permitting the government to interfere with the market
whenever such intrusions were merely "reasonable" to promote "public welfare,"
id at 79, and (2) the explicit consideration of the real-world consequences of the rule of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1 (1842), in determining the "correctness" of Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
In any event, the present bifurcation of(l) the rejection of laissez-faire and (2) the rejection of formalism does
not mean to suggest that these two aspects of the New Deal revolution are entirely independent. It is quite plausible
to argue, for instance, that the new pragmatic-contextualist jurisprudential stance was what caused the Court to
realize the fallacy of the laissez-faire Constitution. Or, vice-versa, that it was the realization of the failure of the
laissez-faire Constitution-in the brutal form of the Great Depression-that triggered the rejection of the formalistconceptualist jurisprudence in favor of a pragmatic one.
427. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
428. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
429. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 515 (quoting N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 312, ch. 69 (McKinney 1933))
(alterations inoriginal).
430. See id
431. See id at 517-19.
432. See Lochner v.New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1905). The Lochner Court stated:
The mere assertion that the subject relates, though but in a remote degree, to the public health
does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation...
and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid
which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his
power to contract in relation to his own labor.

Id
433. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 523.
434. See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53-54 (analysis begins with acknowledgment of the constitutional
protection for liberty of contract, then proceeds to examine whether state interference is justifiable). But cf.id
at 75 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("[The Clonstitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory,
whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire.").
435. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 536 (emphasis added).
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4 36 As Justice
Nebbia left little of the ideal of a night-watchman state.
McReynolds correctly pointed out in his dissent, the legislation at issue in Nebbia
"is not regulation, but management, control, dictation" of an individual's liberty
to contract, 437 and surely would not have survived the close scrutiny employed
by the Lochner Era Court.
The final blow to the laissez-faire Constitution came in West Coast Hotel,
where the Court upheld the State of Washington's minimum wage law for female
hotel and motel workers. 438 The transformative nature of439this decision is best
seen in comparison to Adkins v. Children's Hospital, Lochner's female
cousin."' In Adkins, the Court invalidated minimum wage legislation for adult
female and adolescent hospital workers because it found that the law amounted
44
to a state-compelled payment of wages without regard to the work done. ' The2
Adkins Court described the challenged statute as "a naked, arbitrary exercise""
of legislative authority that
amount[ed] to a compulsory exaction from the employer for the support of a
partially indigent person, for whose condition there rests upon him no peculiar
responsibility, and therefore, in effect, arbitrarily shifts to his shoulders 3a
burden which, if it belongs to anyone, belongs to the society as a whole."

The world and the Court had dramatically changed by 1937. In his brief as
amicus curiae urging the West Coast Hotel Court to uphold the Washington law
and overrule Adkins, the Washington Attorney General explicitly conceded that
the aim of the challenged legislation was "to create an equality where none
existed [in order] to prevent employers from making an unfair use of their
superior bargaining power.9 44 4 Although this argument may not raise an
eyebrow in 1997, a bald admission that the ultimate goal of the challenged law
was to alter the given state of affairs in the free market of contracting agents
would surely have led to judicial invalidation during the height of the Lochner
Era. The fact that such an argument could even be explicitly asserted was a sign
of changed times.
Indeed, times had changed and the Court in West Coast Hotel accepted the
basic framework proposed by the amicus. The Court began its analysis by
reminding its audience that "[tihe Constitution does not speak of freedom of

436. Cf.Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61. The Lochner Court explained:
Statutes ...limiting the hours in which grown and intelligent men may labor to earn their
living, are mere meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual, and they are not
saved from condemnation by the claim that they are passed in the exercise of the police
power ....

Id
437.

Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 554 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).

438. See 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
439. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
440. The present discussion borrows from SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 45-47; see also Sunstein, supra note
425, at 876-77.
441. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 561-62.
442. Id. at 559.
443. Id at 557.58.
444. West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 383 (argument of amicus curiae).
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contract ... [;] [it] does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable
liberty.""' This acknowledgment must have surprised the plaintiffs and other
denizens of the world of Lochner, Adair v. United States,"6 and Coppage v.
Kansas.447 The West Coast Hotel Court then took the final step away from the
individualist, minimalist state of the Lochner Era:
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with
respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenceless against the
denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health and well being
but casts a direct burden for their support upon the community. What these
workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called upon to pay .... The

community is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers.48

The 180 degree turn from the Adkins opinion should be apparent: to the West
Coast Hotel Court, there was no longer anything "natural," "obvious," or
"presumptively correct" about a system in which individual agents are given free
rein to seek economic gain. As Cass Sunstein argues, the 1937 Court recognized
that even "[m]arkets are made possible only by government regulation, in the
form of the law of tort, contract, and property."" 9 State control over economic
affairs is thus no longer an exception, but in fact the unavoidable general rule. As
summarized by Sunstein, the Court in West Coast Hotel finally realized that "the
failure to impose a minimum wage is not nonintervention at all but simply
another form of action .... ,45o Read literally, the Court's language in West
Coast Hotel indicated not merely that the existence of an inequality in bargaining
position was sufficient tojustify state intervention, but that regulatory intervention
by the state was required in such situations. If the state did not intervene when
inequalities were present, then it would actually be contributing to-and
responsible for-the resulting inequities. 451 ' The Court's recognition of the
interconnectedness of all actors in the modem economy-and of the state-created
character of the so-called "free" market-spelled the end of the old world's
laissez-faire assumptions.452

445. Id at 391.

446. 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908) ("[T]he employer and the employ[ee] have equality of right, and any
legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract ....").
447. 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915) ("Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property ...

is the right to make contracts ... .
448. 300 U.S. at 399.

449. SuNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 5; see Note, The Peppercont Theory of Consideration and the Doctrine
of FairExchange in Contract Law, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1091-92 (1935) ("[Tlhe freedom from regulation

postulated by laissez-faire adherents is demonstrably non-existent and virtually inconceivable. Bargaining power
exists only because of government protection of the property rights bargained, and is properly subject to
government control.").
450. SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 50; see Morris R. Cohen, Propertyand Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8
(1927). See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 40-67.
451. See West CoastHotel, 300 U.S. at 398-99.

452. The four dissenters in West Coast Hotel recognized the revolutionary nature of the majority opinion.
See id. at 403 (Sutherland, J., joined by Van Devanter, J., McReynolds, J.,
and Butler, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing
the majority opinion and charging that, if one dislikes the laissez-faire Constitution, the proper "remedy consists
in repeal or amendment, and not in false construction").
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Confirmation of the New Deal Achievement in Federal Indian Law: The
Death of Laissez-Faireand the Rebirth of the Indian Tribe
The Supreme Court's Indian law jurisprudence could not remain unaffected by
the New Deal's repudiation of the laissez-faire Constitution and the historic protribal transformations that occurred in the federal Indian policy of the
contemporary period. Nebbia, West Coast Hotel, and Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins,4 53 did not occur in a vacuum, and they did not merely overrule
Lochner. This section argues that among the casualties of the New Deal
transformation were Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock4m and the three Cherokee Nation
4 55
decisions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This section
examines three "transformative opinions" of the post-1937 Court: Shoshone
458
457
and United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks. These
1,456 Shoshone 11,
three cases played for Lone Wolf the same role that West Coast Hotel played for
Lochner: that of the pall-bearing progeny.
C.

1. Shoshone I: Just Compensation for Indian Treaty Lands
On January 4, 1937, Justice Cardozo held for an unanimous Court that federal
appropriation of treaty-reserved Indian lands in explicit breach of an earlier
agreement constituted a Fifth Amendment Taking requiring just compensation to
be paid to the Indians. 4-5 9 The Shoshone plaintiffs based their claim on an 1868
treaty, in which the United States agreed to set apart 3,054,182 acres of land in
Wyoming "'for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the Shoshonee
[sic] Indians.. .[,] and for such other friendly tribes or individual Indians as from
time to time they may be willing, with the consent of the United States, to admit
amongst them,"' in exchange for 44,672 million acres of Shoshone ancestral
lands. 0 In 1878 the United States, over the objection of the Shoshone Tribe,
brought to its reservation a band of Northern Arapahoes-who "had been allies
61
military escort for
of the Sioux, who were the foes of the Shoshones" 40-under

453. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see supra note 426.
454. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
455. See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445
(1899); Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
456. 299 U.S. 476 (1937).
457. 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
458. 329 U.S. 40 (1946).
459. See Shoshone 1, 299 U.S. 476. A case decided two years earlier, United States v. Creek Nation, held
that an Indian tribe deserved just compensation from the United States for reservation lands appropriated by the
federal government. See 295 U.S. 103, 104 (1935). The earlier opinion is not discussed here for the simple
reason that its analysis and justification are both far emptier and weaker than that found in Justice Cardozo's
Shoshone I opinion. Justice Van Devanter's Creek Nation opinion did not directly discuss the precise basis of
its holding; specifically, it is unclear from the opinion whether the awarded compensation was the result of
congressional largess (as evidenced by the legislative grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to hear the
Indians' complaint), or of a "violation" of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. See id. Furthermore, Van
Devanter failed to explain, as Justice Cardozo does in Shoshone 1, 299 U.S. at 497-98, why Lone Wolf and the
plenary power doctrine did not preclude recovery by the Indians against the federal government. See Creek
Nation, 295 U.S. at 104.
460. Shoshone 1, 299 U.S. at 485-86 (quoting Treaty between the United States of America and the Eastern
Band of Shoshonees and the Bannack Tribe of Indians (1868 Treaty), July 3, 1868, U.S.-Shoshonee and
Bannack, art. 1I, 15 Stat. 673, 674 (1869)).
461. i1 at 486.
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permanent settlement. 2 Subsequently, the United States provided material and
other aid to the Arapahoes to help them settle in their new "reservation."" 3 The
land occupied by the Arapahoes grew to encompass nearly one-half of the three
million acres reserved to the Shoshones by the 1868 Treaty, despite frequent
complaints by the original Indian inhabitants."4 In August of 1891, the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs issued an official statement, again over the
objections of the Shoshones, certifying that 'the Arapahoes have equal rights to
the land on the said reservation which does not depend upon the further consent
of the Shoshones. . . .",40
Unilateral treaty abrogations by Congress were, of course, exactly what the
Lone Wolf Court had upheld as valid exercises of the United States' plenary
power over its Indian wards.4" Keeping this precedent in mind, Cardozo's
finding of a constitutional taking in Shoshone I in the same context is astounding.
This section carefully examines Justice Cardozo' s opinion in order to illustrate the
extraordinary hurdles that had to be overcome-by both the Shoshones and
Justice Cardozo-to reach the final holding that a Takings Clause "infringement"
had occurred when the United States violated the 1868 Treaty by introducing the
Arapahoes onto the Shoshone reservation.
a. Jurisdiction for the Shoshones
The United States Court of Claims was established in 1855 to permit many
types of private claims, especially those of a tortious or contractual nature, against
the United States for monetary damages." 7 Its existence constituted a partial
waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States.4 In 1863, in accord with
the spirit of the times, Congress expressly excluded Indian claims based on treaty
violations from the jurisdiction of the court. 4 9 As a result, Indian tribes who
were victims of federal treaty abrogations had to seek individual congressional
acts granting special jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to hear claims arising
from particular treaties.47 ° In an era in which even tribal lands held in fee
simple could be leased by the federal government to non-Indians over a tribe's
objections and in contravention of explicit treaty provisions,47' few such supplications reached sympathetic ears.472
By the late 1920s, times had begun to change and Congress occasionally
granted jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to hear Indian claims arising from
treaty breaches by the federal government. For example, Congress passed the Act
of March 3, 1927 (1927 Act), which the Shoshone would eventually employ in
462. See id at 487.
463. See id at 487-88.
464. See id at 488-90.
465. Id at 488-89 (quoting the Commissioner of Indian Affairs).
466. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); see also supra Part II.B.3.

467. See GETCHES, supra note 1, at 311.
468. See id
469. See id (citing An Act to Amend "An Act to Establish a Court for the Investigation of Claims Against

the United States," ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765, 767 (1863)).
470. See id
471. See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902); see also supra Part II.B.2.b.
472. See GETCHES, supra note 1. at 311.
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their suit against the federal government. 4" Earlier that year, the House
Committee on Indian Affairs had "reported a bill to make atonement for the
wrongs that for nearly half a century had been left without redress.,

474

The bill

quickly passed through both Houses, but was vetoed by President Calvin Coolidge
because it included a provision allowing the Indians five percent interest per year
on any property found by the court to have been wrongfully appropriated. 475
The bill was then sent back to Congress, which deleted the troublesome provision
and returned the bill to Coolidge, who promptly signed it. 476 The final version

of the 1927 Act provided jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to hear the
Shoshones' charges and explicitly removed restrictions arising from the statute of
limitations,47 so that the Court of Claims could "hear, examine, adjudicate, and
render judgment in any and all legal and equitable claims which the Shoshone
Tribe... may have against the United States arising under or growing out of the
[T]reaty of July 3, 1868 ..

.

Justice Cardozo, beginning his legal analysis with an interpretation of the 1927
Act, found that the Act itself "makes no admission of liability, or of any ground
of liability, on the part of the government, but merely provides a forum for the
application of the claim according to applicable legal principles." 479 He
explained that:
No cause of action can be vindicated [under the 1927 Act] unless such a
cause of action as, apart from the impediment of governmental immunity from
suit, was already in existence. Under th[is] jurisdictional act the court is to
inquire whether the violation of the [T]reaty of 1868 ...has given rise to

legal or equitable grounds of liability ....In the event of a failure to sue or
to prosecute the suit to a decree, rights and liabilities will remain as they were
before any act was passed. 4 °
Cardozo thus informed his audience that the resolution of the ultimate question
in the case-whether to grant or deny the Shoshones compensation-would not
be based on a congressional gratuity, but only on those rights of the Indians that
existed prior to any congressional grant of jurisdiction. If the Indians were to
prevail, they would have to rely on claims or privileges that always existed, but
that merely lacked a judicial remedy. 48'
b. Original Indian Title vs. Shoshone Indian Title
Beyond the question of jurisdiction, the next hurdle facing the Shoshones was
the long established doctrine that "Indian title" only conferred a right of

473.
(1927)).
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.

See Shoshone 1,299 U.S. 476, 484 & n.I (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1927 (1927 Act), ch. 302, 44 Stat. 1349
Id. at 490 (citing H.R. REP. No. 69-1628 (1926)).
See iS at 491.
See it
See it. (construing 1927 Act, ch. 302, 44 Stat. 1349 (1927)).
Id. (quoting 1927 Act, ch. 302, 44 Stat. 1349 (1927) (citing the 1868 Treaty, supra note 460)).
Id. at 492-93 (quoting United States v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians, 229 U.S. 498, 500 (1933)).
Id. at 493 (citing 1868 Treaty, supra note 460).
See id at 494-95.
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occupation or possession and not true ownership in fee simple." 2 The United
States thus argued that any "deprivation" of occupancy or possessory interests
would not require compensation. 8 3 The "Indian title" doctrine originated in Chief
Justice Marshall's seminal opinion in Johnson v. McIntosh,4 which concerned
the validity of land grants made by a tribe to private individuals.8 3 Marshall, in
finding the conveyances invalid, ruled that the act of "discovering" lands in the New
World gave the discovering European sovereign (or its American surrogate) a "title
good against all other Europeans" and "the sole right of acquiring the soil from the
natives. 48 6 Under the McIntosh rule, the Indians retained only the right of
possession or occupancy, and could not convey the property they occupied without
the consent of the discovering sovereign.4 87 In strong language subsequently
repeated in innumerable Court opinions, 48 Marshall held that "discovery gave [the
discoverer] an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by
purchase or conquest ....
McIntosh represented a significant obstacle blocking the Shoshones' claim; for
if conquest (as distinguished from purchase) was available as a legally legitimate
route to acquire Indian lands, it hardly seemed logical to hold that the discovering
sovereign was constitutionally required to compensate Indian tribes for the
appropriation of their lands.490 Cardozo circumvented this doctrine, while
continuing to pay lip-service to its vitality, by first distinguishing the Shoshones'
' Because the 1868
title to their land from that held under "original Indian title."49
Treaty had set apart the land at issue "for the absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation of the Shoshone Indians, 4 92 Cardozo found that their title was
somehow "stronger" than average, everyday Indian title.493 While conceding that
"title in the strictest sense was always in the United States," Cardozo nonetheless
ruled that "the Shoshones had the treaty right of occupation with all its beneficial
incidents." ' The crucial next question, of course, concerned the exact nature of

482. See i. at 496.
483. See id

484. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); see supra Part II.B.4.a (discussing McIntosh in the context of Jones v.
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899)).
485. See McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 543, 550, 555.
486. id at 573. Chief Justice Marshall described the nature of the Indians' title as follows:
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim
to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power
to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomever they pleased, was denied by the original
fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
d at 574.
487. See id at 603-04.
488. McIntosh is cited in nearly every Indian law opinion of the Lochner Era Court. It continues to be cited
frequently in contemporary Indian law decisions. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 699 (1990) (Brennan,
J.,
dissenting), superceded by 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994).
489. Mcntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587 (emphasis added).
490. See id at 598-99.

491. See Shoshone 1, 299 U.S. 476, 485 (1937).
492. Id at 485 (quoting 1868 Treaty, supra note 460).

493. See id
494. Id. at 496 (emphasis added). Justice Cardozo's refusal to apply the formal rule that title to Indian lands
is always held by the United States in fee simple is a good example of the new era's pragmatic adjudicative

approach. See supra note 426.
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these "beneficial incidents": what characteristics did the Shoshones' treaty-based
title possess beyond those normally associated with Indian title?49 5 Cardozo,
however, casually dismissed the need to spell out the precise distinction between
original Indian title, extinguishable by conquest, and "treaty Indian title"-whatever
496
that may be-which may not be extinguished by the sword alone.
With that brilliant act of legerdemain having been performed, the necessary
components were in place for the first monumental holding of Cardozo's Shoshone
I opinion:
The right of occupancy is the primary one to which the incidents attach, and
division of the right with strangers is an appropriation of the land pro tanto, in
substance, if not in form ....
The right of the Indians to the occupancy of the landspledged to them, may be
one of occupancy only, but it is "as sacredas that of the United States to the
fee. ,497
If one recalls the Court's Lochner Era decisions in Lone Wolf and the three cases
involving the Cherokee Nation, the conclusion that a tribe's "title" to its
reservation lands was "as sacred as" that held by the United States in fee simple
should seem nothing less than astounding. By collapsing the previously
unchallenged distinction between a fee simple interest and the Indian right of
occupancy,4 98 Cardozo went a long way in overruling the doctrine in McIntosh
that upon discovery, the Indians retained only a right of occupancy extinguishable
by the United States through either the dollar or the sword. 49 After all, if the
government's mere introduction of strangers onto Indian lands was found to be
the legal equivalent of a pro tanto appropriation, 0 0 little remained of the
proposition that the discoverer can extinguish the Indians' title "by purchase or
conquest.""'
c. Plenary Power in the Post-New Deal Court
The last hurdle for the Shoshones and Cardozo to overcome was the plenary
power doctrine enunciated in cases such as Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,"° Cherokee
Nation v. Hitchcock, °3 and United States v. Kagama.5 0 4 The plenary power
doctrine is the simple proposition that Congress possesses absolute power-

495. See Shoshone 1, 299 U.S. at 496.
496. See it ("[W]hat those incidents are, it is needless to consider now.").
497. 1d at 496, 498 (quoting United States v. Cook, 89 U.S. 591, 593 (1873)) (emphasis added). Again
notice the pragmatic approach taken by Justice Cardozo; instead of abiding by rigid, formalistic rules, Cardozo
concluded that the title held by the Indians, while traditionally conceived of as vastly inferior to title in fee, was
"as sacred as" title held in fee simple. See id at 497. See generally supra note 426.
498. The distinction was pragmatically described by Cardozo to be merely formal, not substantial. See
Shoshone 1, 299 U.S. at 496.
499. See generally Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
500. See Shoshone 1, 299 U.S. at 496.
501. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587.
502. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
503. 187 U.S. 294 (1902).
504. 118 U.S. 375 (1886); see supra note 94.
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exclusive and unreviewable--over the affairs of the nation's Indian wards."'
The doctrine presented an obstacle for the Indian claimants in Shoshone I because
Congress itself had authorized the settlement of the Arapahoes on the Shoshone
lands." Because the Court had already ruled that Congress could prosecute
Indian-on-Indian crimes committed on Indian lands (Kagama), could allot tribal
lands despite explicit treaty provisions against such action (Lone Wolf), and could
lease tribal lands held in fee simple for mineral exploration against the Indian
owners' consent (Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock), for instance, it did not appear
likely that the Court would find difficulty with Congress's mere introduction of
some unfriendly Indians onto the Shoshones' land, even if the land was "treatyrecognized." 0 7.
Cardozo, in his last and most important sleight-of-hand in Shoshone I, first paid
lip service to the plenary power doctrine.'
In the very next sentence, however,
Cardozo took back what Lone Wolf gave away:
The power does not extend so far as to enable the Government "to give the
tribal lands to others, or to appropriate them to its own purposes, without
rendering, or assuming an obligation to render, just compensation...; for that
'would not be an exercise of guardianship, but an act of confiscation"'....
Spoliation is not management. 5 9
In one short passage, Cardozo single-handedly renounced the bulk of the Lochner
Era Court's Indian law jurisprudence. If we take Cardozo's statements to their
logical end, nothing much would remain of either McIntosh or the plenary power
doctrine. A comparison of the following passage from Hitchcock with Cardozo's
remarkable pronouncement above illustrates the tremendous distance that the
Court had traveled by 1937:
The power existing in Congress to administer upon and guard the tribal
property, and the power being political and administrative in its nature, the
manner of its exercise is a question within the province of the legislative
branch to determine, and is not one for the courts."0
Cardozo concluded his opinion in Shoshone I by finding that the congressionally authorized introduction of the Arapahoes constituted a Fifth Amendment
Taking of the Shoshones' property. " As mentioned earlier, the first version of
the 1927 jurisdictional act was vetoed by Coolidge because it contained a

505. See Shoshone I, 299 U.S. at 497.
506. See Act of June 7, 1897 (1897 Act), ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62. 93-94 (1897).
507. Recall that the disputes in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 294 (1902), and Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899), all involved treaty-recognized and
reserved properties.
508. Justice Cardozo cited Lone Wolf, for instance, as authority for the proposition that the "[p]ower to
control and manage the property and affairs of Indians in good faith for their betterment and welfare may be
exerted in many ways and at times even in derogation of the provisions of a treaty." Shoshone 1, 299 U.S. at
497 (citing Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553).
509. Id at 497-98 (quoting United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1934) (quoting Lane v. Pueblo
of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 (1918)) (first omission in Shosone I.).
510. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. at 308.
511. See Shoshone 1, 299 U.S. at 497.
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provision allowing for the award of interest."1 2 This history, it would seem,
clearly indicated that the 1927 Act did not authorize the Court to award interest
even if the Shoshones prevailed on the merits of their claim. 5 3 Cardozo,
however, having already bounded over hurdles much taller than this one, held that
the statute's silence concerning interest did not preclude an award of interest
where there has been "an appropriation of property within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment. 51 4 He thus remanded the case to the Court of Claims for
calculation of the proper amount of interest payments due the Shoshones." 5
d. Summary
Somewhat paradoxically, the New Deal Indian Law Court, unlike the New Deal
substantive due process Court, exhibited its .changed feathers by protecting tribal
property rights against governmental action (through requiring just compensation
for appropriations of tribal land) instead of allowing governmental intrusions into
the free market (as in, for instance, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish"6 ). This
conundrum is only an apparent one. The Court's protection of tribal property
rights from governmental intrusions is perfectly consistent with the social
welfarist Constitution embraced by the new Court. Tribalism and communalism,
after all, are hardly core principles of laissez-faire. Translated more concretely
into the language of Indian law, the New Deal stood for the proposition that
governmental disruptions of tribal life were no longer immunized from challenge
merely because the intrusion promoted the obliteration of the tribal lifestyle and
the creation of new private property owners. More compelling reasons must be
offered to justify governmental actions that interfere with tribal existence.
2. Shoshone II: Full Recognition of Tribal Property
On Cardozo's remand of Shoshone I, the Court of Claims heard new evidence,
calculated the interest payments required, and awarded the plaintiffs a judgment
for $4,408,444.17 Included in this amount was the value of the standing timber
and mineral resources within the reservation at the time of the Taking by the
United States. 518 The government appealed this sole aspect of the decision to
the Supreme Court.""
a. A Strong Lochner Era Precedent: United States v. Cook
The United States "contend[ed] that the Shoshones' right to use and occupy the
lands of the reservation did not include the ownership of the timber and

512. See i at 491; see also supra notes 474-478 and accompanying text.
513. See id. As discussed earlier, Congress responded to President Coolidge's veto by drafting a new bill
that was identical to the earlier bill, except that it did not mention an award of interest. See id.; see also supra
notes 475-476 and accompanying text.
514. Id at 497.
515. See id. at 496-98.
516. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
517. See Shoshone Tribe of Wind River Reservation in Wyoming v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 331, 381
(1937).
518. See id at 377-79.
519. See Shoshone 11, 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
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minerals." 52 Even if treaty-recognized Indian title contained more "beneficial
incidents" than original Indian title, the United States argued that this treaty-based
title was not equivalent to full fee simple interest in the real property. 52 '
Because the only type of interest in real property at common law that included
the right to harvest standing timber and mineral resources on the property for
profit was the fee simple interest, the United States argued that the Court of
Claims erred in its award of compensation."
The government cited United States v. Cook 23 as dispositive of the case at
bar. In Cook, the United States brought a repevin action to recover cut timber
sold by tribal Indians to one George Cook.5 The decision in Cook turned on
the rights of the Indians to the timber, and thus on the nature of their title to the
reservation lands upon which they lived.525 Finding in favor of the United
States, Chief Justice Waite ruled that because the Indians' right in the reservation
lands was that of occupancy alone, they could only sever the timber for the
purpose of improving the land, and not for profiting from it.5 26 The opinion,
resting on the common-law principle of waste,527 strongly implied that the
Indians' right over their reservation land was merely a possessory one. As the
Court noted,
a tenant for life has all the rights of occupancy in the lands of a remainderman. The Indians have the same rights in the lands of their reservation. What
a tenant for life may do upon the lands5of28 a remainder-man the Indians may
do upon their reservation, but no more.
With so solid a precedent in hand, a reversal of the lower court's award appeared
inevitable-Indians, like others holding only a "life estate" in the land they
occupied, have no rights over standing timber and mineral resources on the land.
b. The Court's Transformative Opinion
In an opinion issued on the same day as Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 529
and United States v. Carolene Products Co., the Court surprisingly affirmed
the lower court's calculation of compensation. After summarizing Justice
Cardozo's conclusions from Shoshone 1,531 the Shoshone II Court began by

520. id at 115.
521. See id
522. See id at 116-17.

523. 86 U.S. 591 (1873).
524. See id at592.
525. See id at 594.
526. See id.
at 592-93.
527. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1590 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "waste" as the "[u]nreasonable conduct
by [an] owner of [a] possessory estate that results in physical damage to real estate and substantial diminution
in value of estates in which others have an interest").
528. Cook, 86 U.S. at 594 (emphasis added).
529. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
530. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
531. See Shoshone 11, 304 U.S. at 115-16 (citing Shoshone I, 299 U.S. at 484). Shoshone II spewed forth
this single sentence to summarize the earlier opinion:
In this case we have [already] held that the tribe had the right of occupancy with all its
beneficial incidents; that, the right of occupancy being the primary one and as sacred as the
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noting that the 1868 Treaty between the Shoshones and the United States
provided that "the Shoshones should have, and permanently dwell in, the defined
district of country... [and should enjoy] peaceable and unqualified possession
'
Construing the "right of perpetual and exclusive
of the land in perpetuity."532
occupancy of the land" to be no "less valuable than full title in fee, 533 the
Shoshone II Cour pragmatically ruled that "[flor all practical purposes, the tribe
owned the land."
The Court quickly disposed of the looming presence of Cook, concluding that
the case gave "no support to the contention that in ascertaining just compensation
for the Indian right taken, the value of mineral and timber resources in the
reservation should be excluded. 5 35 While this was technically correct (because
the earlier case involved a replevin action by the United States, not a Takings
claim by Indians), the later Court's interpretation of the earlier case is
questionable. Indeed, the Shoshone II Court went further and concluded that Cook
simply did not decide the question of whether "the tribe's right [to536reservation
land] was the mere equivalent of, or like, the title of a life tenant.,
One final aspect of Shoshone 11 is worth describing. The Court noticed certain
provisions within the 1868 Treaty that provided federal funding for teaching
Indian children and for instructing adults in farming and mechanical skills, and
other provisions safeguarding individual titles (for instance, the 1868 Treaty
allowed for voluntary selections of homestead-sized allotments by individual
Indians).537 Recall quickly that when the 1868 Treaty was signed, federal Indian
policy, although still committed to the project of transforming Indians into
indistinguishable citizen-farmers by segregating them on reservations, was
beginning to embrace the program of allotment.538
Regardless of the details, Shoshone Irs interpretation of the purpose behind
these provisions is a paradigmatic example of reader-response theory gone
wild.539 For the Court anachronistically described these aspects of the 1868

fee, division by the United States of the Shoshones' right with the Arapahoes was an
appropriation of the land pro tanto; that although the United States always had legal title to
the land and power to control and manage the affairs of the Indians, it did not have power
to give to others or to appropriate to its own use any part of the land without rendering, or
assuming the obligation to pay, just compensation to the tribe, for that would be, not the
exercise of guardianship or management, but confiscation.

304 U.S. at 115.
532. Id at 116.
533. Id
534. Id. Notice again the Court's acceptance of pragmatic considerations over strictly legalistic ones in
reaching its decision. Although the tribe did not hold fee simple title over its land, the Indian title that it did
possess was somehow "practical[ly]" equivalent to fee simple title. Compare id. with Shoshone 1, 299 U.S. at

497 (stating that Indian right of occupancy was "as sacred as that of the United States to the fee").
535.

Shoshone 11, 304 U.S. at 118.

536. Id
537.
538.

See id at 113-14 (citing 1868 Treaty, supra note 460).
See supra Part II.A.1.

539. "Under [reader-response theory], ... 'the work is more than the text, for the text only takes on life
when it is realized, and furthermore the realization is by no means independent of the individual disposition for
the reader....' Louise Harmon, Law, Art, and the Killing Jar,79 IOWA L. REV. 367, 412 n.65 (1994) (quoting
Wolfgang Iser, The Implied Reader: Patternsin Communication in Prose Fictionfrom Bunyan to Beckett, in
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Treaty as "plainly evidenc[ing a] purpose on the part of the United States to help
to create an independent permanent farming community upon the reservation." 40 To anyone knowing even a modicum of Lochner Era federal Indian
policy, the Court's reading of these provisions could hardly sound like anything
but a mystery."4 Such an anachronistic recharacterization of the previous era,
however, served well the function of revolutionizing the Court's Indian law
jurisprudence without attracting unwanted scrutiny. Finding that true "ownership
of the reservation land" would further the purpose of promoting the independent
tribal community allegedly contemplated by the 1868 Treaty, the Shoshone II
Court thus identified an additional justification for holding that the tribe's treaty
right of occupation was "as sacred and as securely safeguarded as [the] fee simple
absolute title. 54 2 Thus, the standing timber and mineral resources on the
reservation lands were properly included in the damage calculations designed to
compensate the Indians for their loss.543
c. Summary
Shoshone II symbolized the full judicial recognition of Indian tribes' treatybased property rights in the federal Indian law of the New Deal.5 44 A
comparison of this case with Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcocke 5 should suffice to
illustrate the striking contrast between the Lochner Era Court's and the New Deal
Court's treatment of tribal, treaty-based property rights. In Hitchcock, the Court
upheld a congressional act authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to lease
Cherokee lands to non-Indians for oil and mineral excavation. 546 Although
earlier treaties had explicitly granted the Cherokee tribe fee simple title over the
land in question, and despite the tribe's strenuous objections against the proposed
leases, the Hitchcock Court found that "there is no question involved in this case
as to the taking of property."' 7 In stark contrast, Shoshone 11 held that even
when Indians do not technically own their land in fee simple, but merely hold a
"treaty-recognized right of occupation" over the land, federal appropriation of that
READER RESPONSE CRITICISM 50 (Jane Tompkins ed. 1980)); see Peter D. Coffman, Power and Duty: The
Language of the War Power, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1236, 1267 n.3 (1995) (book review).
540. Shoshone I,304 U.S. at 117-18 (emphasis added).
541. Or, in a better light, the Court's reading can be seen as the creation of a myth of rediscovery within
the context of an amendment-analogous, transformative judicial opinion. See ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 43,
101. As Ackerman explains:
[Miodem lawyers do not describe either the substantive or the procedural aspects of the New
Deal by telling themselves a tale of constitutional creation. The triumph of activist national
government is mediated by a myth of rediscovery-as if the Founding Federalists had foreseen
the works of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and would have been surprised to learn that the great
struggles of the 1930[s] were necessary to gain the welfare state's constitutional legitimation.
Id at43.
542. Shoshone II, 304 U.S. at 117.
543. See id at 118.
544. See United States v. Kiamath & Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119 (1938) (decided on same day as Shoshone
i/)(holding that Indians are entitled to compensation for the federal government's Taking of reservation lands
and that the amount of compensation includes the value of standing timber and the interest on the unpaid value
of appropriated lands from the date of the original Taking).
545. 187 U.S. 294 (1902); see supra Part II.B.2.b.
546. See Hitchcock, 187 U.S. at 307.
547. Id
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land constitutes a Takings Clause "violation," for which the requisite compensation includes the value of all the "beneficial incidents" that ordinarily run only to
owners holding title in fee simple. 548 Although not immediately apparent,
Shoshone 11 effectively overruled Hitchcock and its denigration of the legal rights
of the tribal unit.
3. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks: Expansion
The disputes in Shoshone I and Shoshone 11 concerned Indian lands that the
federal government had agreed to set aside for the "absolute and undisturbed use
and occupation"' 9 of the Indian claimants. In those cases, the Indians' rights
were violated by subsequent governmental action that breached the earlier
agreement. 550 Read narrowly, the Court's holdings could be limited to exclude
tribal claimants whose property interests were grounded solely on "original Indian
title"-i.e., interests in land based solely upon aboriginal possession, and
unrecognized by the federal government through either executive order, treaty, or
legislation.
The question of whether such a narrow reading was correct finally reached the
Court in United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks.551 The Indian claimants
demanded compensation for lands taken from them in 1855 when, by executive
order, a reservation (for the use of other Indians) was carved out of ancestral
2
Tillamook lands with neither a treaty nor the consent of the Tillamooks. 5 The
Tillamooks argued that this act of appropriating land to which they held Indian
title was no different from the553seizure found to be a Fifth Amendment Taking in
Shoshone I and Shoshone H.
The practical significance of Tillamooks was well-recognized in 1946; for if all
aboriginal Indian lands involuntarily appropriated by the United States required
just compensation to be paid to their original occupants, the United States would
5potentially be in store for a flood of claims amounting to billions of dollars.
The legal aspect of this case was equally significant, for it squarely presented an
opportunity to revisit both Johnson v. McIntosh' s prescription that the discovering
555
sovereign could extinguish aboriginal title by either "purchase or conquest,
and the Lochner Era Court's generally anti-tribal stance as exemplified in cases
such as Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.5 56

548.
549.
550.
551.
552.

See Shoshone I!, 304 U.S. at 115.
Shoshone 1, 299 U.S. at 485 (quoting 1868 Treaty, supra note 460).
See idLat 478; Shoshone 11, 304 U.S. at 112.
329 U.S. 40 (1946).
See id at 44. The relevant facts are somewhat complicated. The federal government had in fact signed

an agreement with the Tillamooks for the cession of their aboriginal land in exchange for other lands secured

for the Tillamooks. See id at 43. The agreement was to be operative only upon ratification as a treaty, and
although the agreement was submitted to the Senate for ratification in February of 1857. it was never ratified.
See id
553. 1d at 49-50.
554. See, e.g., id at 55-56 (Reed, J., dissenting) (expressing concern about the consequences of the Court's
ruling because, "[w]est of the Mississippi, [the amount of unrecognized Indian land taken by the United States]
must be large.").
555. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823).
556. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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Chief Justice Vinson's plurality opinion in Tillamooks-joined by Justices
Frankfurter, Douglas, and Murphy-ruled that the Tillamooks deserved
compensation for their loss.557 This section will examine the steps the plurality
took to reach this remarkable conclusion.
a. Jurisdiction: Cardozo Revisited
Chief Justice Vinson's analysis began with the 1935 Act that granted the Court
of Claims jurisdiction to hear the complaints of the Tillamook Indians. The act
expressly empowered that Court to consider "any and all legal and equitable
claims arising under or growing out of the original Indian title .... Based
on such language, it was possible to construe the 1935 Act as embodying not only
a waiver of sovereign immunity and a grant of jurisdiction, but also a substantive
cause of action against the United States.559
Following Justice Cardozo's lead in Shoshone J,560 however, the plurality, in
agreement with the three dissenters on this point,5 6' rejected this interpretation
of the 1935 jurisdictional act.562 Finding that Congress by this law "neither
admitted nor denied liability," Chief Justice Vinson ruled that the 1935 Act
merely "removes the impediments of sovereign immunity and lapse of time. 563
In strong language, the Chief Justice set the stage for a no-holds-barred
constitutional confrontation:
No new right or cause of action is created [by the 1935 Act]. A merely moral
claim is not made a legal one. The cases are to be heard on their merits and
decided according to legal principles pertinent to the issues which might be
presented under the [1935] Act ..... By consenting to be sued, and
submitting the decision to judicial action, [Congress] ha[s] considered it as a
purely judicial,,rstion, which we are now bound to decide, as between man
and man ....
Thus, erasing the possibility that any award given the Indians would be based
merely on congressional charity instead of upon preexisting legal rights, Vinson
transformed a potentially trivial debate about the meaning of a jurisdictional
provision into a challenge of constitutional proportions.

557. There were four justices in the plurality opinion, one justice-Justice Black-in a concurrence, and three
justices in dissent. See Tillamooks, 329 U.S. at 41, 54, 55. Justice Jackson did not participate in the case. See
id.at 54.
558. Id at 42 (quoting 1935 Act, ch. 686, 49 Stat. 801 (1935)).
559. This was the interpretation accepted by Justice Black in his solo concurrence: that Congress, in the
1935 Act, "created an obligation on the part of the Government to pay these Indians for all lands to which their
ancestors held an 'original Indian title.'" Id. at 54-55 (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

560. See supra Part m.C.I.a.

561.
562.
563.
564.

See Tillamooks, 329 U.S. at 63 (Reed, J., joined by Rutledge, J. and Burton, J.).
See id at 45.
Id
Id at 45-46 (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 711 (1832));

see id. at 57 (Reed, J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority that "the Indians [by virtue of the 1935 Act alone)
get no money by grace or charity or for reasons of honorable dealings with helpless peoples") (footnote omitted).
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b. The End of Johnson v. McIntosh?
Chief Justice Vinson began the substantive portion of his opinion b
°
immediately acknowledging that the Tillamooks deserved compensation.'
Justifying this conclusion, however, required a peculiar reading of historical
precedent and a re-telling of the past. Vinson started his mythical tale with the
Ordinance of 1787, which declared that "the utmost good faith shall always be
observed [by the United States] toward the Indians; their land and property shall
never be taken from them without their consent."" Noble sentiments were
undoubtedly enshrined in this proclamation; however, the actual history of the
United States' relations with its Indian neighbors hardly evidenced "utmost good
faith" toward their property. Continuing undeterred with his exercise in myth
creation, Vinson next skipped over approximately 150 years of federal
67
misbehavior regarding tribal property rights, and remarked that "[tihe latest
indicia of [c]ongressional regard for Indian claims is the Indian Claims
,,.68 The lesson learned from this largely
Commission Act [of 1946] .
fictional history of benevolent federal Indian policy, Vinson concluded, was that
the "taking [of] original Indian title without compensation and without consent
does not satisfy the 'high standards for fair dealing' required of the United States
in controlling Indian affairs. 5 69 Seen within the context of the Lochner Era's
70
allotment policy and cases such as Lone Wolf, Hitchcock, and Stephens, the
conclusion that the United States had always dealt with its tribal wards in
accordance with "high standards of fair dealing" comes as no small surprise.
The Court in Tillamooks brushed aside the plenary power doctrine created in
Lone Wolf and Kagama even more casually than it did in Shoshone I and
Shoshone II. Although "admitting the undoubted power of Congress to extinguish
original Indian title," Vinson concluded that this acknowledgment "compels no
conclusion that compensation need not be paid."517 ' While logically true, this
conclusion conveniently ignored the Lochner Era decisions discussed earlier in
this Article. More importantly, after Tillamooks, there seemed little left of
McIntosh's holding that original Indian title could be extinguished by either
purchase or conquest. 72 If the sovereign is required to pay compensation for the
Taking of lands held under Indian title, nothing remained of the possibility of

565. See id at 47.
566. Id at 48 (quoting Ordinance of 1787, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1787)).
567. The Tillamooks Court did, however, take explicit notice of the Indian New Deal: 'The considered
attention given to the many ramifications of Indian affairs in the 1930[s] suggests that Congress well-realized
I at 53. The Court further stated: '"The
the import of the words used in the jurisdictional act of 1935 .... Id.
decade from 1930 to 1939 is as notable in the history of Indian legislation as that of the 1830[s) or the
1880[sl."' Id at 53 n.33 (quoting FELix S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 83 (1945)).
568. 1d at 49. The Indian Claims Commission was finally established in 1946. After 1946, Indian claimants
no longer needed new, individualized jurisdictional laws in order to gain access to the Court of Claims. See id.
at 49 (citing ch. 959, § 2(5), 60 Stat. 1049, 1050 (1946)).
569. ld at 47 (quoting United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 356 (1941)).
570. See supra Parts ll.B.2-3.
571. Tillamooks, 329 U.S. at 47.
572. See id
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acquisition by "conquest. 5 73 The power possessed by the federal sovereign over
tribally occupied and originally held land is merely the power it has over property
of any other kind-absolute power to acquire under eminent domain, but also the
absolute duty to pay just compensation. 74
c. Justice Reed's Dissent: The Lochner Era Revisited
The significance of the Tillamooks plurality opinion was not lost on the
dissent. 75 Arguing that the federal government was not required to compensate
Indians whose claims arose from seizures of aboriginal lands, Justice Reed echoed
many of the themes of the Lochner Era Indian law Court. Beginning his analysis
by agreeing with the plurality that the 1935 jurisdictional act merely constituted
a waiver of immunity and not an admission of liability," 76 Justice Reed
conceded-in deference to Shoshone I and Shoshone II-that "recognized" Indian
title represented a compensable interest in the event of a governmental
Taking. " However, citing Lone Wolf and McIntosh as support, Reed distinguished unrecognized aboriginal title from recognized title and argued that "the
sovereign without legal obligation could extinguish [original Indian] title by
purchase or the sword. 5 71 On precedential grounds, Reed was correct--even
a casual reader of earlier Court opinions in the area of federal-Indian relations
would have recognized the absence of judicial protection for aboriginal,
unrecognized property interests. Although the following cold-hearted
characterization by Reed clashed with prevailing sentiments in the post-New Deal
Court, it was entirely consistent with the pre-New Deal Court's Indian law
jurisprudence: "Indians who continued to occupy their aboriginal homes, without
definite recognition of their right to do so, are like paleface squatters on public
lands without compensable rights if they are evicted. 57 9
d. Summary
Times had dramatically changed in Indian affairs, as well as in the rest of
American life, by 1946. In the post-New Deal world, Justice Reed's claim, in
dissent, that the United States retained the right to extinguish Indian title "by the

573. See id at 47.
574. Those who know the next chapter of federal Indian policy, i.e., the brief period of termination in the
1950s, see supra Part III.A.4, also likely know the case of Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272
(1955). In a blatant misreading of Tillamooks, the Tee-Hit-Ton Court found that the Tillamooks decision awarded
compensation based solely on the 1935 jurisdictional act, and not upon the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 282-83.
It then concluded that because the particular jurisdictional act under which the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians brought their
claim did not create a similar obligation to pay on the part of the United States, the original Indian title held by
the claimants did not constitute an interest whose 'Taking" required just compensation. See id. at 284. Part
IV.A, infra, argues that the Tee-Hit-Ton case, like its federal policy cousin, the Termination Era, was but an
aberrant, anti-tribal blip on the post-New Deal screen.
575. See Tillarnooks, 329 U.S. at 55-56 (Reed, J., dissenting) ("It is difficult to foresee the result of this
ruling in the consideration of claims by Indian tribes against the United States. We do not know the amount of
land so taken. West of the Mississippi it must be large.").
576. See id. at 57 (Reed, J., dissenting).
577. See id (Reed, J., dissenting).
578. Id at 58-59 (Reed, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903);
Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587-89 (1823)).
579. Id at 58 (Reed, J., dissenting).
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5 0 The Tillamooks decision, like other
sword" hardly seemed plausible.transformative opinions of the immediate post-New Deal Indian law Court, was
the natural outcome of both the death of the laissez-faire Constitution, repre5
sented by cases such as Nebbia v. New York ' and West Coast Hotel Co. v.
5 2 and the birth of tribalism in the federal Indian policy of John Collier.
Parrish,
The combined effect of these concurrent revolutions was a judicial recognition
that the laissez-faire world was neither preordained not constitutionally required.
Concomitantly, the Court accepted the possibility that other forms of the polity,
whether in the mold of the highly regulated market of Nebbia and West Coast
Hotel, or in the shape of communally based, tightly organized tribal bands, were
entirely legitimate conceptions of social and political life under the Constitution.
Thus, just as governmental attempts to "create" such new societies were upheld
in Nebbia and West Coast Hotel, so governmental attempts to "destroy" such
"anti-laissez-faire" communities as Indian tribes were recognized as unconstitutional so long as just compensation was not forthcoming, as the three cases discussed in this section ruled.583

IV. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AS AN AXIOM OF POST-NEW DEAL
INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE CONTEMPORARY IMPLICATIONS
OF THE NEW DEAL REVOLUTION
The preceding Part demonstrates that the death of Lochner and its laissez-faire
outlook resounded throughout the corpus of the Court's decisions during the New
Deal. West Coast Hotel, Shoshone I, Shoshone II, and Tillamooks all signified the
loosening of the hegemonic grip of the laissez-faire Constitution, and together
confirm that in the new social welfarist world in which we now dwell, no ideal
juridical subject predominates, or is mandated by, American constitutionalism.

580. See id at 59 (Reed, J., dissenting).
581. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
582. 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see supra Part III.B.
583. Although Shoshone I, Shoshone 1, and Tillamooks combined to rescue the tribal unit from the graveyard
of perished legal entities, these decisions did not go so far as to resurrect the Worcester-derived conception of
Indian tribes as "distinct, independent political communities retaining their original natural rights .... "
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)
(holding that though tribes are not foreign nations, they "may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic
dependent nations"). While Lone Wolf s absolute disregard for the tribal unit was overcome by the three
immediate post-New Deal decisions, Kagama and Southern Kansas Railway's denial of sovereign status to
Indian tribes still stood unchallenged. As the Court stated in Kagana:
Indians are within the geographical limits of the United States. The soil and the people within
these limits are under the political control of the Government of the United States, or of the
States of the Union. There exists within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886) (emphasis added). Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas
Railway Co. echoed a similar sentiment: "The proposition that the Cherokee Nation is sovereign in the sense
that the United States is sovereign, or in the sense that the several states are sovereign ... finds no support.
... ' 135 U.S. 641,653 (1890); see Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261,265 (1901) ("[Tihe North American
Indians do not and never have constituted 'nations' .... In short, the word 'nation' as applied to the uncivilized
Indians is so much of a misnomer as to be little more than a compliment."). Although none of these turn-of-thecentury cases explicitly overruled Worcester, they did much to discredit the Marshall Court's pro-tribal posture.
As Part IV will show, the post-New Deal Court quickly went beyond the holdings of the three New Deal Era
cases discussed in Part III.C and rediscovered the respect given by the Marshall Court for the tribe as a
sovereign entity.
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In the six or so decades since the New Deal, the rejection of the laissez-faire
Constitution and the concomitant embrace of tribal sovereignty have become
axioms of contemporary constitutional life. As the Court recently stated, for
instance, "[Indian] tribes are, to be sure, 'a good deal more than "private
voluntary organizations,"' and are aptly described as 'unique aggregations
possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.'"" Talk of tribal sovereignty is rife in the modern world. 85 Although
the exact extent of an Indian tribe's sovereign power is the subject of much
heated debate-indeed, post-New Deal Indian law can be seen as essentially a
long and factually complex meditation on the limits, characteristics, and nature
of an Indian tribe's assumed sovereign status 3 6- all sides agree that tribes
possess at least some attributes of sovereignty akin to that possessed by the
5 87
federal and state governments.
A.

Confirmation of the New Deal Achievement: Tribal Sovereignty in the
588
Modern Era
In 1955, the Court repudiated the narrow holding of Tillamooks in Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians v. United States. 8 9 The Tee-Hit-Ton Court ruled that federal appropriation of non-recognized tribal land does not amount to a Fifth Amendment
Taking. 590 By blatantly misreading the Tillamooks precedent,59 ' the Court was
able to restore "the rule derived from Johnson v. McIntosh that the taking by the
United States of unrecognized Indian title is not compensable under the Fifth
Amendment." 592
The significance of the Tee-Hit-Ton decision, however, should not be
overemphasized; for it did not repudiate the holdings of either Shoshone I or
Shoshone II, and had no relevance for treaty-recognized tribal property. Like its
"policy cousin"-the termination program of the 1950s 593-Tee-Hit-Ton
was
584. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)),
superceded by 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994).
585. See discussion infra Part IV.A. A relatively early and explicit invocation of tribal sovereignty is the
decision in Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th Cir. 1959) (Indian tribes
"have a status higher than that of states. They are subordinate and dependent nations."). Although, in retrospect,
this language has proven hyperbolic, the notion that tribes are sovereign entities of some strength remains an
axiom of contemporary Indian law. See generally infra notes 626-627.
586. Two recent cases, for instance, have considered the question of the exact extent of tribal jurisdiction
over criminal offenses committed on reservation lands, either by non-Indians, see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), or by non-member Indians, see Duro, 495 U.S. 676.
587. See, e.g., Native Am. Church, 272 F.2d at 134 (discussing the federal court's lack of jurisdiction over
the internal affairs of the Navajo Nation, such as police powers, ordinances, and penal matters).
588. See generally WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 53-63.
589. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
590. See id at 290-91.
591. See supra Part m.C.3.a (discussing the meaning of the 1935 Act). The Tee-Hit-Ton Court concluded
that the finding of a compensable "Taking" in the earlier Tillamooks case was grounded solely upon the relevant
1935 jurisdictional statute and not in any way upon the Fifth Amendment. See Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 284.
Even a cursory reading of Tillamooks reveals, however, that both the four-justice plurality opinion and the threejustice dissent disagreed with this view. See Tillamooks, 329 U.S. at 45-46 (Vinson, CJ., plurality opinion), 5657 (Reed, J., dissenting). The only justice in Tillamooks whose view conforms with the Tee-Hit-Ton Court's
reading of Tillamooks and of the 1935 jurisdictional act was Justice Black. See id at 54 (Black, J., concurring).
592. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 284-85.
593. See supra Part III.A.4.
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short-lived; for within a few years of this decision, the Court turned away from
its anti-tribal sentiment and embraced tribal sovereignty as an axiom of
contemporary federal Indian law. The Court's 1959 term marked the first occasion
that the post-New Deal Court explicitly relied upon the Worcester v. Georgia
that
decision and hence, implicitly, re-embraced the notion of tribal sovereignty
594 In the
policy.
federal
and
Court
Era
Lochner
the
by
repudiated
been
had
landmark case of Williams v. Lee,595 the Court was confronted with the question
of whether an Arizona state court possessed the authority to render judgment on
a dispute arising from a contract made between a non-Indian plaintiff and several
5 96 The resolution of this case
Navajo defendants on the Navajo Reservation.
turned on the question of whether the Indian tribe itself possessed the power to
adjudicate such disputes-the power to adjudicate being an important attribute of
sovereignty that would have been frustrated if the Arizona court possessed the
power it claimed to possess. 597
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Black effectively overruled the
proposition, put forth in many Lochner Era decisions, that Indian tribes possess
no sovereign capacity whatsoever. 598 He concluded that the Arizona court had
no authority to adjudicate the dispute in question because allowing the state
tribunal to exercise such power "would undermine the authority of the tribal
courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the
Indians to govern themselves .... The cases in this Court have consistently
5
guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations." " Justice
6
M
Georgia
v.
Worcester
Black relied explicitly on Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion, quoted it for the proposition that "'[tihe Cherokee [N]ation . . . is a
distinct community, occupying its own territory. . . in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force, ' ' 60 1 and called the decision "one of [Marshall's] most
courageous and eloquent opinions.""6 2 Most importantly, the Williams Court
unanimously endorsed the proposition that "[d]espite bitter criticism ... [,] this
Court's mandate in Worcester ... came to be accepted as law .... [T]he basic
policy of Worcester has remained. ' 60 3 Approximately fifty years of highly
critical treatment of the Marshall opinion during the Lochner Era was thus
summarily disregarded.
Although Williams can perhaps be read as merely upholding the absolute right
of the federal government vis-A-vis the states in Indian affairs, subsequent

594.

An earlier case, United States v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940), ruled

that Indian tribes possess sovereign immunity. That decision is not discussed here because the recognized source
of the tribes' immunity was a grant of such privilege by the United States. See id at 512.
595. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
596. See id. at 217-18. One recent commentator has described Williams as a "watershed" decision that
"open[ed] the modem era of federal Indian law." WILKINSON, supra note I, at 1.
597. See generally Williams, 358 U.S. at 223.
598. See id at 222-23.
599. Id. at 223 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
600. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
601.

Williams, 358 U.S. at 219 (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561).

602. Id.
603. Id. (footnote omitted). Somewhat perplexingly, Justice Black included Kagama in a string-cite
supporting this proposition. See id at 219 n.4.
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decisions have confirmed the axiomatic status of tribal sovereignty. In the 1973
case of McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, for instance, the Court
faced the question of whether states had the power to tax the personal income of
an Indian earned on an Indian reservation.' In finding that the state possessed
no such power, the Court ruled that so grave an intrusion as the state's power of
taxation could be upheld only if the intrusion did not interfere with the tribe's
right of self government. ° As in Williams, the McClanahan Court quoted
extensively from Worcester and concluded that "the reservation of certain lands
for the exclusive use and occupancy of the Navajos ...was meant to establish
the lands as within the exclusive sovereignty of the Navajos under general federal
supervision."6°
Two years later, the Court in United States v. Mazurie6° ' held that Congress
could delegate regulatory authority over the issuance of liquor licenses to Indian
tribes°S-despite a precedent holding that delegations of general regulatory
powers to nongovernmental, private bodies were unconstitutional 9-and thus
implied that Indian tribes were at least semi-sovereign entities. 610 As the Court
reasoned, limitations on the authority of Congress to delegate were
less stringent in cases where the entity exercising the delegated authority itself
possesses independent authority over the subject matter. Thus, it is an
important aspect of this case that Indian tribes are unique aggregations
possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory, they are "a separate people" possessing "the power of regulating
their internal and social relations .... Indiantribes within "Indiancountry"
are a good deal more than "private, voluntary organizations"... 611
Noting that tribes possess "attributes of sovereignty" and "a certain degree of
independent authority over matters that affect the internal and social relations of
tribal life, '61 the Mazurie Court firmly rejected the anti-sovereignty sentiment
61 3 for instance, and
of Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co.,
61 4
sovereignty.
tribal
of
acceptance
Court's
the
reaffirmed
604. See 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973).
605. See id. at 179.
606. Id.at 174-75. As the McClanahan Court noted: "The Indian sovereignty doctrine ... provides a
backdrop against which the applicable treatiesand federal statutes must be read. It must always be remembered
that the various Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and that their
claim to sovereignty
long predates that of our own Government." Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
607. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
608. See id. at 544-45.
609. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); cf. Larkin v. Grehdel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S.
116 (1982) (invalidating a statute giving a local church veto power over the issuance of liquor licenses on
Establishment Clause grounds).
610. See Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557.
611. Id. at 556-57 (quoting Unites States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886)) (emphases added)
(citations omitted).
612. Id at 557.
613. 135 U.S. 641, 653 (1890); see supra note 583. See generally supra Part Il.B.2.a.
614. The modern Court often goes out of its way to ensure that
tribal sovereign prerogatives are preserved
against potential legislative interference. A good illustration is the Court's use of the pro-tribal "clear statement
rule" of statutory interpretation in Bryan v. Itasca County, in which the Court was called upon to decide whether
a county possessed the power to impose a personal property tax upon the mobile home owned and occupied by
a member of the Chippewa tribe on reservation lands. See 426 U.S. 373 (1976). Although the Marshall Era
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A recent, emphatic affirmation of the concept of tribal autonomy can be seen
in United States v. Wheeler," 5 in which a criminal defendant, who was
convicted by a tribal court and then subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury
for a crime arising out of the same incident, claimed that the federal prosecution
would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.6 t6 Because
clear precedent held that the Double Jeopardy prohibition did not apply to
successive prosecutions by federal and state governments, 6"' but that it did
apply to successive prosecutions by city and state,61 8 and federal and U.S.
territorial6 9 authorities, the question in Wheeler boiled down to the source of
the Indian tribe's power to punish wrongdoers--"whether it is a part of inherent

doctrine that state laws have no force over Indian affairs in Indian territory had been resurrected by this time,
see Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959), the State of Minnesota-and Itasca County in particular-argued
that a congressional statute passed at the height of the Termination Era had delegated the power of taxation over
Indian property to the state. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 378-79. The act in question was PL 280, which provided
that "civil laws of [the] State... of general application to private persons or private property shall have the
same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State .... " 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360(a) (1994); see supra note 398. Furthermore, although section 1360(a) of PL 280 did not specifically
provide that a state's tax laws could be extended over Indian country, a subsequent provision of PL 280, section
1360(b), specifically excluded the state taxation of certain categories of Indian property. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b)
(1994). Bryan's mobile home did not fall within any of these categories. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 377. These two
clauses of PL 280, when viewed together, strongly suggested that Congress had delegated the power of taxation
over nonexempted items to the state and county.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Brennan disagreed. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 390. Although some
reliance was put on evidence culled from legislative history that gave credence to Brennan's limited
interpretation of PL 280, see 426 U.S. at 379-83, the opinion conceded that PL 280 was at best "admittedly
ambiguous," id. at 392. Brennan continued, however, and ruled that in situations of uncertainty, the Court must
be guided by the "eminently sound and vital canon that statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes
.. are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians." Id. (citation
omitted). Thus, using the pro-tribal rule of interpretation to bend clearly anti-tribal statutory language, Brennan
concluded that because this principle of statutory construction has "particular force" in the face of a claim by
the state to tax Indians residing on Indian reservations, the county's attempt to tax was invalid. See id. at 392-93.
For other examples of the use of the "clear statement rule" to protect tribal sovereignty, see, for example,
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) ("States may tax Indians only when Congress has
manifested clearly its consent to such taxation[.]"); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,
247-48 (1985) (quoting United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 346 (1942)) ("[Tlhe Court has
held that congressional intent to extinguish Indian title must be 'plain and unambiguous."'); Matz v. Arnett, 412
U.S. 481, 505 (1973) ("A congressional determination to terminate must be expressed on the face of the act or
be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history."); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973) (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930) ("(T]his Court in
interpreting Indian treaties ... [has] adopt[ed] the general rule that '[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved
in favor of the ... wards of the nation .... '); and Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413
(1968) ("mhe intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress."). See
generally Frickey, supra note 1, at 413.
As one commentator has described, these slightly varying canons of interpretation embody both: (1) a very
liberal stance in determining when Indian rights exist; and (2) a very narrow stance in determining when Indian
rights are abridged. See GETCHES, supra note 1, at 157.
615. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
616. See id Wilkinson describes Wheeler as "play[ing] the crucial role of reviving the tribal sovereignty
doctrine and analyzing it at sufficient length to lay the doctrinal foundation for the opinions that followed."
WLKINSON, supra note 1, at 62.
Note also that Wheeler was decided just two weeks after Oliphantv. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978). Oliphantrepresented a set-back to the expansion of the tribal sovereignty axiom because the Court found
that tribes have no power to prosecute crimes committed on reservations by non-Indians. See id. at 212.
617. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
618. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
619. See Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
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tribal sovereignty or an aspect of the sovereignty of the Federal Government that
has been delegated to the tribes by Congress." 620 The Ninth Circuit ruled that
the "dual sovereign" exception to the double jeopardy prohibition did not apply
in this instance because "Indian tribes are not themselves sovereigns, but [like
federal territories] derive their power to punish crimes from the Federal
Government.""62
In an opinion by Justice Stewart, the Court unanimously rejected the circuit
court's reasoning and concluded that "the power to punish offenses against tribal
law committed by Tribe members, . . . was part of the Navajos' primeval
sovereignty, ha[d] never been taken away from them .... and [was] attributable
in no way to any delegation to them of federal authority. 622 In reaching this
conclusion, the Wheeler Court ruled that tribal powers are "'inherent powers of
a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished,"''623 and quoted
Mazurie for the proposition that "Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing
62
attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory ....
The Court concluded that just as successive state-federal prosecutions do not
violate double jeopardy, so too successive tribal-federal prosecutions do not
violate double jeopardy. In both situations, there are two distinct sovereigns with
independently derived powers of criminal prosecution. 6z
That Indian tribes possess legal capacities and powers normally belonging only
to sovereign entities is a foundational tenet of post-New Deal Indian law.626
Indeed, the central contemporary debate in Indian law assumes the validity of
tribal autonomy, but questions the exact scope of such sovereignty. While some
adhere to a narrow conception of tribal sovereignty, others hold an expansive
view of tribal powers.627 The importance of this dispute for present purposes is

620.
621.
622.
623.

Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 313.
Id at 319.
Id at 328.
Id. at 322 (quoting COHEN, supra note 567, at 122).

624. Id at 323 (omission in Wheeler) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).

625. See id. at 329-30.
626. "The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal powers is marked by adherence
to three fundamental principles: (1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any
sovereign state..... COHEN, supra note 34, at 123.
Many other recent decisions have noted explicitly that tribes possess inherent sovereign powers. See, e.g.,
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superceded by 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14
(1987); Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986); National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v.
Crow Tribe. 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); New Mexico
v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Moe v.

Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); see also Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823. 825 (9th
Cir. 1995); Texaco v. Zah, 5 F.3d 1374, 1377 n.5 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786,
793 (2d Cir. 1992); Smith v. Moffett, 947 F.2d 442, 444 (10th Cir. 1991); Blue Legs v. Bureau of Indian

Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1097 (8th Cir. 1989).
627. A good illustration is Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superceded by 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994), in
which the Court was faced with a dilemma created by two intersecting precedents. The case centered around a
criminal defendant, Duro, convicted by the Pima-Maricopa Tribal Court for the murder of a member of the Gila
River Tribe committed on the Pima-Maricopa Reservation. See id. at 679-82. Challenging his conviction by the
Pima-Maricopa tribunal in a federal habeas petition, Duro argued that the Pima-Maricopa tribunal had no
authority to try him because he was not a member of that tribe, but a member of the Torres-Martinez Band of
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not the question of which side is correct, but the simple fact that tribal
sovereignty is a shared and unchallenged starting point on all sides.
Contemporary Implications of the New Deal Origin of Tribal Sovereignty
This Article has argued that the contemporary paradigm of tribal sovereignty
was borne of the New Deal-that, like the modem social welfarist state, the
modem sovereign tribe is grounded upon and justified by the rejection of the
Lochnerian Constitution. Because courts and commentators alike have failed to
see this connection, however, they have failed to incorporate the implications of
the New Deal transformation into modem-day discussions of federal Indian law.
The Article concludes by discussing briefly three contemporary implications of
the argument offered here.
B.

Neither Worcester nor Lone Wolf The New Deal Birthdate of the
Tribal Entity
Some have argued that tribal sovereign prerogatives should be protected
because Indian tribes are weak and helpless entities requiring judicial solicitude
for their survival.6 28 The core of this justification, somewhat paradoxically,
harkens to anti-tribal Lochner Era cases such as Kagama and Lone Wolf. It is not
1.

the Cahuilla Mission Indians. See id. at 682. Duro relied on Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,
212 (1978), which held that the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes did not extend to criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians who commit crimes on the reservation. However, United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978),
discussed above and decided shortly after Oliphant, pulled in the opposite direction, for the Court there
reaffirmed the long-standing authority of the tribe to prosecute and try its own members. See id at 328. The
situation that Duro presented, therefore, stood "at the intersection of these two precedents, for here the defendant
is an Indian, but not a member of the Tribe that assert[ed] jurisdiction." Duro, 495 U.S. at 684.
Although the Duro majority determined that Oliphantwas the applicable precedent and hence held that tribal
courts have no power to prosecute nonmembers-whether non-Indian or Indian--even for crimes committed
within the tribe's territorial jurisdiction, see id. at 685, it commenced its analysis with the premise that tribes
generally possessed the sovereign right of criminal prosecution. See id. As Justice Kennedy noted at the
beginning of his legal analysis, "[t]he question we must answer is whether the sovereignty retained by the tribes
in their dependent status within our scheme of government includes the power of criminal jurisdiction over
nonmembers." Id. at 684. Although the conservative majority narrowly interpreted the extent of tribal
sovereignty, it generally agreed with the dissenters that "the powers of Indian tribes are 'inherent powers of a
limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished."' Compare Duro, 495 U.S. at 698 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322), with Duro, 495 U.S. at 688 (Kennedy, J.) (quoting Mazurie, 419
U.S. at 557) ("The tribes are, to be sure, 'a good deal more than "private voluntary organizations," and are aptly
described as "unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory."'). The dispute, in short, was not about whether tribes were sovereign bodies or merely private
associations, but whether the tribes' assumed sovereignty encompassed the power to criminally prosecute nonmember Indians. We have indeed come a long way from Kagama, Southern Kansas Railway, Stephens,
Hitchcock, and Lone Wolf. See supra Part II.B.
Including the limitation created by Duro, only four explicit limitations on tribal sovereign power-all
supposedly necessary implications of the tribes' status as "domestic dependent nations"-have been established
by judicial decisions. First, tribes have no power to enter into direct diplomatic or commercial relations with
foreign nations. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832); see also Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831). Second, tribes have no right to alienate freely the land they occupy
to non-Indians. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 23 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 604 (1823); see also Oneida Indian Nation
v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667-68 (1974). But see supra Part III.C.3.b. Third, tribes have no power
to prosecute or try non-Indians for crimes committed in Indian country. See Oliphant,435 U.S. at 212. Duro's
rejection of a tribe's right to prosecute non-member Indians is the fourth limitation on tribal sovereignty.
628. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164. 174 (1973); Carpenter v. Shaw,
280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930) ("Doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people
who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.").
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difficult to see visible traces of this justification in the following oft-cited
explanation for the plenary power doctrine: "Indian tribes are the wards of the
nation. They are communities dependent on the United States[;]dependent largely
for their daily food[; diependent for their political rights ....From their very
weakness and helplessness,. . . there arises the duty ofprotection, and with it the
power."6 29 Tribal weakness and dependency operate as a two-edged sword.
Although invoked to justify Congressional exercise of power over Indians in the
Lochner Era cases discussed earlier, this same feebleness is the source of the
contemporary federal "duty of protection" and, hence, respect for tribal
prerogatives. One incarnation of this federal trusteeship duty630 is the judicial
protection of Indian tribes through the construction of statutes so as to avoid
treaty-abrogating or Indian-harming consequences.63' Ironically, therefore, this
theory claims that the pro-tribal posture of modem federal Indian law falls from
the same "guardian-ward" or "trustee-beneficiary" tree as Lone Wolf-plenary
power is both a sword for Congress and a shield for Indian tribes.632
The other commonly invoked justification for the pro-sovereignty axiom-this
time harkening back not to the Lochner Era but to the early Marshall Court-has
recently been defended by Phillip Frickey. 6 a He argues, for instance, that Chief
634
Justice Marshall's Indian law opinions undergird the autonomy-protecting
"clear statement rule" (seen in cases such as Bryan v. Itasca County63 5), that
favors a tribe's sovereign prerogatives over potential encroachments by either
federal or state legislatures.63 6 Frickey attempts to revive this sometimessomnolent canon by recalling Marshall's decision in Worcester, which held that
the laws of the State of Georgia had no effect in Cherokee territory.637 Drawing
from this decision, Frickey concludes that the same justification given for clear
statement rules designed to preserve basic constitutional, structural, or institutional
schemes also grounds the pro-sovereignty canon. 638 For instance, because Indian

629. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) (original emphasis omitted) (emphasis added);
see Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
630. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (finding the United States liable
for mishandling tribal member funds because the government was to "be judged by the most exacting fiduciary
standards").
631. See Carpenter,280 U.S. at 367-68; see also supra note 614.
632. See, e.g., Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of indian Treaty Abrogation: "As
Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601,
655-56 (1975) (Treaty rights of Indians should be abrogated only by express statement in subsequent statutory
law because the "relationship of Congress toward the American Indian is characterized by uniquely broad power
and a fiduciary's duty."); GETCHES, supra note 1, at 348 n.4 ("A primary reason for the toughness of the rules
[of construction] is the development of 150 years of law ... dealing with the trust relationship.").
633. See generally Frickey, supra note 1.
634. See id at 412-13.
635. 426 U.S. 373 (1976); see supra note 614.
636. See Frickey, supra note 1,at 412-17.
637. See id. In Marshall's words, a tribe was "a distinct community occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
638. See Frickey, supra note 1, at 439-40. One example of a rule designed to preserve a basic structural scheme
is the interpretive canon providing that "'the historic police powers of the States [are] not... superseded by [a]
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P.
Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: ClearStatement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking,45 VAND. L. REV. 593,
607 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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treaties are "premised on the continuing nature of tribal sovereignty ' 639- i.e.,
they structure an ongoing relationship between sovereigns-there must exist a rule
of construction whereby the judiciary can carefully police the boundaries of that
relationship. Relying on Chief Justice Marshall's view that agreements between
Indian tribes and the United States represent "constitutive document[s] providing
the undergirding and framework for an ongoing (tribal) government-(federal)
government relationship," 40 Frickey concludes that this constitutes the source
of the modem Court's use of a "stringent approach to protect the spirit" of these
documents from evisceration by subsequent governmental acts. 64 t
Neither Frickey's Marshall-centered account nor the tribal "weakness and
dependency" account, however, can withstand scrutiny. Each suffers from a
temporal flaw in its reliance upon long-repudiated conceptions of the federalIndian relationship. Frickey's justification, first, fatally skips over the entire
Lochner Era. For even if one grants Frickey his interpretation of the Marshallian
case law,6 2 the era of allotment and assimilation (beginning with the 1871 Act
terminating federal treaty-making with Indians 643 and culminating in cases such
as Stephens, Hitchcock, Kagama, and Lone Wolf 644) effectively buried the
principle that Indian tribes possessed a separate, independent existence as
sovereign entities. In a world defined by laissez-faire ideals and populated solely
by atomistic, juridical subjects striving for economic gain in the minimalist state,
no room remained on the constitutional landscape for judicial deference toward
communally based tribal societies populated by "unproductive" nomadic wanderers.' 5 Frickey's assertion that a meaningful version of "tribal sovereignty"
survived this period amounts to an act of mythic reinvention that 646
succeeds only
by overlooking approximately fifty years of both history and law.
The justification that grounds respect for tribal sovereignty upon the federal
government's duty to protect its Indian wards likewise suffers from a temporal
flaw. Instead of ignoring the assimilationist Constitution of the Lone Wolf Court,
however, this rationale-borne of the Lochner Era itself-fails to incorporate the
achievements of the New Deal transformation described in Part III. The 1930s
heralded both the death of the laissez-faire Constitution and the birth of John
Collier's pro-self-determination federal Indian policy. On the technically legal side

639. Frickey, supra note 1, at 403.
640. ld at 409.
641. See id at 412.
642. It is quite possible, however, to construe the "achievements" of the Marshall Court quite differently.
For instance, by pointing either to Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), which ruled that the
United States possessed the power to extinguish Indian title by purchase or by the sword, or to Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831), which characterized the federal-Indian relation as one of guardian to
ward, one can plausibly argue that it is Marshall himself who is to blame for the subsequent disaster for tribal
life during the Lochner Era.
643. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871 (1871 Act), ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (1871) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 71 (1994)) ("No Indian nation or tribe ... shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent
nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty ....");see also supra Part II.A. I.
644. See supra Parts II.B.2-3.
645. See supra Part H. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886) ("There exists within
the broad domain of sovereignty but these two[, the federal government and the states.]").
646. See Frickey, supra note 1, at 392-98. Compare Frickey's account with Chief Justice Vinson's re-telling
of the myth of federal Indian relations in Tillamooks. See supra Part IlI.C.3.b.
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of the equation, first, the New Deal represented the Court's acceptance of other
ways of life-whether the highly regulated welfare state or the tightly-knit tribal
community-as worthy and legitimate modes of existence under the federal Constitution. " On the political-historical side, the New Deal represented the
acceptance of anti-laissez faire legislation-whether in the form of welfarist,
market-intrusive programs such as those upheld in Nebbia v. New York" 8 and
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,9 or in the form of pro-tribal initiatives such
as the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 65 0 -as an entirely appropriate mode
of governmental action.65' The true birthplace of the modern sovereign tribe is
the New Deal. The welfare state and the sovereign tribe of 1997 are both the
offspring of cases such as West Coast Hotel.
2. Infringement upon Tribal Sovereignty as the Reembracing of Lochner
The above reconceptualization of the origin of the modem sovereignty axiom
surprisingly leads to the conclusion that judicial decisions insufficiently protective
of a tribe's sovereign prerogatives represent retreats to the Lochner Era's laissezfaire Constitution. Because sovereignty, like modem welfarism, is, in a sense,
grounded upon the rejection of Lochnerism, the rejection of sovereignty-like the
rejection of the welfare state-implicates the re-embracing of Lochner. A court
that decides to uphold legislative intrusions into tribal sovereign privileges, or to
invalidate legislative attempts to restore tribal powers, therefore, should think
carefully about its concomitant acceptance of the long-repudiated laissez-faire
Constitution.
A good example of such a retreat to Lochner is the Supreme Court's decision
in Hodel v. Irving.652 In Irving, the Court invalidated the Indian Land
Consolidation Act of 1983 (ILCA),653 a law whose purpose was to prevent the
further fragmentation of tribal lands and to consolidate a tribe's control over its
territory. 6 4 Focusing upon the provision of the ILCA requiring that insignificant
individual interests in fragmented land escheat to the tribe upon the death of the
interest holder,655 the Irving Court undertook a balancing of interests and found
656
that the provision constituted a Fifth Amendment Taking.
The "error" in the Irving decision is not in its particular outcome. Rather, its
flaw lies with its failure to recognize that its invalidation of a law passed for the

647. See supra Parts Ill.B and III.C.
648. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
649. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
650. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-378 (1994).
651. See supra Part III.A.
652. 481 U.S. 704 (1987). The Court's most recent decision on this issue, Babbitt v. Youpee, 117 S. Ct. 727
(1997), is not discussed because it reviewed only a slightly modified version of the 1983 law invalidated in
Irving, and relied almost entirely on the arguments of that earlier decision in striking down the amended version
of the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983 (ILCA), tit. 11,96 Stat. 2515, 2517-19 (1983) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2211 (1994)), on similar grounds. See id. at 732 ("In determining whether the
1984 amendments to [section] 207 render the provision constitutional, we are guided by Irving.").
653. ILCA, tit. II, 96 Stat. at 2517-19.
654. See id
655. See id.
656. See Irving, 481 U.S. at 716-18.
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purpose of strengthening tribal sovereign prerogatives has as an implicit

consequence both the rejection of the New Deal transformation and the embrace
of Lochner. Although commentators have commented upon the Lochnerian flavor
of Irving's heightened solicitude for what were, admittedly,"" minor interests

in property," no one has yet recognized the Lochnerian flavor of the Court's
refusal to accord respect to the sovereignty of the tribe. If the Court wishes to

continue to invalidate sovereignty-enhancing governmental actions, or to affirm
sovereignty-eroding initiatives, it should at least acknowledge its retreat into the
still much-vilified

Lochner Era before doing so.

3. End of Plenary Power?
Outside of academic circles," 0 the plenary power doctrine66' is alive and
well in 1997. Contemporary courts continue to invoke this doctrine, relying

largely upon a passage from the Kagama decision of the Lochner Era Court," 2

with little doubt of its continuing vitality. 3
Given that tribal sovereignty is an axiom of contemporary federal Indian law,
is it still possible to maintain the proposition that another entity--Congress-has

657. See id. at 714.
658. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward A Coherent Jurisprudence of
Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 340 (1995); G. Richard Shell, Contractsin the Modem Supreme Court,
81 CAL. L REV. 433, 434 n.3 (1993).
659. The charge of "Lochnerizing" is one of the worst invectives one can hurl at a constitutional opponent
in the post-New Deal world. Compare, for instance, Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,481 (1965), where he was careful to distinguish the justification for his holding from
that of the Lochner majority, ("Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner should be our guide. But we
decline that invitation .... "), with then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting), which accuses the majority of Lochnerizing ("While the Court's opinion quotes from
the dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in Lochner ... the result it reaches is more closely attuned to the majority
opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham in that case."). But see RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 5 (1985) (charge of Lochnerizing is the highest praise).
If we are to believe the contemporary Court's words, Justice Peckham's opinion in Lochner is as dead as
can be in the year 1997. See, e.g., American Dredging Co. v. Miller. 510 U.S. 443. 447 n.] (1994); see also
GUNTHER, supra note 424, at 445 ("Rejection of the Lochner heritage is a common starting point for modem
Justices ... "). But see Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 406 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (accusing the
majority of resurrecting Lochner in Takings Clause jurisprudence).
660. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 1, at 1; Clinton, supra note 202, at 99 (claiming that Lone Wolf was "as
devastating to Indians and their rights as Plessy v. Ferguson was to the cause of civil rights for AfricanAmericans"); Newton, supra note 94, at 195; Singer, supra note 2, at 1.
661. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886).
662. The Kagama Court employed the following justification for upholding congressional action:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the
United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights.
...From their very weakness and helplessness .... there arises the duty of protection, and
with it the power.
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now
weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection .... It must exist in that
government, because it never has existed anywhere else ....
Id at 383-84; see supra note 94.
663. See, e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 404-05 (1994); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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the power to define, restrict, and even extinguish' altogether that prerogative?
The principle of tribal sovereignty is fundamentally inconsistent with the plenary
power doctrine. True sovereignty is hardly conceivable if another entity possesses
the legal authority to eliminate it entirely. Although the contemporary Court has
not realized this, the plenary power doctrine likely perished in the New Deal.
While Congress may possess the exclusive power to handle Indian affairs within
the American constitutional scheme, it does not have the unchecked power to
work its will upon Indian tribes. 665 The foundational principle of tribal
sovereignty, born of the New Deal transformation, is grounded upon the rejection
of Lochner. As long as that principle holds, the plenary power doctrine has no
place in federal Indian law. Only if we return to the world of Lochner can the
notion of unlimited congressional power over tribes have any legitimacy.
V. CONCLUSION
Both judges and academics alike fail to recognize that contemporary federal
Indian law is largely the child of the New Deal transformation of the 1930s.
Although some continue to exalt the courageous opinions of Chief Justice
Marshall as the basis of contemporary doctrine, thus ignoring fifty years of antiMarshall sentiments in the Lochner Era Court and federal policy, others refer to
several seminal decisions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as if
they were still good law, thereby ignoring the rejection of those decisions by the
New Deal transformation in policy, law, and jurisprudence.
A proper conception of federal Indian law in 1997 must acknowledge the New
Deal's repudiation of the laissez-faire Constitution, its embrace of social
welfarism, and its resurrection of the sovereign tribe originally delivered by Chief
Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia, but laid to rest in cases such as Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock. The world of sovereign tribes in which we currently dwell is
only recently born.

664. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) ("The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain...
exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.").
665. Recall Justice Cardozo's Shoshone I opinion:
The power does not extend so far as to enable the Government "to give the tribal lands to
others, or to appropriate them to its own purposes, without rendering, or assuming an
obligation to render, just compensation . . .; for that 'would not be an exercise of
guardianship, but an act of confiscation'.... Spoliation is not management.
299 U.S. 476, 497-98 (1937) (quoting United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1934) (quoting Lane
v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 (1918)) (first omission in Shoshone I). See generally supra Part
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